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ABSTRACT
Informed choice is fundamentally a process of communication, reliant entirely on the
tools of language. However, the meanings and understandings of words change with time,
setting, and context, threatening the basis of consent. We conducted a qualitative content
analysis of Canadian genetics research documents, exploring the impacts of language on
informed consent. Numerous language usages were noted as potential barriers to
informed consent, including language that was vague, variable, and unusually defined.
Unique combinations of words were observed to generate novel concepts without clear
meanings and definitions were absent or unclear. However, the ambiguity of the language
was concealed by words that were simple and familiar. We conclude that a gap in
communication may exist when discussing genetics, health, and disease, in that the same
words, when used by different individuals, can have different meanings, and thus
individuals may not fully understand each other despite using the same words.

Keywords: informed consent, informed consent documents, communication,
communication barriers, language, genetics, research ethics.
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BACKGROUND
Medicine is increasingly being dominated by a genetic framework, which gives rise to
new ways of thinking and talking about the concepts of health, disease, and normalcy
(Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). The meanings and understandings of these new geneticsimpacted concepts are often markedly different from those that are still commonly
employed outside of genetics (Lippman 1991, Bubela and Caulfield 2004, Hodgson,
Hughes et al. 2005, Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). Furthermore, genetic concepts are often
complex, poorly defined, and difficult to comprehend (Cox, Burger et al. 2002). Thus, a
significant gap in the meanings and understandings of language may exist between
people working in genetics and the individuals with whom they interact, including
patients and research participants (Burgess, Laberge et al. 1998). Such a gap would
threaten the informed choice process, both in clinical practice and research.

The purpose of this study was to explore the meanings and understandings of terms used
in the informed choice process of genetic research and recognize any concepts that may
stand as a barrier between researcher and research participant and vice versa. This
research is informed by three general subjects: the social impacts of genetics; informed
consent and the use of consent documents; and the influences of language on
communication.

Genetics
Since the advent of recombinant genetic technologies, allowing us to ‘read’ and
potentially alter our DNA, genetics has taken a central seat in modern medicine (Keller
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2000, Manis 2007). DNA has been described as the “book of life” (Kay 1995), the “Holy
Grail” (Nathanson and Weber 2001), and the “code of codes” (Kevles and Hood 1992).
Billions of dollars were spent on The Human Genome Project (The Human Genome
Project 2008). It has been argued that genetics is the ideology of our time (Rothman
1998) and the gene a cultural icon (Nelkin and Lindee 2004). However, the rapid
emergence of genetics has generated many complex issues (Kevles and Hood 1992,
Richards 1993, Conrad and Gabe 1999, Nelkin and Lindee 2004), and the “media hype”
(Bubela and Caulfield 2004), has caused misunderstandings and confusion.

Some worry that the public’s adoption of genetic thinking is based on a genetic discourse
that is oversimplified and extended beyond its scientific basis (Lippman 1992, Conrad
1999), and that a genetic framework is being applied to an increasing number of social
problems (Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). The media has reported on the discovery of genes
for sexual orientation (Connor 1995, Pinker 2005), alcoholism (Alleyne 2010), obesity
(Devlin 2008), and thrill seeking behaviour (Gower 2000), among many others (Conrad
and Weinberg 1996, Conrad 1997). Lippman argues that this increasing tendency to
reduce all difference to genetics, which she calls “geneticization” (Lippman 1991), results
in a dangerous “genetic fatalism” (Lippman 1992). This genetic fatalism is evident in the
comments made during a series of focus groups conducted by Crosseley (2002), in which
she found that many individuals discounted personal responsibility for health, such as the
benefits of smoking cessation, because, ultimately, is was just a matter of luck; there is no
control in the face of genetic predisposition.
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Although discussions of health, illness, and disability should be informed by the
interaction of a large number of factors, such as social and physical environments,
economics, personal behaviours, and available health services, genetics is increasingly
eclipsing other considerations (World Health Organization 1948, Lippman 1991,
Wilkinson and Marmot 2003, Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). The privileging of genetics
over these other factors and the complex ways in which they interact, focuses medicine
and medical research on genetic “faults” (Wilson 2001), rather than the social factors that
influence health.

The increasing focus on genetics is a major concern of disability scholars, who see
disability as a socially constructed concept (Parens and Asch 1999, Shakespeare 1999,
Wasserman, Bickenbach et al. 2005). Being in a wheelchair is not a disability when a
society builds adequate ramps and automatic doors (Shakespeare 1999). Being deaf is not
a disability in a community where everyone knows sign language (Groce 1985). Parens
and Asch (1999) believe that basing decisions about the worth of individuals on genetic
differences represents “a preoccupation with what is trivial and an ignorance of what is
profound.”

Another common concern is the potential for the rise of a modern eugenics (Duster 1990,
Kerr, Cunningham-Burley et al. 1998, Shakespeare 1999, Nelkin and Lindee 2004).
Although it is generally recognized that eugenics would not be accepted as policy, many
worry about a “backdoor to eugenics” (Duster 1990). Reproductive choices are currently
viewed as private and parental; however, social pressures to homogenize decisions could
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unintentionally result in eugenic practices (Nelkin and Lindee 2004). Furthermore, the
desire to keep reproductive choices private has limited the sense of social responsibility
(Duster 1990, Parens and Asch 1999). Thus, although genetic counseling for sexual
selection was once unheard of, a majority of genetic counselors indicate they would
provide this service (Paul 1992).

Unfortunately, most serious discussions about the social impacts of genetics remain in
academic venues, while media representations of genetics are optimistic and at times
sensational (Petersen 2001, White 2001, Bubela and Caulfield 2004). Media coverage
focuses on successes, while ignoring important setbacks and retractions (Stockdale 1999).
Thus, the average individual approached for consent in genetics research may be aware of
an overwhelming scientific optimism, but not the corresponding social concerns.

Genetics is also fundamentally changing the way we think about concepts such as health
and disease (Lippman 1991, Bayertz 1998, ten Have 2003, Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010).
Until recently, a person was sick when he or she looked and felt sick. Our definitions of
disease were based on physically manifested symptoms. Increasingly, however, disease is
becoming associated with genes. A test is run, a gene is found, and you are diseased.
There are now “presymptomatic patients”, who have genes that ensure one day they will
become ill, but are currently healthy by traditional standards (Bayertz 1998). In most
cases, however, genetics is a framework of probabilities. Thus, a category of “prepatients or potential patients” is created for people who may never become sick (ten Have
2003). These individuals enter the medical system and are labeled as ‘diseased’, with all
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the accompanying implications (Fleischman 1999, Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005). They
have a gene, but may never have symptoms (Bayertz 1998).

Genetics is also creating entirely new categories of disease, in which classical symptoms
never develop (Issa 2002). For example, pharmacogenetics – the field of study that relates
genetics to the efficacy of drug therapies – has the potential to create a new, subclinical
classification of disease, in which individuals with a genetically decreased response to a
drug are seen as ill (Issa 2002). Thus, adoption of the genetic framework necessitates a
reassessment of the traditional boundaries of health and disease.

Consequently, genetics complicates the process of informed consent. The general hype
surrounding genetics alters perceptions of the potential risks and benefits of research. The
genetic framework is complex, non-intuitive, and poorly understood (Bhutta 2004). The
long term genetic risks are incompletely appreciated, and are therefore difficult to
adequately describe. Finally, genetics presents the possibility of unique harms, as genetic
disease is not something that someone has, but rather that someone is (Shakespeare
1999). Genetics may represent a great modern medical achievement, but it is important to
recognize and study the impacts of the genetic framework on medicine, research, society,
and the informed choice process for research participation and increasingly for clinical
diagnosis and treatment.
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Informed choice
The goal of informed choice is to ensure that the decisions made by research participants
are intentional, knowledgeable, and free of coercion (Faden and Beauchamp 1986,
Burgess, Laberge et al. 1998, Baylis 2004, Tri-Council Policy Statement 2009). To
accomplish this, participants must understand the nature of the research, its risks, and its
potential benefits (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Then, they must be allowed to form
their own decisions, free of external influences (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Neither
of these steps is without difficulty, especially in the context of genetics research. The
culmination of the informed choice process is the signing of the informed “consent form”
both for research and clinical activities.

New genetics concepts add another layer of complexity to the already poor understanding
of medical and scientific concepts (Waggoner and Mayo 1995, Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999,
Corrigan 2003, Miller, Begbie et al. 2006). Genetics relies on the difficult to understand
concepts of prediction and probability, and is often concerned with future rather than
present disease (Burgess, Laberge et al. 1998, Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier et al. 2008).
Furthermore, genetics has introduced new classes of illness, and new forms of research
(Issa 2002, Wertz 2003, Knoppers 2005, Secko, Preto et al. 2009).

Adequately describing the risks and benefits of genetic research is problematic
(Hoedemaekers, Gordijn et al. 2006). Despite resounding optimism, benefits are often
theoretical or abstract (Burgess, Laberge et al. 1998, King 1999, Burgess 2001). Risks are
also largely theoretical, but harder to predict, as concerns often focus on social or
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psychological risks (Burgess, Laberge et al. 1998, Burgess 2001, Saraiva, Anionwu et al.
2001, Wertz 2003). Many risks are unique to genetics, such as the risk of discovering
new but undesired information about paternity, social history, or ethnic differences
(Burgess, Laberge et al. 1998, Saraiva, Anionwu et al. 2001, Wertz 2002).

The hereditary nature of genetics complicates the concept of independent, autonomous
decision making (Burgess, Laberge et al. 1998, Annas 2001, Wertz 2002, Knoppers and
Chadwick 2005). Genetic information has familial impacts and decisions will be
influenced by familial dynamics and perceived responsibilities (Burgess, Laberge et al.
1998, Hallowell 1999, Annas 2001, Knoppers and Chadwick 2005). Furthermore, genetic
information can impact entire communities, potentially raising questions about heritage,
developing stigma, or provoking discrimination (Burgess, Laberge et al. 1998, Saraiva,
Anionwu et al. 2001, Wertz 2002). Research involving only a few could classify entire
populations as at risk (Annas 2001).

Though informed choice is a necessary safeguard of free choice and ethical research, it
may not be sufficient (O'Neill 2003, Knoppers and Chadwick 2005, Burgess 2007).
Informed choice may assign responsibility to the individual, but ignore the
responsibilities of institutions and society in moral practice (Hoeyer and Lynoe 2006).
Informed choice alone may not be adequate to address the familial and community
impacts of genetics, and genetic research frequently raises new issues such as the long
term storage of specimens, multiple or unknown goals of research, and recruitment within
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families, that are not adequately addressed by informed consent alone (Wertz 2003, Hull,
Glanz et al. 2004, Knoppers 2005, Burgess 2007).

Informed consent documents
Consent documents are fundamental to informed consent, not just as lasting evidence of
the process, but also as sources of important information for participants (Kent 1996).
The information provided during the oral part of informed choice may be similar to that
in documents (Sankar 2004) but can be quite variable (Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999). Thus,
the consent form acts as a consistent source to ensure adequate information is provided to
all research participants. The consent form is also a lasting source of information, which
is likely to be re-read (Ghulam 2006). As such, the language and structure of consent
forms are important to ensure clarity and understanding.

Quality of consent forms
Some studies have reviewed consent documents with the goal of assessing the
information contained and determining what important information is missing (White,
Jones et al. 1996, Nolan 1999). Nolan performed a content analysis of consent documents
from pharmacological research. She illustrated a lack of information provided to women
about potential harms to a fetus and the procedures employed to ensure women’s safety
(Nolan 1999). No similar studies were found for genetic research documents.

Other studies have focused on the complexity of language and the readability of consent
documents, with the idea that complex and technical language stands as a barrier to
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understanding and therefore to informed consent. Considerations of average reading
abilities have led to various recommendations that consent documents be written to a
maximal grade level (Hochhauser 1997, Baevsky 2008, Jefford and Moore 2008). In a
study of 12 consent forms from pharmaceutical studies, Hochhauser (2000) concluded
that consent forms were difficult to read, with an average grade level greater than 13, too
many uncommon, lengthy words, and a complex sentence structure. Hochhauser also
argued that various formatting issues, such as decreasing the number of words per line
and the number of lines per page, would increase the readability and accessibility of the
consent forms.

Pothier (2005) reviewed the consent forms submitted to his institutional review board,
and found that the average Flesch readability levels equated to the “difficult college
level”. Others have indicated that readability scores remain low even after institutional
review board alterations (Murgatroyd and Cooper 1991, Hammerschmidt and Keane
1992). The conclusion that consent forms are too complex and difficult to read has been
supported by numerous other studies (Tarnoawski, Allen et al. 1990, Lynoe, Sandlund et
al. 1991, Hopper, TenHave et al. 1995, Goldstein, Frasier et al. 1996).

The issue of consent forms being complex and difficult to read has been present in the
literature since at least the 1980s (Grunder 1980, Baker and Taub 1983, LoVerde,
Prochazka et al. 1989). Despite convincing research in the area, readability has not
improved. Over the same period, there is evidence that the length of consent forms has
increased dramatically, with some now averaging over 12 pages (LoVerde, Prochazka et
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al. 1989, Beardsley, Jefford et al. 2007). Within genetics, these issues are likely to be
compounded, as novel concepts, new categories of risk, and complex study designs are
tentatively explained.

However, the use of statistical readability formulas as an approach to rating consent
documents has drawbacks. There is little evidence that these statistical values translate
into better understanding (Hochhauser 1997). They emphasize short sentences and short
words, but these do not necessarily make documents easier to read. Furthermore,
statistical grade levels are not objective. Consent forms primarily contain biomedical
language, so there is little correlation between 14 years of schooling in the arts and
understanding of a medical consent form with a grade level of 14. For these reasons,
Hochhauser (1997) has argued that the best assessment of consent forms results from
asking readers about their understanding.

Comprehension of consent forms
When potential research participants have been studied regarding the content of informed
consent forms, specific words and phrases have been focused upon and generally poor
comprehension has been noted of the concepts of randomization (Waggoner and Mayo
1995, Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999, Kodish, Eder et al. 2004, Jefford and Moore 2008),
placebo (Waggoner and Mayo 1995, Corrigan 2003), and equipoise (Gallo, Perrone et al.
1995). Stead (2005) conducted a series of focus groups in which patients were presented
with different consent forms. She found that common scientific terms, such as
“randomization”, “blinding”, and “placebo” were poorly understood and alarming to
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participants. One frustrated participant exclaimed, “‘A randomized, doubled-blind study
to compare durability…’ Hello, hello – it’s English I speak!” (Stead, Eadie et al. 2005)
Furthermore, participants were very concerned that doctors would participate in such
studies. Blinding and randomization were seen as disturbing, in that doctors were
willfully ignorant of and uninvolved in treatment decisions (Stead, Eadie et al. 2005).

Bjorn’s, noted that even with an improved consent form and a clear explanation, only
42% of participants understood the concept of randomization. They conclude that the
concept of randomization is so different from the standard doctor-patient relationship that
comprehension is impeded (Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999). Similarly, other alien concepts,
such as the probabilistic and predictive model of health and disease in genetics, may
preclude understanding and therefore properly informed consent (Burgess 2007).

Genetics related concepts such as inheritance, susceptibility, and relative risk are largely
unknown to the public (Erby, Roter et al. 2008). Although these words and concepts are
familiar to and easily understood by scientists, they can be misunderstood and troubling
to the research participants.

Some studies have demonstrated increased comprehension with changes to consent
forms. In a randomized control trial comparing two versions of a consent form, Bjorn and
colleagues showed that linguistic modifications improved both self-assessed ratings of
readability and general comprehension of the research participants (Bjorn, Rossel et al.
1999). However, Davis found that rewriting consent forms from a grade 16 to a grade 7
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level did not improve comprehension, despite making the forms easier to read and more
appealing (Davis, Holcombe et al. 1998). Similar results have been reproduced elsewhere
(Coyne, Xu et al. 2003, Flory and Emanueal 2004). Thus, quantitative measures of
language are likely inadequate in assessing the complex communication entailed in the
informed choice process.

Consent forms and the therapeutic misconception
One issue of informed consent that has received a lot of attention is what Appelbaum has
called the “therapeutic misconception” (Appelbaum, Roth et al. 1987). Research is
conducted precisely because the results are unknown. When beginning a study and
enrolling participants there is little or no evidence that the studied intervention will be
effective, and there is always the chance that it will cause harm. For this reason, Levine
calls the term “therapeutic research” self-contradictory and illogical (Levine 1988).

Nevertheless, research participants consistently list therapeutic benefit among their
reasons for participating in research. In interviews of 1,882 patients in oncology and
cardiology clinics from five centers across the United States, Sugarman found that 67%
of patients who had previously participated in research had done so in order to receive
better medical care. Fifteen percent of all responders indicated that therapeutic benefit
was their sole reason for participating (Sugarman, Kass et al. 1998). Appelbaum (2002)
suggests that as many as 70% of research participants are subject to this therapeutic
misconception.
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The language of consent forms has been studied as a potential source of therapeutic
misconception. Research participants are often inappropriately referred to as “patients”
and investigators as “doctors”. Rather than referring to a “treatment under study”, consent
documents commonly refer to “treatment” (Churchill, Collins et al. 1998, King 1999,
King, Henderson et al. 2005). Within genetic research, the problem of referring to early
gene transfer studies as “gene therapy” is another example of the same problem (King
1999).

Kimmelman and Levenstadt (2005) conducted a quantitative content analysis of consent
documents in phase 1 human gene transfer trials. They found that the majority of forms
used the term “gene therapy”. They also found that 10% of the consent forms contained
statements that implied that the goal of the research was therapeutic. They further noted
that the format of a document may contribute to a therapeutic misconception. For
example, they indicated that displaying possible outcomes of a study in list format gives
the impression that all outcomes are equally possible, even though that is rarely the case.

It is important to note that this type of quantitative analysis of documents has
shortcomings. It can provide valuable information about how often certain words and
phrases are being used, but it is unable to identify potentially troubling words in the first
place. This, of course, raises the question: how are difficult words initially identified?
Some have used experience and gestalt (Waggoner and Mayo 1995). Others choose
words that arise from medical or scientific vocabularies (Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999).
Asking research participants can be a productive mechanism (Stead, Eadie et al. 2005),
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but it assumes that participants recognize all problematic words. However, familiar words
may also represent points of miscommunication, if understood differently by researchers
and potential research participants. Only qualitative analysis will be capable of
discovering such gaps in language.

Language
Informed choice is fundamentally about communication. Language is used to promote
understanding and request consent. Language must therefore be clear and descriptive, as
any miscommunication will weaken the foundation of informed consent.

The understanding of language in my research is influenced by the work of Wittgenstein.
Although earlier philosophers were concerned with finding normative rules of language,
Wittgenstein recognized that the meaning of a word is in its use; a naturalistic
investigation is necessary for definition. (Wittgenstein 1968) Thus, in order to explore
meanings in genetic language, it is not enough to simply open a dictionary – an account
of use must be developed.

Wittgenstein based his analysis of meaning in communities, defined as groups with
meaningful interaction and thus a shared use of language. Each group plays a “language
game” in which language becomes defined by the goals of the community. (Wittgenstein
1968) In genetics, there are many distinct communities, with varying goals, and therefore
language will adopt different meanings depending on the ‘winning’ use of each language
game.
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Language is neither static nor concrete. The meanings of words change with time – for
example, “cool”, “mouse”, or “spam”. New meanings are not adopted instantly and rarely
eradicate previous usages (Speed 2006). Furthermore, changing language is not
unidirectional. Different groups will use words differently, with the result, or perhaps the
purpose, of not being fully understood by other groups (Holmes 2001).

Of course, general society is an important community of language users. Hence, for many
concepts the language game is played communally, which allows general
communication. However, this general capacity to communicate should not mask the fact
that in many settings miscommunication is possible. The same word may be understood
differently by any two people. From the standpoint of informed consent, the changing and
inconsistent meanings of words could have a profound effect.

Jargon
Some language difficulties result not from differing uses, but simply from unknown
words. Medical communication is made challenging by an abundance of uncommon or
highly technical words that are difficult to understand from outside the field. These words
are commonly referred to as “jargon”. Of course, not all jargon is avoidable. When
communicating highly technical concepts, technical words may be necessary. It is
generally recognized, however, that whenever jargon is used an explanation or definition
should follow (Makoul 2001).
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In an analysis of the language used by resident pediatricians when describing the
outcomes of newborn screening, it was noted that an average of 20 unique jargon words
were used per 10 minute interview. Many of these words were used more than once,
resulting in a total of 72 jargon words per interview. Most residents attempted to explain
some of the jargon used, but overall 83% of the words were left unexplained (Farrell,
Deuster et al. 2008).

Identifying jargon words among all words that are commonly used in health professions
can be a major challenge for the health professional. For example, among the list of
jargon words in Farrell’s study was the word “gene”. As this word is encountered
frequently in medical teaching, and increasingly in the media, it is difficult to recognize it
as a technical concept. Farrell recognizes three classes of jargon: the highly specialized,
the uncommon, and the common but confusing. He uses the example of “carrier” as a
word that is commonly used, but can adopt an unfamiliar and complicated meaning
within genetics (Farrell, Deuster et al. 2008). Given the probabilistic and predictive
nature of genetics, it is possible that words such as “health”, “disease”, and “normal”
have developed similarly unfamiliar and complex meanings.

The use of jargon makes medical language less comprehensible. This weakens informed
consent and can potentially harm patients through mistaken expectations or increased
anxiety. However, it is not just jargon that affects comprehension of medical language.
Individuals who apparently speak the same language at the same level can use words
differently.
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Vague language
Vague language is a potential source of confusion in informed consent documents (Liss,
Aspevali et al. 2004). Probability words, such as “frequent” and “rare”, are interpreted
inconsistently by research participants and therefore should probably be replaced by
precise numbers (Sutherland, Lockwood et al. 1991, Beardsley, Jefford et al. 2007).
Similarly, the designations “mild”, “moderate”, and “severe” are recognized as
ambiguous and definitions are recommended (Beardsley, Jefford et al. 2007, Burgess
2007).

The use and meaning of the word “serious” has also been questioned. The words
“serious” and “grave” were noted frequently in legislation governing access to genetic
services and abortion. Consequently, Wertz (2002) conducted a survey of all members of
the American Board of Medical Genetics and the American Board of Genetic Counseling,
and showed a lack of agreement about how “serious” should be interpreted. Genetic
conditions, such as Trisomy 21, were classified by some as “lethal”, while others
considered them “not serious” (Wertz and Knoppers 2002).

Within genetics, the word “mutation” is another example of vague and potentially
confusing terminology. Common usage has a negative tone. Personal communication
with various leading geneticists has revealed a belief that “mutation” should be reserved
for situations where there is a known disease or negative consequence of genetic changes.
The neutral “polymorphism” is offered as a descriptor for other forms of genetic
variation. However formal definitions have commonly indicated that a mutation is any

18
permanent change to an organism’s DNA, whether harmful, neutral, or beneficial
(Condit, Archer et al. 2002, Passarge 2007). Thus, usage is not constrained by definition,
allowing for confusion in communication both among researchers and with research
participants.

The impact of words
Word selection is not trivial. Cognitive scientists have demonstrated that the mind is
guided and constrained by the format of a symbol (Zhang and Norman 1995, Zhang
1997). Sociologists argue that behaviour towards an entity is guided by definitions or
understandings of that entity (Hall 2006). Research on the medical impacts of language is
somewhat limited. However, there is good evidence that the words we use affect patients
and professionals alike.

Language use has been shown to impact both perception and memory development
(Loftus and Palmer 1974, Zhang 1997, Zhang 2002, Heritage, Robison et al. 2007).
Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed a video of a car crash and then asked the question:
“about how fast were the cars going when they [smashed, collided, bumped, contacted, or
hit] into each other?” The use of the word “smashed” elicited higher estimates of speed
than any of the other words and also made participants more likely to falsely remember
broken glass in the video.

When asking patients in a general medical practice about unmet concerns, a marked
difference in response can be demonstrated by changing a single word. Patients were
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much more likely to respond positively to the question “is there something else you
would like to address in the visit today?” than they were to “is there anything else you
would like to address in the visit today?”. The change of a single, seemingly
inconsequential word drastically changed the physicians’ effectiveness (Heritage,
Robison et al. 2007).

The potential impacts of language on clinical practice have been recognized (Sweeney,
MacAuley et al. 1998, Guyatt, Montori et al. 2004, Stableford and Mettger 2007). Some
authors argue for the use of specific terminology because of perceived benefit, or to avoid
harms (Sweeney, MacAuley et al. 1998, Guyatt, Montori et al. 2004). These authors
recognize the importance of terminology in keeping physicians focused on outcomes that
truly matter to patients. Furthermore, many major scientific and medical associations,
including the World Health Organization, the American Medical Association, and the
Canadian Public Health Association, have recognized problems with health literacy and
therefore emphasized the importance of plain language (Stableford and Mettger 2007).

Individual words have also been shown to be important factors in decisions to participate
in research (Slevin, Mossman et al. 1995, Sugarman, Kass et al. 1998, King 1999). In a
study of oncology patients’ views on research, 72% of respondents indicated that trials of
a “new treatment” would be very appealing. However, when the term “experimental
treatment” was substituted, only 27% responded positively (Slevin, Mossman et al.
1995). Similarly, Sugarman (1998) demonstrated that perceptions of research changed
depending on how one labeled the study. For example, “medical experiments” were seen

20
as riskier than “medical research”, but both were riskier than “medical studies” and
“clinical investigations”. “Medical research” was seen as providing the greatest chance
of benefit. Sugarman concludes that a researcher’s choice of language is an important
determinant of participants’ perceptions of risks and benefits, and therefore must be
considered for informed consent. Language also plays an important role in potential
research participants distinguishing between therapy and unknown research (King 1999).
Substituting “patient” for “participant”, “treatment” for “intervention under study”, and
“physician” for “researcher” all problematically confuse the boundary between research
and standard clinical practice (King 1999).

Language and harm
In addition to the capability of language to shape perceptions and affect decisions, it is
also important to recognize that inappropriate language can cause harm. (Nisker and Daar
2006) Although we all know that words cannot “break our bones”, it is not true that
“words will never hurt us” (Rothstein 1991). For example, words can isolate and
dehumanize. As language forms a foundation of social acceptability, inappropriate words
can cause social harms (Rothstein 1991). As “do no harm” (Wagley 1987) is the primary
ethical foundation of health professionals, the use of potentially harmful language must
be looked for and avoided.

Words can provoke unnecessary anxiety, both affecting patients’ decisions and causing
them undue harm (Chapple, Campion et al. 1997, Shakespeare 1999, de Crespigny 2003,
Bedell, Graboys et al. 2004, Byron, Cockshott et al. 2005, Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005).
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For example, while the diagnosis “congestive heart failure” represents a treatable entity to
a clinician, patients often only hear failure, with the suggestion of something more
imminently fatal (Bedell, Graboys et al. 2004). Similarly, in interviews of patients after
genetic counseling sessions, Chapple (1997) found that many commonly used genetic
words, such as “syndrome”, are unfamiliar and distressing to patients.

The language used in prenatal screening has also received attention for its ability to shape
decisions and potentially cause harm (Beaulieu and Lippman 1995, Benkendorf, Prince et
al. 2001, de Crespigny 2003). The use of the words “baby” and “mother” in place of
“fetus” and “pregnant woman” imply that it is expected that the woman will give birth
and become a mother (de Crespigny 2003). This assumption, in the setting of prenatal
testing, can be both harmful and unsuitably directive (de Crespigny 2003).

The disability literature provides further example of the potential harms of language, as
well as the possibility of change. There is a long history of changing terms used to
describe individuals with disabilities, with the most recent transitions being from
“handicapped”, to “disabled”, to “person with a disability” (Devlieger 1999, Jette 2005).
Using a language of “activities” and “participation” has also been suggested (Jette 2006).
The emphasis of the new language is that the person comes first; that disability is only
part of one’s identity (Devlieger 1999). It attempts to avoid the use of labels that privilege
the trivial and devalue the individual.
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In other areas of genetics, other value laden words, such as “severe”, “suffering”, and
“abnormality” are commonly used (Shakespeare 1999). Byron argues that phrases such as
“burden of illness” and “culprit chromosome” reinforce negative stereotypes of disability
(Byron, Cockshott et al. 2005).

Hodgson (2005) conducted a survey on the use of potentially harmful language at a
genetic advocacy conference in Australia. Several commonly used words, such as
“mutant”, “normal”, and “disease”, as well as the practice of labeling people, were
categorized as offensive (Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005). While the respondents, being
people with genetic conditions and their advocates, may be more sensitive to problems
with genetic language than the general population, the same population is likely to be
represented in genetic research.

The word “mutation”, although common and relatively benign in scientific dialogue, is
particularly frightening in ordinary speech. In Hodgson’s study (2005), one respondent
noted that, “mutant is tainted from space alien movies…” Roget’s thesaurus associates
“mutation” with “freak” and “monster” ( Roget's 21st Century Thesaurus 2008). It is a
frightening and confusing term when applied to patients or research participants. In an
analysis of genetic media coverage and a series of focus groups, Condit found that the
word mutation was often presented with a negative connotation and elicited strong
emotional reactions, which were not associated with the alternatives “change”,
“alteration”, or “variation” (Condit, Archer et al. 2002, Condit, Dubriwny et al. 2004).
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Purpose
Informed choice is fundamentally a process of communication, reliant almost entirely on
the tools of language. However, language can be incomprehensible, variable, or vague,
making choice less informed. Language can alter perceptions and shape actions,
complicating the concept of free choice. Inappropriate language can cause harm. The
purpose of this study was to explore the meanings and understandings of terms used in
the informed choice process of genetics research and to recognize any concepts that may
stand as a barrier between researcher and research participant, and vice versa.

The exploratory, inductive nature of the proposed research meant that we planned to
analyze themes that developed from the data, rather than constraining our focus to
predefined categories of inquiry. Therefore, our research questions were necessarily
broad. The key questions we hoped to address included: What language is used to
describe genetics research on genetics informed consent documents, and what are the
possible implications of this language with regards to communication and informed
consent? How are key genetics-related concepts, such as ‘health’, ‘disease’, and
‘normalcy’, portrayed through the language of genetics research documents? And could
the language used in these documents impede informed consent or cause harm?
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METHODS AND METHODOLOGY
General design
The goal of this research was to explore the meanings and understandings of geneticsrelated words in genetic research documents. In general, I aimed to be highly inclusive of
any language related theme that emerged from the documents. Specifically, I was
concerned with language in its communication role in the informed consent process, with
a focus on its potential to result in miscommunication or harm. The general question I
hoped to address was: could the language used in genetic informed consent documents
have a negative impact on the informed choice process? In order to address this question,
I selected a qualitative approach for several reasons. First, I hoped to recognize language
uses not previously recognized, which requires an inductive approach and obviously
would not allow for predetermined categories of study. Second, I felt that an emphasis on
absolute numbers was inappropriate. While it may be useful to determine what
percentage of consent documents make use of problematic language, such studies cannot
be entertained until a better understanding exists of what language might be classified as
problematic. Furthermore, certain phrases, even if infrequently used, could represent
significant sources miscommunication or harm. Finally, the understanding of consent
form language that I desired required an in depth reading and interaction with the
material that would not be possible with the larger number of documents required for a
representative quantitative study (Lincoln and Guba 1985).
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Informed consent is a process of communication that includes, but is not limited to the
informed consent documents. In the current study, however, I chose to limit my attention
to the informed consent documents. It has been noted that what is said during an
informed consent interview resembles what is present in the consent documents
(Henderson, Davis et al. 2004). In fact, Sankar (2004) noted that many essential elements
of informed consent that are often missed in the interview are invariably present in the
consent documents. Additionally, oral information is quite variable from one participant
to another (Williams and Zwitter 1994, Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999). The consistency of
consent documents facilitates their analysis and provides an important safety net in the
consent process itself.

As a lasting documentation of the consent process, informed consent documents are
important in their availability for review. Obviously, this is important for research, as it
allows one to study informed consent without being limited to ongoing or future
interactions. Furthermore, the ability of consent documents to be reread by patients and
study participants increases the importance of the information and language they contain
(Ghulam 2006).

An assumption might also be made about the language present within consent documents.
Unlike clinical interactions, consent documents are reviewed many times, both by their
authors and by research ethics boards, before they are seen by patients. This may result in
more carefully selected language than is possible in verbal communication. Problems that
are apparent in such a formal context may be seen as more problematic than those
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observed in clinical conversations. However, it must also be recognized that the
production of consent documents represents an artificial scenario, heavily influenced by
legal concerns, which may create unnatural or confusing language that one would not
encounter in oral communication.

Finally, documents provide important access to the context of the consent process, as
original grant applications, research documents, and publications can all be included to
provide a richer understanding of the research and consent process.

Data collection
The focus was the identification of funded genetic studies involving human populations
and the collection of all documents used within each study: grant proposals, surveys,
information letters, consent forms, as well as the ensuing publications. Studies were
selected to provide maximal depth of information pertaining to the language of health,
disease, and normalcy in genetic research, especially considering the importance of
language to the process of informed consent. Studies of interest were those working with
adult onset conditions in human populations. Studies looking at congenital and early
onset genetic conditions were excluded from the present analysis due to the additional
complexities of communication and consent in pediatric populations. For the same
reason, studies were excluded where the patients could have a lack of capacity, such as
studies of psychiatric conditions, and substitute decisions makers may be involved.
Studies examining populations in the developing world were also excluded due to
concerns that the context of consent and understanding of genetic health and disease
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would be too far removed from our own. Finally, I excluded studies that did not involve
human contacts, such as those using existent registries or data mining techniques.
After identification of appropriate grants, lead authors were invited to participate by the
principal investigator of the Genome Canada grant that funded this research: Dr. Robert
Hegele. The involvement of Dr. Hegele, a prominent and well respected Canadian
genetics researcher, as our key informant and primary contact during recruitment was felt
to be essential to achieve buy in from genetics researchers for an ethics project using
unfamiliar qualitative methodology and designed to analyze potentially sensitive topics.

The analysis began with a single large genetics grant that encompassed multiple projects
which fit our inclusion criteria. The grant was chosen partially on the basis of
convenience, as the primary investigator was known and eager to participate in the
research. However, the research itself also played an important role in the decision. The
grant included a diversity of genetic research. Both common and rare conditions were
represented. Simple Mendelian inheritance was studied along with complex genetic
interactions and newly discovered forms of genetic variation. I felt that the inclusion of
such a variety of types of research was important, considering the general exploratory
nature of this project. As the research progressed, further genetic grants were included to
expand certain themes, until a theoretical saturation was attained. (Admittedly, this was a
difficult point to define, as the emergence of new themes always led to new questions.
Also, defining the study as exploratory, there were always further grants that could have
been explored. Therefore, what truly defined the endpoint for data collection was the
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concept of diminishing returns, combined with practical considerations of the desired
scope of a master’s thesis.)

Only operating grants were considered. While it would be interesting to explore the use
of language in all grants, in this preliminary study we felt it was important to limit
ourselves to those studies that involved larger populations and would likely be viewed as
leaders in their fields. Due to the rapid development of genetic knowledge, technology,
and the associated language, only the most recent studies were sought. Recipients of
grants awarded in 2007 (the year that data collection began) were approached first and
older studies were subsequently requested until data saturation was achieved. CIHR and
Genome Canada were relied upon as sources of grants to limit the variability in scope and
regulation that exists in the extensive field of genetics. From these funded grants, I
collected the grant proposals, surveys, information letters, consent forms, and any
ensuing publications. After being offered a copy of a REB application by one participant,
such documents were subsequently added to our list of requests. All documents received
were placed in an electronic database that was subsequently loaded into the qualitative
data analysis software NVivo 7™.

All documents were generously contributed by highly respected genetics scientists. By
using such a select group of researchers, we were assured that the best interests of
patients as research participants were always the primary goal of these documents.
Therefore, we knew prior to starting our analysis that any complicated language that
might be identified would be unintentional. We anticipated that such language may exist,
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simply because research such as this had not previously occurred. That these researchers
were interested in participating in the project indicated their commitment to their research
participants in general and particularly informed choice, as well as their willingness to
subject their own documents to critique to prevent potential harm to their research
participants.

In total, 33 scientists were sent an invitation to participate through our principal contact,
and 16 responded, providing their current research documents. Two individuals were
unable to provide electronic copies of their documents and another indicated that the
original consent forms were no longer available, and so these grants were not included.
Individual grants were purposefully selected from the remaining 13 grants based on a
review of their content, and analyzed one at a time until analytical saturation was
reached. The end result was a group of seven grants purposefully selected for their depth
of information, presumed importance within genetics research, and relevance to the larger
issues of communication and consent (Miller and Alvarado 2005). It should be noted,
however, that aside from the exclusions mentioned above, grants were not selected or
excluded based on the focus of their work. Thus, the choice of what diseases, conditions,
or traits were important enough to be studied was left in the hands of the geneticists doing
the research.

Choice of Methodology
I conducted a qualitative content analysis to explore the uses of genetic language
surrounding the concepts of health, disease, and normalcy, as expressed within the
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collected research documents (Hsieh 2005, Mayring 2002, Miller and Alvarado 2001,
Morgan 1993) A theoretical distinction has previously been made between content
analysis and context analysis. The former approaches documents as independent sources
of knowledge and attempts to determine what information they contain. The later
approaches documents as part of a social structure and uses them to answer questions
such as how and why they were developed (Miller and Alvarado 2005). Practically,
though, this distinction is difficult to maintain. A document’s context cannot be fully
determined without knowledge of its content and knowledge of its content is valuable
only insofar as it relates to its context. My primary task was the identification of the
various usages and understandings of the language of health, disease, and normalcy
expressed within the documents – the content. However, this was simultaneously
accompanied by an analysis that considered how and why such usages are employed and
what impacts they may have – the context. Thus, the following represents the intertwined
processes of content and context analysis, with the overarching goal of an understanding
of the genetics language used in the studied genetics research documents.

Content analysis can further be subdivided into that which focuses on manifest or
apparent data and that which uses latent or inferred data (Graneheim and Lundman 2004).
Again, this analysis required the use of both. I hoped to describe how words were being
used, in what combinations, and in what context. Additionally, I strove to examine how
terms were understood or defined. Aside from the rare case of a dictionary or glossary,
the meaning of words is wrapped up in their context and accessible only through an
analysis of latent data (Wittgenstein 1968, Holmes 2001, Condit, Archer et al. 2002). In
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fact, documents can provide important clues about how words are operationally defined
without ever using them. (It would be possible to write a treatise on the meaning of health
without ever using the word “health”.) Thus, the research goals necessitated the use of
both latent and manifest content analysis.

The qualitative analysis of documents differs from analysis of other sources in one
important manner: the data to be analyzed is generated prior to its being collected (Miller
and Alvarado 2005). While the researcher collecting data from interviews, focus groups,
or observations controls the production of data and knows the reasons for its creation, the
researcher who studies documents must strive to account for the unknown motives that
drove the creation of the documents. This can, and should, be accomplished both at the
level of document selection and within the analysis.

As described above, documents were selected to ensure they were rich sources of
information and products of an understood context. Grants submitted to funding agencies
such as the CIHR and Genome Canada, as well as the documents within, are created
primarily to facilitate the research process, gain funds, and ensure ethical research
practices. Thus, through the selection criteria, I was able to avoid documents created for
unknown or potentially dishonest reasons. The context of document creation was further
considered as part of the analysis. Individual documents were coded according to type,
allowing important differences in motive - as occur, for example, between consent forms,
grant applications, and surveys - to later be readdressed in the process of theory testing
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and model development. Additionally, theoretical memos were written to address the
potential motives behind each individual document type.

Analysis
The approach to analysis and coding that was employed derived from the work of Strauss
and Corbin (1998) and that of Lincoln and Guba (1985). Three analysts coded the
documents using inductively developed categories to emerge and determine themes of
language use. First, all documents within a case (a single research project) were read in
their entirety to help the researchers immerse themselves in the data and gain a sense of
the whole. Subsequently, documents were read line by line as part of the process of open
coding. Descriptive codes were applied to the smallest unit of text containing the overall
idea, with an emphasis on deriving the code’s working title from the text (Strauss and
Corbin 1998, Hsieh and Shannon 2005). As data emerged and similarities became
apparent, the process of axial coding was integrated to further describe developing
categories. Codes evolved using the constant comparative method, in which data to be
coded was compared with all data previously coded in the same category, allowing for
the modification of code descriptions and reclassification of older data as necessary
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). The coding process was reliant on and supplemented by the
frequent use of analytic memos. Memos are important to record first impressions,
develop categories and theory, and function as an audit trail (Lincoln and Guba 1985,
Catanzaro 1988).
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Data that did not initially seem to fit into an existent code, nor warrant the creation of a
new code, was temporarily placed in a miscellaneous category to be readdressed as
coding progressed, ensuring that data was not lost (Lincoln and Guba 1985). However,
the use of the miscellaneous category was intentionally limited. The existence of
ambiguous data can be thought to indicate difficulties in the developing coding structure
and conflicts in analysts’ thoughts. Thus, the discovery of ambiguous data was followed
by a break from coding to allow for the writing of memos, both about why this particular
data was difficult to code, as well as about the how existing coding structure excluded the
difficult case (Lincoln and Guba 1985).

The use of three analysts was intended to reveal more about the data through multiple
viewpoints and act as a form of triangulation as differences between coding structures
were collaboratively reviewed. The independent coding structures were reviewed
primarily at the levels of open and axial coding. The differences and similarities in coding
structures, including specific data coded, grouping of codes, and naming of codes, were
compared. Similar categories were combined, using differences to refine category
descriptions. Analytical memos were written collaboratively to explain the reasons for the
differences in coding structures, to assess for bias, and to ensure that each analyst’s codes
were adequately grounded in the data. Divergent observations were noted, discussed at
length, examined through analytical memos, and ultimately included in the coding
structure if they were felt to be adequately grounded in the data. The principal
investigator (Justin Morgenstern) was responsible for integrating and refining the
multiple coding structures and completing the process of selective coding.
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Although documents were labeled according to type to allow for future questioning of
like documents, throughout the initial stages of analysis a case based approach was
adhered to. Thus, all documents from a single project were examined together as part of a
larger whole. This approach was necessary in order to understand the documents, fully
grasp their context, and approach the analysis of meaning in an intelligible manner.
Documents are fundamentally intertextual, with contained information relying on and
developing from other documents (Miller and Alvarado 2005). This is especially true of
documents created as part of the same project. For example, a consent form is
meaningless without the attached information letter, and both are difficult for a researcher
to interpret without a grant describing the proposed research. Furthermore, the depth of
understanding essential to qualitative research is based in large part on the development
of a rich context (Catanzaro 1988). Significant perspective would have been lost had
documents been approached individually. Finally, aside from the rare document that
contains a glossary, definitions are never explicit. The meaning of words is derived
through their use and context (Wittgenstein 1968, Holmes 2001, Condit, Archer et al.
2002). Thus the inductive process of reconstructing understandings of words is greatly
aided by increasing the number of examples and spreading the breadth of context. That
being said, it was noted that each ‘case’ likely had multiple authors, including numerous
scientists as well as individuals who specialize in the writing of documents such as
consent forms. Thus, the potential for multiple intended meanings was anticipated and
incorporated into the analysis.
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Throughout the process of data analysis, several techniques were employed to help ensure
that constructions were adequately grounded in data, credible, and fully developed.
Analysts immersed themselves in the data, providing scope through prolonged
engagement and depth through persistent observation (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Depth of
understanding was further enhanced through purposeful sampling and the development of
a rich context through the case based approach to analysis. The use of three independent
analysts provided a variety of perspectives and allowed for the triangulation of theory and
the generation of multiple convergent constructions (Lincoln and Guba 1985, Catanzaro
1988). Reflective memos were written whenever new ideas were developed and
whenever data was encountered that did not fit within existent coding structures, to
ensure all themes were fully developed and grounded in the data (Strauss and Corbin
1998, Lincoln and Guba 1985). Peer debriefing, both among analysts, and with an
independent disinterested peer (an individual not involved in the coding process), was
important in testing hypotheses, unearthing and exploring bias, and “keeping the inquirer
honest” (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Finally, using the built in functions of NVivo 7, an
audit trail was created to allow the process of analysis and resultant constructions to be
reviewed (Catanzaro 1988).1

1

As is explored in Theme 1 “The difficulty with presenting qualitative data ethically and anonymously”,
the invitation to participate in this study included a promise of anonymity for the research participants. This
limits the practical value of an audit trail, as my raw data is not anonymous. Therefore, it is unclear who
should be allowed access to this data, and in what context.
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THEMES AND SUBTHEMES
Five major themes emerged during the coding process and are outlined below. Theme I
explores the tension between the ethical requirement that research participants remain
anonymous and the rich context required to adequately present qualitative research
results. Theme II explores the difficulty encountered in coding and understanding the
language used to describe genetic phenomena. Theme III considers the absence of
explicit definitions in informed consent documents. Theme IV discusses a unique
representation of “family” in the studied genetic research documents. Theme V describes
and explores the impacts of a linguistic tool which I have named “conceptual meshing”.

I.

II.

III.
IV.
V.

The difficulty with presenting qualitative data ethically and anonymously
a. Identifying data is difficult to identify
b. It is unclear how best to anonymize data
c. The consequences of altering presented data
Complex, vague, and variable language
a. The language of causation
i. Direct causation language
ii. Susceptibility language
iii. Variable language use
iv. Vague causation language
v. The role of external references
b. Descriptions of the causative agent
c. The interchangeability of condition labels
d. The phenotype
i. Condition labels are empty
ii. Normalization of the phenotype
iii. New classes of illness
The lack of explicit definitions
The genetic family
Conceptual meshing
a. The “disease individual”
b. Other meshed individuals
c. “The X gene” and other meshed concepts

37

Identifying data is difficult
to identify

Theme I: The difficulty with
presenting qualitative data
ethically

Unclear how to best
anonymize data
Direct causation Language
Consequences of altering
presented data
Susceptibility language

Variable language use
Language of causation

Descriptions of the causative
agent

Vague causation language

Theme II: Complex, vague,
and variable language
The interchangeability of
condition labels

The phenotype
Theme III: The lack of
explicit definitions

Empty condition labels

Normalization of the
phenotype

New classes of illness
Theme IV: The genetic
family
The “disease individual”

Theme V: Conceptual
Meshing

Other meshed individuals

“The X gene” and other
meshed concepts

Figure 1. Major themes and subthemes
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THEME I. THE DIFFICULTY WITH PRESENTING QUALITATIVE DATA
ETHICALLY AND ANONYMOUSLY

In the process of preparing my results for presentation, I became aware of a tension
between the necessity to keep data anonymous and the importance of direct quotations
and rich context in qualitative research. To ensure the anonymity of research participants,
it was necessary to replace details in some quotations with generic placeholders. For
example, I used “[condition]” to replace any named condition and “[location]” to mask
the name of a place. Initially, this process seemed to work. It made the data anonymous
while, I believed, preserving the essence of what was being said. However, as the process
of writing continued, many problems became evident: it was often difficult to determine
what details required elimination; it was unclear how quotations should be altered;
changing quotations influenced how the results were presented; some data could no
longer be presented at all; and with each substitution important but potentially concealed
assumptions were made. That my purpose was to analyze the use of language made the
need to alter language especially problematic. The words were not just a tool to present
data, they were the data.

Identifying identifiers
With a biomedical background, I assumed that recognizing identifying data would be
simple. Names, places, telephone numbers, birthdates, etc. are all relatively easy to spot
and eliminate. However, in preparing the data for presentation I quickly realized that such
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superficial identifiers were a minor worry. The richness of qualitative data meant that
participants were identified not just by name, but also through the details presented.

The difficulty in identifying identifiers stems both from the need to recognize data as
potentially identifying and from the need to decide how much anonymization is
sufficient. Some data, such as information about the location of studies, was easily
recognized – possibly because the same data would be anonymized in biomedical
research – and it was also easy to eliminate, as location is highly identifying but of
limited value to the study.

Other potentially identifying information was often overlooked on a first reading. It is not
clear to me why, but many words that could identify the research participants initially
seemed innocuous. For example, in the following sentence, the word “women” was not
initially recognized as potentially identifying data, despite the fact that it obviously
provides information about the study population, and therefore potentially about the
genomics researchers involved.

We will analyze [] from unrelated women who are at high risk of carrying a
susceptibility mutation…
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 153

I found that recognition of potential identifiers required extensive time and concentration.
A brief skim through the data would not be sufficient. Indeed, even with a detailed focus
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on anonymization, I cannot be sure I have identified all identifiers. Presumably, this
process becomes even more difficult when using other forms of qualitative data. I
imagine it is extremely difficult to know what details of an individual’s life story are
unique, allowing identification by family and friends.

The word “women” is also an example of identifying data that may not truly identify.
Obviously, as the quotation appears here unchanged, I decided it should not count. The
knowledge that women were involved in the study certainly indicates a certain subset of
all genomics research. However, there are so many studies that involve women, either
exclusively or as a subgroup, that such knowledge on its own is surely not identifying.

Similar considerations were required when contemplating the methodological language in
these documents. Specific methods or technologies mentioned could identify the grant.
However, some techniques are so commonly employed that they would be powerless as
identifiers. Without the appropriate knowledge of genomics, though, these common
procedures are difficult to differentiate from the more unique techniques. Thus, in this
study, my paucity of genomic knowledge necessitated the general exclusion of
methodology identifiers, unless I could be certain that they were commonly employed. In
general, it seems that a certain degree of expertise will always be required for
anonymization – one must understand the field and its participants to truly know what
data could identify.
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My approach to the difficulty of identifying identifiers was to consider every word as
situated along two spectrums: 1) from minimally to highly identifying and 2) from
unimportant to central to the research. A representation of this scheme is presented in
figure 1. Each point represents a potential word. The line represents a theoretical cutoff
for including a word, though, as will be explored below, there are numerous problems
with such a concept. This system was not perfect, but it allowed me to consider the
impacts of keeping or removing each word.

Figure 2. A representation of the properties of words considered in anonymization decisions.
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The extremes of these spectrums are relatively easy to deal with. If value is high and
potential to identify low, the data should be kept. If value is low and potential to identify
high, the data must be eliminated or altered.

When the potential of data to identify was very low, my instinct was to favour
maintaining the original language, even if the value of specific words was also considered
low. Although the individual words may not have been central to a theme, they provided
important contextual information and improved the flow and coherence of sentences,
improving comprehensibility and maintaining the vitality of the language. Furthermore, it
is often difficult to know what data will become interesting or relevant, either to future
research or to the audience. Therefore, I aimed to preserve as much of the original
language as seemed possible while still ensuring the anonymity of my research
participants.

On the other hand, when the potential of data to identify was very high, obligations to
research participants outweighed the value of the data, even when that data was integral
to theme development. My initial invitation to participate included a promise of
anonymity in presented data, thus my obligation was clear: despite the loss of important
data, anonymity had to be the priority.

Unfortunately, most decisions were not so simple. The majority of words were situated
somewhere in the middle of each spectrum. They were valuable and informative, though
perhaps not central to a theme. They were also identifying, in that they provided
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information about the participants, but did not directly identify. I was left with no guide
in deciding how the data should be anonymized. Each word had to be considered
individually, weighing its value to the research against its potential to identify.

The above treats each word as if it exists independently, and therefore over-simplifies the
process of anonymization. In the presentation of qualitative data, value and identifiability
are cumulative of all words. When presented independently, words may be rated as ‘low
value’ to the study. However, whenever a word is removed, the context, flow, and
coherence of the presented language are diminished. In combining to form phrases,
sentences, and entire documents words become more valuable than they ever are on their
own.

The same is true of words as identifiers. Independently, a word may rank low on the
‘identifiability scale’, but when combined with other seemingly innocuous words the
cumulative effect can be highly descriptive. I argued above that the word “women” has
minimal potential to identify. However, if information was also provided about the
population’s age, ethnicity, location, symptoms, treatment, or genetic make-up, the
research population may be easily identified. Importantly, such additive information need
not be in proximity. Presented data can additively identify when presented in different
quotations, different chapters, or even different publications. Although, practically
speaking, it may be more worrisome to see all identifiers in a single sentence, if one
strives for true anonymity distant accumulation must also be considered.
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Additive identifiability makes the presentation of qualitative data far more complicated.
Some limit to the degree of allowable identifiability must be determined. Somehow, the
researcher must decipher the impact of combining words, as each set of words will be
uniquely valuable as well as uniquely identifying. The researcher is no doubt the best
judge of the value of words. On the other hand, determining identifiability may be
beyond the researcher’s ability. As we have seen, the task often requires specific
expertise. One needs to know not only how identifying each detail is on its own, but also
how details may combine to identify. In my experience, the complexity can be
overwhelming.

One possible solution is to present the data either to the study participants or to the
studied community. If individuals intimately familiar with the local context of data
collection are unable to identify participants, it is probably safe to claim anonymity.
Unfortunately, if the presented data is not anonymous, research participants have been
identified precisely where anonymity is most important: among individuals who know
the research participants (Nespor 2000). Furthermore, such a system may verify
anonymity, but cannot determine if the researcher has been overzealous, removing data
that could have remained. This technique also does not account for an audience that may
actively try to identify participants, potentially using external resources, such as
journalists.

Additive identifiability requires that the researcher recall all previously presented data. If
we are concerned with true anonymity, then even data presented in different articles or
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different formats must be considered additive. However, the depth of qualitative research
means that results are often presented over long periods of time, as the researcher
develops and revises theories, making attention to such details difficult.

Finally, the additive effect of qualitative data means that, after data has been presented,
decisions must be considered final. Presented data is ‘out there’ for comparison. In my
decision to include the word “women” over other potentially additive identifiers, I have
limited my future possibilities. Reflection may provide new insights, but if any data
combines with “women” to identify, I will not be able to present it.

Presently there is very little guidance available to make such decisions. I was greatly
aided by the imagery of many overlapping circles – a Venn diagram. Highly identifiable
data would be a small circle – representing a small possible population. Larger circles
represent a larger possible population. As many circles overlap, the potential population
is drastically limited. That is, to know that a study population is male only eliminates
50% of the population, but when information about age, location, occupation, etc. is
added, the possible population is quickly limited. Obviously, then, not all such details can
be included. It is up to the researcher to choose the ‘circles’ that are most important to the
research, and then anonymize the rest.

How to anonymize
After identifying data to be anonymized, another difficulty lies in deciding how it should
be masked. Many options are available to anonymize individual words. One could simply
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black words out, leave blanks, use codes derived from the words, use descriptors, or try to
find distinct but equivalent words (Rock 2001). These methods vary in both the degree of
anonymization and the retention of data. The best method will depend on the type of data
and the goals of the project.

Simply removing words, or replacing them with incomprehensible codes, alters sentence
structure and limits readability. However, choosing a substitute word is difficult. For
example, in anonymizing interview participants, one would use “male #1”, “female”,
“nurse”, “doctor”, “child”, or “teacher” as descriptive placeholders. These terms provide
potentially valuable context to the audience, but also retain the ability to identify.
(Consider the use of “doctor” in a study of a rural community with only a handful of
doctors.) On the other hand, the use of a more general place-holder, such as “individual
1” or a blank, is certainly anonymous but loses valuable information. The choice of
replacement may also impact on the structure, complexion, and comprehensibility of the
quotations presented.

In this study, the choice of how to replace specific condition titles was particularly
difficult. A vast array of biology is studied in genomics, and finding words to replace
such variety is problematic. The first time I encountered this problem, I was lucky. I had
been stuck trying to determine the best placeholder(s) for the sentence:
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We are conducting a research study looking at genetic contributions to
[_____], [_____] or [_____] …
-

Project 1, Consent Document 1, Line 110

The three phenomena described were quite varied and I was unsure how to proceed.
However, in this case, returning to the original text provided an answer. In the next
sentence, the author refers to all three phenomena as “conditions”.

Earlier studies have suggested that some genetic differences in special
populations are linked to these conditions.
-

Project 1, Consent Document 1, Line 111

Consequently, I felt comfortable in choosing “[condition]” as a replacement. The sense of
the sentence was still altered, potentially making the results less clear, but at least the
replacement word arose from the author’s own lexicon.

Unfortunately, I was routinely required to choose a place-holder without any clues from
the text. I had to decide whether a certain condition was negative enough to count as a
“disease”, or if another word fit better. This was impossible, given that the very reason
for undertaking this study was to explore the meanings of these words. Thus, I felt
powerless to choose the ‘correct’ word, and instead focused on the potential impacts of
my choice. Some words, like “disease” and “disorder”, have been described as pejorative,
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especially in the context of genetics, and therefore were avoided (Hodgson, Hughes et al.
2005). Other words just seemed too specific.

Ultimately, I decided to replace all specific condition names with “[condition]” because it
was the most neutral and encompassing term I could find. Unfortunately, the tradeoff is
that “condition” is vague (being defined as both a state of health and of disease) and
uninteresting (The American Heritage Dictionary 2004). Consequently, sentences with
this substitution assume a tone of bland neutrality that is not present in the originals.
Furthermore, the repetition of the same substitute may provide the reader with a sense of
consistency that was never seen in the original language.

When replacing specific condition titles, it was also necessary to decide whether to label
each condition uniquely. By using only one word, “condition”, it would be impossible to
observe how language differed between conditions. To retain such information, a further
code would have to be developed. For example, “condition 1” and “condition 2” could
have been used to replace distinct condition names. For this study, I decided a single
place-holder was the best approach. My analysis did not find any major differences in the
language used to describe specific conditions, so I did not feel that multiple place-holders
would be valuable. Furthermore, the number of named conditions across the seven
projects was so large that organizing specific codes would have been difficult, and
remembering them nearly impossible.
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Sometimes terms were so technical or specific, I decided the best that I could do was
replace them with “[]”. This indicated, to me, that a specific or technical word was being
used for which I could find no alternative. However, an assumption that underlies this
project is that all words are specific and have individual meanings. Thus, the symbol “[]”
might have been more fitting throughout. Ultimately, however, I decided the use of words
as place-holders, where possible, was necessary to maintain the comprehensibility of the
sentences presented.

In addition to the words and language used, the anonymity of presented quotations is also
influenced by reference to its source. The first step that I took in the anonymization of my
data was to replace the titles of grants with generic titles, such as “project 1”. In choosing
this placeholder, many of the same issues discussed above applied. For example, some
contextual information would have been added by including the year that the grant was
awarded in the label, but there are so few genomics grants in the Canadian context that
such information may have been too identifying.

Quotation labels allow comparison of multiple quotations from the same project,
providing context but also permitting additive identification. The words “young”, “male”,
“lung”, and “infertile” may individually be equivocal, but together point strongly towards
a study of cystic fibrosis. By hiding the source of quotations, words appearing separately
cannot be combined, and therefore are less powerful as identifiers.
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Despite the anonymity benefit, I decided that labels of quotation source were important in
this project. Although most presented quotations are single sentences, documents build
meaning that extends beyond individual sentences. By presenting the source of
quotations, the audience can develop a greater sense of each project, despite having never
seen any document in its entirety. Source was also important in the revelation of a major
theme of my work: variable language use. It was important that I was able to demonstrate
that the large range of language I encountered was often contained within a single
document.

Furthermore, an indication of source is an important component of the “audit trail” that
allows assessment of my work (Catanzaro 1988, Strauss and Corbin 1998). The source
code is the remaining link between final product and raw data, which will allow
interested parties to examine my work. (However, as my raw data is not anonymous, an
interesting side issue exists in determining who should be granted such access.)

The consequences of altering quotations
Changing the language of quotations frequently muddied the presentation of themes,
which were, after all, about the language being presented. For the most part, I found that
altered quotations were still capable of illustrating the themes. However, I was struck by
a sense that the presentation was always weakened. Consider the quotation used to
introduce the theme of conceptual meshing:
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Some remaining subgroup of [condition] individuals will have …
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 71

The altered language is the same language that I want to bring to the attention of the
audience; it is the language from which the theme developed. However, a specific name
has been replaced with the mysterious “[condition]” and the reader is left to ponder what
kind of individual this might have been. Although I am able to illustrate this novel use of
language, the essence of the words is lost. What makes this language so intriguing is the
incredible emotion it could provoke. There is an enormous difference between a “lung
cancer individual”, a “diabetes individual”, and a “hemorrhoids individual”. The general
concept is preserved, but the imagery and feeling of the sentence is lost.

In addition to such emotional content, the removal of specific condition titles also
removed important information. For example, specific genetics titles often contain words
such as “familial” or “hereditary”. When such a title is replaced with “[condition]”
integral information about the condition’s presumed familial nature is lost. A “familial
condition individual” is an intriguing, complex concept that is forever lost behind the veil
of “[condition]”.

On the other hand, when the altered language is peripheral to the theme, it is tempting to
claim that changes are undisruptive. Unfortunately, I found such changes to be equally
troubling. For example, consider these quotations from the discussion on causation
language:
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Below you will find a brief explanation of our study to identify the cause of
[condition].
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 5

These studies will include analysis for genes that affect the risk of
developing [condition].
-

Title of Project:

Project 7, Consent Document 3, Line 30

Characterization of genes involved in [organ]

development and [condition]
-

Project 3, Consent Document 2, Line 6

As before, the specific condition titles in each sentence have been replaced, but now the
words of interest are “cause”, “risk”, and “involved”. Initially, these peripheral changes
seemed to leave essence of each statement intact. However, closer examination reveals
that the problems associated with “[condition] individual” are still present. Again, the
sense or tone of a sentence about the “risk of diabetes” is drastically different from one
about the “risk of cancer”. Also, important information about the language of causation is
lost. Without the disease title, it is unclear to what the causation words are referring.
Behind the veil of “[condition]” could be any number of different physical states, each
with unique genetic involvement. The audience can no longer assess for themselves how
appropriate certain causation language is when combined with a specific condition.
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At its extreme, the requirement for anonymity occasionally rendered data unusable.
Without specifics, some conclusions could not be effectively illustrated. This fact was
most obvious in the discussion of the language of phenotype. It was noted that conditions
are often referred to as being “characterized by” a phenotype:

Affected individuals were characterized by [list of characteristics] …
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 114

Individuals affected by the abnormality were characterized by [list of
characteristics] …
-

Project 2, Paper 3, Line 40

However, the lists of features that were said to “characterize” the condition were different
in each of these descriptions. This observation is interesting, but it was impossible to
present this data anonymously. The condition being studied, and hence the researchers,
could be identified by its characteristics. Therefore, while note was made of the
observation, the audience is forced to either accept it on faith or to ignore it. Without
quotations, the validity of the analysis is obscured.

The presented language is also impacted by the words and markings that are added to
quotations. Through the various place-holders, necessary to maintain anonymity, I have
put words into the mouths of the researchers. It is not just a matter of losing information
and sense, but also of inserting ideas that were not present initially.
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I spoke briefly about my decision to use “condition” as a general place-holder for all
condition titles. It was a complicated and trying choice, based on considerations of the
meaning of the word and its seemingly innocuous nature. It did not seem to have the
negative overtones of a word like “disease”. However, as a result of this decision, I ended
up putting my beliefs and understandings into my data in a way I had never intended.

The bias present in the repetitive use of “condition” continues to bother me. I was aware
at the outset that I would shape my results; that I would construct themes based on my
understandings and social context. The presentation of data, through quotations, was also
understood to be subjective, in that I was able to choose what and when to quote. These
subjectivities are well recognized and expected in qualitative research. I am concerned,
however, that the bias that I have inserted into quotations is more concealed.

Quotations allow for the presentation of raw data. The audience relies on this data to
judge the adequacy of the author’s constructions. In many ways, then, quotations are seen
as objective; as the ‘truth’ in which the analysis in grounded (Strauss and Corbin 1998,
Hsieh and Shannon 2005).

I am concerned that the changes made here become so inherent to the raw, ‘objective’
data that they become a part of it; that the audience, in assessing the data, is actually
assessing my words, beliefs and preconceptions. Where I used “condition”, others would
have used “disease” and the sense of the presented data would have been drastically
different.
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Nespor (2000) raised a similar, though broader concern in his discussion of the use of
pseudonyms for location in qualitative research. He argues that the use of pseudonyms
not only strips data of fundamental contextual information, but also reinforces the
conception that the data is generalizable. A pseudonym implies that the data is not tied to
a specific time and place, but could belong to any time or place. Likewise, my use of
“condition” strips away all context and may give the impression that the language used is
representative of all situations, not just the specific documents studied.

An example
I have been limited in my ability to present the difficulties of anonymization using my
own data, as I cannot present the raw, pre-anonymization data. The best illustration
would be the presentation of a sentence from my data before and after changes were
made, but this is not possible. Therefore, to provide a more thorough example of the
difficulties and consequences of anonymization, I include the following example of a
passage from the New York Times. The following two paragraphs are found in a story
entitled “Facing Life with a Lethal Gene”.

The gene that will kill Ms. Moser sits on the short arm of everyone’s fourth
chromosome, where the letters of the genetic alphabet normally repeat C-AG as many as 35 times in a row. In people who develop Huntington’s,
however, there are more than 35 repeats.
No one quite knows why this DNA hiccup causes cell death in the brain,
leading Huntington’s patients to jerk and twitch uncontrollably and
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rendering them progressively unable to walk, talk, think and swallow. But
the greater the number of repeats, the earlier symptoms tend to appear and
the faster they progress.
(Harmon 2007)

Of course, a newspaper story from the New York Times is quite different from a set of
research documents. In my project I am attempting to hide the identities of the authors:
genetics researchers. In a newspaper article, it would be more common to be concerned
about the anonymity of the story’s subject. For my purpose, I will claim the story was
written by a researcher, and that is the identity that I must anonymize.

It is also important to note that the American context of this news story differs drastically
from the Canadian context of my research. In the United States the number of researchers
studying any given genetic condition far outnumbers those in Canada. Thus, learning that
the condition was Huntington’s disease might point to hundreds of researchers in the
United States, but only a handful in Canada. Such small numbers obviously necessitate a
stricter attention to anonymity. Again, for the sake of illustration, let us imagine that the
case is in a Canadian setting.

How might we ensure the anonymity of this passage? Obviously, the individual’s name
and the title “Huntington’s” must both be removed. However, it is not clear how they
should be replaced. As discussed above, Huntington’s could be referred to as a disease, a
condition, an illness, a trait, etc. To choose one of these terms requires us to make

57
assumptions about the author’s views of Huntington’s. Another option would be to just
leave a blank, but that risks affecting the flow and comprehensibility of the passage.
Likewise, it is unclear how we should replace the individual’s name. One could use a
code, such as “Ms. X”, although that still identifies her as a woman. Some might suggest
“patient”, but presently she has no symptoms, just a gene. Does this fit with our, or more
importantly the author’s understanding of “patient”? Perhaps “carrier” is a better fit.
Another option is to use a generic term, such as “person” or “individual”, but those terms
are far less informative.

The listed symptoms must also be removed, as Huntington’s can be easily identified. The
status of other medical data is less clear. Knowing that the condition is “in the brain” is
certainly identifying, but many conditions occur in the brain. Therefore, in order to
decide whether this phrase can be kept, it would have to be compared to all other
presented data to assess the additive affect. When combined with other identifiers, such
as ‘late onset’ or ‘autosomal dominant’, the words “in the brain” may become highly
identifying. A choice would have to be made about which words were the most valuable
to keep.

The genetics details provided could also identify the condition, but now expertise is
required. Without knowing how many genes are present on the short arm of chromosome
four, it is impossible to know how distinctive such information is. Similarly, one would
have to find out how many conditions are caused by a “repeat of C-A-G” and, of those,
how many have a threshold of 35? Without such knowledge, the only appropriate choice
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is to remove the data. Could we keep the word “repeat” but eliminate the more specific
data? If removed, what can we can we use to replace the highly technical words like
“normally repeat C-A-G as many as 35 times in a row”?

The language that originally interested me in this passage was the reference to “the gene
that will kill”. However, even this phrase has the potential to identify. Reference to a
single gene condition limits the possibilities, and the indication that the gene is lethal
further defines the condition. On its own, this piece of information is probably still too
vague to pinpoint the authors, but with a few added words – such as “in the brain” or
“repeat C-A-G” – it could easily identify. However, as this language is our focus in the
passage, its value may outweigh its ability to identify. If used, though, we must be very
selective about the remaining presented data.

Ultimately, editing for anonymity leaves us with:

The gene that will kill [person] sits on [chromosome], where the letters of
the genetic alphabet normally repeat [ ]. In people who develop [condition],
however, there are more than [number] repeats.
No one quite knows why this DNA hiccup causes cell death in [organ],
leading [condition] patients to [list of symptoms]. But the greater the
number of repeats, the earlier symptoms tend to appear and the faster they
progress.
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The resulting passage is awkward and far less compelling. However, several interesting
uses of language, including “the gene that will kill” and “DNA hiccup”, are preserved.
The data did not have to be completely abandoned – unless, of course, we were interested
in the language of repeats, or symptoms, or the name “Huntington’s”.

Assuming that the phrase of interest is “the gene that will kill”, how is the presentation
affected by the changes made? It was certainly a more compelling, emotional sentence
when we knew the name of the individual destined to die. Without the list of symptoms,
death itself is far less interesting. Will this gene allow you to lead a full, rich life and then
‘kill you’ in your eighties? Or will it lead to an early, painful death? We know that the
disease can progress more or less quickly, but we no longer know why. Like most of the
language presented throughout this study, the general concept seems to have been
retained, but the presentation lacks important details and emotional content.

This process is obviously very subjective. Different authors would have made different
changes. In fact, if asked to repeat the process, my results would probably differ.
Therefore, as much as quotations are used to present ‘the raw data’, they are also the
product of the researcher’s personality, preconceptions, and goals. The ability to shape
quotations is advantageous; it allows the researcher to select desired data, anonymizing
only as necessary. However, it may also allow for inconsistency.
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Possible solutions
We have seen that the process of anonymization is difficult, time consuming, and
potentially detrimental to the presented data and analysis. Of these, the most problematic
to researchers, who spend significant time collecting and analyzing their data, is probably
the loss of or damage to results. One possible solution would be to abandon anonymity.
This is not an option that can be considered after data collection, especially when
anonymity has already been promised. However, if problems with anonymity were
anticipated at the outset, participants could be informed prior to consent.

One major advantage of anonymity is the general protection against uncertain harms. In
any research, the long term consequences are at best hypothesized. It is difficult to
adequately describe all the potential harms. This is especially true in social research,
where the harms are more likely to be psychological than physical. When harms cannot
be fully predicted, consent may not be truly informed, which is why, even with informed
consent, abandoning anonymity is problematic.

In this study, the language in documents was closely analyzed. I was unsure at the outset
what I would find, therefore it was difficult to predict what harms might arise. My goal
was an exploration of language, but with an ethical perspective I worried that the results
would seem more like a critique. As a result, the authors’ self-regard and reputation could
both be damaged. There is always trepidation in seeing one’s work judged. To publish
my commentary on language non-anonymously would be akin to posting an old high-
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school English assignment, signed and covered in the teacher’s red ink for all to see – a
scary proposition.

Perhaps if, in addition to informed consent, participants also had the chance to review
findings before publication, anonymity could be abandoned. However, such a solution
has many problems (risk of researchers being unable to publish, practical limitations,
power differential in the researcher-participant relationship) that will be discussed below.

One must also consider the practical implications of abandoning anonymity. Without the
safety in being anonymous, research participants may be harder to recruit. Even after
being recruited, participants may be less open in non-anonymous studies. In addition to
the potential harms, the researcher may want to consider the benefits of maintaining the
research relationship, either for the application of study findings or for future research.
Finally, it is important to recognize that once anonymity is lost it cannot be regained.
Thus, breaking anonymity precludes the researcher from publishing any data that is more
sensitive in the future.

An alternative to abandoning anonymity is the member check. By returning to
participants and requesting permission to display certain quotations, the researcher
provides an opportunity for participants to review what has been written and to choose
accordingly (Miles and Huberman 1994). One advantage is that the research participants
may be better judges of what counts as sensitive material (Rock 2001). I declined this
option on the grounds that it is unfair to the research participants. They entered a research
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relationship under the agreement of anonymity and it is unfair to alter that agreement
later. Informed consent will also be complicated at this stage, given the relationship
between the researcher and research participant, as well as the effort expended by both. A
research participant may feel compelled to agree to identification if informed that years of
research would be wasted if they did not. Furthermore, if anonymity was promised at the
outset, even contacting participants (and hence identifying them) could be unethical.

Furthermore, obtaining secondary consent for identification would have been difficult in
this project. Complex documents, like large operating grant applications, often have
multiple authors. To obtain truly informed consent, each individual who contributed
language would have to be contacted, shown all the results, and then give their consent.
The time and effort required by both researcher and participants probably makes such an
approach impractical.

The solution employed here was simply to live with the results of anonymity. If one
quotation was no longer compelling, others were sought. To remedy lost context,
extended descriptions were provided where appropriate. While the presentation was
undoubtedly weakened in various ways, I believe that the major emerged themes were
still adequately illustrated.

Concluding thoughts on anonymization
The use of quotations is and will continue to be fundamental to the presentation of
qualitative data. Quotations are necessary “to provide evidence for some point
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(interpretation, claim, or conclusion) the researcher wants to make, to illustrate or provide
a more concrete example of an idea, to represent the thoughts, feelings, or moods of the
person quoted, to evoke a feeling or mood, or to provoke a response in members of the
audience for the research report” (Sandelowski 1994). For document analysis, I would
add: to illustrate the potential thoughts, feelings, or responses of the individuals who read
the documents.

Chenail (1995) suggests that “data is the star” in the presentation of qualitative research
and should be heavily featured. It allows the reader to judge the validity of research and
to “see if they can see what you were seeing.” It also allowed readers to analyze the data
for themselves and invites them “to continue the inquiry and conversation” (Chenail
1995).

However, presenting qualitative data ethically and anonymously can be difficult. The rich
and full descriptions strived for by qualitative researchers make identification of research
participants easier. In addition to “superficial identifiers”, such as names and addresses,
qualitative data is full of details that potentially betray identity (Rock 2001). When
presenting qualitative data, “the inadvertent description of unique settings and events may
reveal the identity of the research participants” (von den Hoonaard 2003).

There are many reasons to support the use of anonymous data in qualitative research.
From a sociological perspective, Marx (1999) asserts that anonymity can facilitate
communication, encourage reporting of sensitive information, protect from unwanted
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intrusions, protect reputation, encourage experimentation, and protect personhood or
autonomy. The qualitative researcher, depending on the project’s participants, sensitivity,
and goals, must consider these implications of anonymity.

In certain situations, identifiability may be permitted or required. The study of previously
published data may permit identification. When working with individuals in a position of
power, certain information may necessitate, or at least allow the researcher to break
anonymity. An example would be the discovery of child abuse. Identifiability can
increase accountability and allows longitudinal research (Marx 1999). Finally, some have
argued that identification can empower research participants (Rock 2001).

In the opinion of the institutional research ethics board at the University of Western
Ontario, this project did not require full research ethics board approval. Therefore, it was
not an external obligation that led to the promise of anonymity in our invitation to
participate. Although the research ethics board expressed the opinion that this study did
not involve human participants, as the focus was documents, I was still cognizant of the
potentially sensitive nature of the work. I expected that genomics researchers would be
nervous to have information letters and consent forms from ongoing projects analyzed
and therefore believed that participation would be higher if anonymity was promised.
Furthermore, the analysis of one’s writing can be embarrassing and damaging to selfimage or reputation. Informed consent could not cover all potential harms, because the
results were unknown. I was aware that, despite best intentions, my results could sound
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critical. Anonymity offered the participants important protection from harms, even if
unforeseen.
The process of anonymization, however, “is full of methodological, ethical, and
theoretical tensions” (Thomson, Bzdel et al. 2005) centered on the balance between
commitments to research participants and the need to preserve data to produce knowledge
(Rock 2001). In the context of archiving qualitative data, Corti (2000) has recognized that
“it can be difficult to disguise the identity of participants without introducing an
unacceptable distortion into the data.” It is likely that “researchers intent on true,
complete anonymization rather than formal anonymization face a large, complex task”
(Rock 2001).

Data altered to protect anonymity, even if still capable of illustrating the author’s ideas,
will invariably lose context, content, and complexion. While important for protection of
research participants, “anonymizing does change data, so researchers should be aware of
both under- and over-anonymizing” (Rock 2001).

Altering data for anonymity also introduces bias into the data. The use of quotations is
always subjective, as the “researcher must decide whether to quote, what to quote, and
where a quote begins and ends for a particular purpose” (Sandelowski 1994). However,
we are apt to see quoted data as objective, direct representations, that can then be judged
by the audience. However, the process of anonymization changes those quotes. The
researcher places himself in the data, but in a way that may not be obvious to the
audience.
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Researchers have an obligation to their research participants that ordinarily necessitates
anonymity. However, there also exist professional obligations, and pressures, to conduct
valid, profitable research and to publish (Homan 1991). Ultimately, though, our
obligations to the individuals who participate in our research are paramount.
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THEME II. COMPLEX, VAGUE, AND VARIABLE LANGUAGE
The original goals of this analysis were based on an assumption about language use that,
after completing the analysis, seems to have been erroneous. The plan was to study the
context and usage of genetics related words in order to gain insight into the meanings
ascribed to those words by the geneticist authors. I wanted to know, for example, what
words were used to describe genetic causation, and how those words varied in different
contexts of use. I wanted to know the differences, in the eyes of the authors, between a
“disease”, a “disorder”, and a “condition”. I hoped to describe how the authors used
words like “normal” and “abnormal”.

The primary goal of this analysis was to consider how the definitions of these words
within genetics compared to those used more broadly, considering the unconventional
predictive and probabilistic way that genetics frames health, disease, and normalcy. I
wanted to know how the meanings and understandings of these words might affect
communication in general and informed consent specifically. I also hoped to gain a better
understanding of the authors’ overall views on health, disease, and normalcy through the
language that was used.

This section addresses the reasons that I was unable to analyze the language in this way
and the erroneous assumptions I had previously made. The title of this theme, “Complex,
vague, and variable language”, is a simplified statement of the chaos and confusion that I
encountered while attempting to analyze this data. Words were intrinsically complex,
ambiguous, and seemed to be used interchangeably. I observed this pattern of language
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use in many different contexts, including the language used to describe causation, causes,
genetic sequences changes, phenotypes, inheritance, disease titles, and the individuals
who get sick. This theme focuses on the complexity of the language used, and the
resultant potential for miscommunication, by exploring a few of those areas of language.
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THEME II. COMPLEX, VAGUE, AND VARIABLE LANGUAGE
SUBTHEME #1: CAUSATION LANGUAGE
The language used to describe the relationship between genome and phenotype was
complex. The words and phrases used were familiar, perhaps even mundane. They were
remarkable, however, in their abundance and variability. It was unclear how researchers
intended these words to be understood, resulting in a bewildering multitude of possible
interpretations, whether by myself or by potential research participants.

Direct causation language
The simplest form of causation language, as may have been anticipated, depicts a direct
causal relationship between the genome and a particular health condition.

Below you will find a brief explanation of our study to identify the cause of
[condition].
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 5

A Study to Locate and Isolate the [condition] gene
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 1

We wish to find out more about the genetic factors that cause these diseases
including identifying some of the genes that are responsible.
-

Project 3, Consent Document 1, Line 15
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[Organization] previously funded discovery: 1) of causative genes for
[condition] and [condition]; and 2) of >70 human disease mutations causing
[condition], [condition] and [condition].
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 6

Such language implies that the studied conditions result exclusively from genetics; that to
have the gene or the mutation is to have the condition. Direct causation language is
simple, easily comprehensible, and fits with some common understandings and
representations of genetics (Crosseley 2002, Bubela and Caulfield 2004). Unfortunately,
for even the simplest genetic conditions, it is oversimplified and possibly misleading
(Lippman 1992, Miller, Begbie et al. 2006). Our understanding of genetics is largely
incomplete, and simplistic causal statements likely overstep their scientific basis, even for
long-known single-gene conditions (Conrad 1999, Miller, Begbie et al. 2006).
Furthermore, this simplistic language reinforces a genetics-centered theory of disease at
the expense of other frameworks that include physical, financial, and social
environments. The language reinforces a sense of genetic fatalism (Lippman 1992,
Conrad 1999).

Direct causation language is, of course, expected and perhaps even appropriate at times.
There is no doubt that for certain conditions the presence of a specific allele (version of a
gene) or genomic change virtually assures the development of a specific condition within
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our current social and physical environment. We can test for alleles and predict outcomes.
In these settings, we may wish to refer to the genetic “cause” of a physical condition.2
When used in informed consent documents, however, direct causation language portrays
a potentially misleading, optimistic image of genetic science. The benefits of the study
are unintentionally magnified and doubt is displaced. In this way, direct causation
language may unintentionally bias the reader in favour of the research and falsely entice
participation. Similarly, the implied benefits of direct causation language, when found in
grant applications, may unintentionally influence funding decisions.

Susceptibility language
Contrasting the simple cause and effect of direct causation language is the mathematical
uncertainty reflected in language that describes causation through probability,
susceptibility, predisposition, and risk.

These studies will include analysis for genes that affect the risk of
developing [condition].
-

Project 7, Consent Document 3, Line 30

Research has shown that genetic factors have an effect on the risk of
someone developing [condition] or other types of [] diseases. In other

2

The major risk of such language lies in the faulty reasoning that claims that if genetics is “the cause” then
it must also be the focus of our medical therapies (Gannett 1999). A “genetic cause” is not external, but
rather an integral part of the individual (Shakespeare 1999). In an era where gene therapy remains
theoretical, this means that the only genetic therapy available is elimination of the gene – and with it the
individual. However, even for the simplest genetic conditions, we know that there are many effective nongenetic treatments.
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words, some people are at higher risk of these diseases because of their
genetic make-up.
-

Project 3, Consent Document 1, Line 11

This permits us to analyze the DNA for the presence of genes, which may
confer susceptibility to this disorder.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 17

This study is designed to identify the genetic (i.e. heritable factors that are
passed through your bloodline) risk factors responsible for the susceptibility
of [condition].
-

Project 4, Consent Document 1, Line 27

Using genetic approaches, we propose to identify major disease genes that
predispose to [condition].
-

Project 4, Grant Summary, Line 49

Probability is fundamental to understandings of genetics, being inherent to the
uncertainty of genetic inheritance, incomplete penetrance, multi-factor causation, and
variable gene expression (Hallowell and Richards 1997, Passarge 2007). As is seen in the
language used here, the concepts “risk” and “susceptibility” are used to portray this
uncertainty.
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However, it is important to recognize the inherently negative and therefore potentially
pejorative nature of such words (Linell, Adelswrd et al. 2002, Hodgson, Hughes et al.
2005). Direct causation language is relatively neutral, with no intrinsic assumption about
the experience of the phenotype.3 On the other hand, “risk” is an inherently negative
concept. It implies that the resulting condition is bad – something to be avoided or
perhaps eliminated. (Which is especially problematic in genetics, when conditions are not
external, abstract concepts, but rather intrinsic to the individual (Shakespeare 1999).)
This language contains inherent assumptions about the importance and impact of the
condition. These assumptions are routinely made without input from the impacted
individuals. Consequently, primary stakeholders in genetic research describe the concept
of “risk” as negative and pejorative (Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005).

Susceptibility language may also provoke difficulties in comprehension. The concepts of
risk and probability are poorly understood, by physicians and the public alike,
necessitating the use of clear and simple language in their discussion (Gigerenzer,
Gaissmaier et al. 2008). However, the language of susceptibility used here is opaque and
largely uninformative. Genes are spoken of as “affecting risk”, “conferring
susceptibility”, or “predisposing to”, without reference to the nature or magnitude of that
risk. Who would be satisfied with knowing that a procedure entails risk, without being
informed whether that risk was 1%, 50%, or 99%; without knowing whether it was a risk
of death, impairment, or just minor bruising?
3

Direct causation language is not completely neutral. The fact that the phenotype has the attention of the
medical and research communities, which primarily focus on conditions deemed to be negative, or
“disease”, does imply negativity. However, this negativity is not inherent to the language. Despite the
medical community’s negative focus, it is sensible to talk about genes “causing” longevity or happiness. On
the other hand, we would never refer to the “risk” of longevity or happiness.
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In part, the emptiness of susceptibility language is a result of the emptiness of condition
names.4 Superficially, the nature of the risk is described: it is the “risk of developing
[condition]”. However, for this statement to be truly informative, the potential research
participants must first have an understanding of what that condition entails. Are there
varying degrees of severity? Varying definitions? Varying impacts? When these details
are hidden behind a disease label, discussions of risk are far less informative.

The lack of detail associated with susceptibility language seen here may be explained by
the context of these documents. The research is being conducted precisely to determine
the specifics of the genetic risk. The details may simply not be available. Given the
prominent position of susceptibility language in genetics, the meanings and
understandings of this language should be explored in other contexts. Are descriptions in
clinical consent forms richer? Does the language of risk used in conversations about
prenatal screening contain information on the nature and magnitude of the risk? If so,
how?

Even with clear descriptions, the concepts of risk and susceptibility are difficult to grasp.
In one study, only 3% of people even recognized the word “susceptibility” (Erby, Roter
et al. 2008). Perceptions of risk differ markedly among all individuals, including health
professionals (Kong 1986, Kessler 1990, Hallowell and Richards 1997). Research has
shown little relationship between numeric risks and individuals’ interpretations. Despite
detailed descriptions of probabilities, individuals frequently convert risks into binary
equations: either this will or will not happen (Lippman-Hand and Fraser 1979, Parsons
4

See Section II.4: “Complex, vague and variable language: the phenotype” for further discussion.
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1992). Consequently, it is difficult to anticipate how potential research participants will
interpret the generalized, superficial susceptibility language seen here. The concepts are
theoretically coherent, but may be practically difficult to translate.

As the concept of probability is fundamental to genetics, probability language is likely
necessary for clear and accurate communication. Therefore, the difficulties explored here
should not be seen as reasons to abandon such language. However, in light of the
difficulties in comprehension and potentially pejorative nature of this language, authors
should be aware of the implications of these words and strive to make their meanings
more transparent.

The distinction between direct and susceptibility language
The distinction between direct causation language and susceptibility language seems
clear. The two categories have been recognized previously as distinct, theoretically
logical ways to discuss genetic causation (Gannett 1999). As these categories developed,
I speculated that the distinction between them would be based on differences between the
genetic conditions described. Direct causal language seemed to coincide with common
understandings of monogenetic conditions with high penetrance. Susceptibility language,
on the other hand, appeared to fit with understandings of more complex conditions
involving multiple genes as well as non-genomic determinants. However, like much of
the language seen in these documents, the use of causal language was found to be highly
variable. Both direct and probability based causation language were used to describe the

76
same conditions, often in the same document. Consider the language found in project 2’s
consent documents:

Below you will find a brief explanation of our study to identify the cause of
[condition].
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 5

This permits us to analyze the DNA for the presence of genes, which may
confer susceptibility to this disorder.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 17

A Study to Locate and Isolate the [condition] gene
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 1

The information letter begins with the direct and simple “the cause of”, but subsequently
switches to the obscure “which may confer susceptibility”. The title of the consent form
then reverts to more direct causation language in its use of “the [condition] gene”. The
result is confusing. It is unclear how causation is meant to be understood in these
documents. Despite the apparent logical divide between direct and susceptibility-based
causation language, they are used interchangeably here.

On the other hand, a distinction is drawn between the two types of language in another
project:
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We will now use state-of-the-art [] technologies to scan the entire genome
in [] populations to characterize the full extent and frequency of this newly
discovered type of variation, and its potential to cause or influence
susceptibility to disease.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 332

Here, the author recognizes and draws attention to the difference between “cause” and
“influence susceptibility”. In this context, it is clear that the two uses are understood
differently. However, no clues are provided as to the basis of that difference.

Thus, it is evident that some authors draw a clear distinction between direct and
susceptibility-based causation language, but others either do not recognize this distinction
or are careless in their choice of language.5 Consequently, the descriptions of causation
are unclear and confusing. With such conflicting language, the reader’s previously
formed ideas about genetics are likely to be maintained, regardless of their basis, and
consent documents are unlikely to fulfill their role in informing and clarifying.
Communication among scientists will also be affected. When some individuals use words
synonymously that other individuals view as distinct, miscommunication seems
inevitable. The value of words is the shared meanings and understandings they provoke
among the individuals who use them, but here these meanings are unclear.

5

It is possible that two distinct groups of authors were responsible for the language choices. Grant
applications are generally authored by researchers, but consent forms are likely to involve input from
lawyers or ethicists who may fail to grasp the genetic science being described. An interesting note about
consent forms is that they never seem to be signed, leaving the reader in the dark about the influences and
potential biases of the author.
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Vague causation language: the many remaining words
The third, and collectively largest, category of causation language evolved haphazardly
out of an inability to further classify the words. The language certainly did not fit with
either direct or susceptibility causation language, but no other features seemed to define
it. The words that accumulated within this (supposedly temporary) “other” category were
familiar. Some were everyday words like “affect” or “responsible”. Others were more
technical, like “linked” or “determinant”. However, despite countless readings, I could
not determine how these words should be grouped or what they could mean.

The lack of obvious meaning connected the many words in this category. Each time I
read a sentence, it provoked new thoughts and images. I was lost in trying to determine
what these words might have meant to the researchers who wrote them, and what they
might mean to the research participants who read them, because I could not even
determine what they meant to me. They were just too vague.

Thus, the remaining large category is generally referred to as ‘vague causation language’.
Although under a single title, the language represented here is not homogenous. Each
word provides unique ideas, images, and emotions. However, these words all share a
single characteristic that is fundamental to communication and informed consent: they are
frustratingly vague.
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Of the multitude of vague terminology employed, the most commonly used words were
those with the least clear meanings. Genes were said to be “associated with”, “involved
in”, or “correlated with” conditions:

With the recent increase in understanding of [genetic process], it has
become increasingly apparent that many mutations and genome variations
associated with diseases target the [genetic process].
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 945

To begin to investigate whether [ ] might delineate unstable regions of the
genome, at which new disease-associated rearrangements occur, we will
investigate…
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 740

We may find that some or all of the [condition]-associated mutations result
in proteins…
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 442

Further analysis of the [] region is necessary to identify the gene involved.
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 180
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Title of Project:

Characterization of genes involved in [organ]

development and [condition]
-

Project 3, Consent Document 2, Line 6

… your participation will help us better understand the relationship of
[physiologic parameter], and health risks among people to determine
correlation with genetic diseases.
-

Project 1, Consent Document 1, Line 178

This language ties phenotype to genome without providing any details about the
relationship. How are genes “involved” and to what extent? Are other factors also
involved? Is an association even related to causation or does it represent another kind of
relationship altogether? This kind of language provides no concrete knowledge about the
conditions or genetic processes being discussed.

Why would vague words be used with such frequency? Considering that this language is
found in genomics research documents, it might be argued that these words were chosen
because of an incomplete understanding of the genetic processes being studied. When we
do not know how or to what extent genes are involved, our language is necessarily vague.
However, this argument is unconvincing when one notes that the language employed in
project 2, a study of an autosomal dominant condition for which the gene was identified
decades ago, is the same as the language used in the studies of less well known genetic
conditions. Furthermore, the same language is found in both grant applications and
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published papers – both before and after research is completed. If a lack of knowledge
was a primary force in language choice, finished research would presumably alter word
selection. Another possibility is that this language was chosen to avoid technical details
that could be confusing for the lay individuals reading the documents. However, the use
of the same words in both consent forms and the more technical grant applications seems
to contradict this argument.

It is possible that these words are simply so common that the authors fail to recognize
them as empty, or that the words were chosen because the authors felt precision about
causation was unimportant. We have the option to explicitly define every word that we
use, but we generally strive to be precise only about important concepts. However,
causation is a central concept in medical genetics, whether one is interested in diagnosis,
prognosis, or treatment. When giving informed consent to partake in genetic research, an
understanding of causation is essential to understanding the research’s potential benefits
and harms.

Vague and uninformative language is obviously problematic in the context of informed
consent. The purpose of informed consent documents is to inform. It is generally
recognized that consent forms must be comprehensible, and many studies have examined
mechanisms to improve comprehension (Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999, Stead, Eadie et al.
2005). Common suggestions include lowering the target grade level, avoiding long and
uncommon words, decreasing sentence length, and eliminating jargon (Baker and Taub
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1983, LoVerde, Prochazka et al. 1989, Hammerschmidt and Keane 1992, Kimmelman
and Levenstadt 2005, Pothier 2005, Farrell, Deuster et al. 2008).

However, the previously unrecognized problem of common but vague language may
present a larger obstacle to informed consent than language that is esoteric. Though
jargon may not be understood, it is easily recognized, allowing for clarification to be
sought. On the other hand, the causation words encountered here are very common, and
therefore unlikely to draw attention. Their meanings, however, are anything but clear. It
is unclear how such vague but common terminology will be interpreted by readers.
Presumably, they will retain previous understandings of genetic causation.6
Unfortunately, these understandings could vary drastically from those of the authors,
resulting in a significant communication gap. Vague language, therefore, may create a
substantial obstacle to informed consent because it reinforces prior beliefs rather than
fulfilling the role of informing.

Decisions about what and how much information is required to make an informed choice
are complicated. There is a delicate balance between providing too little detail and
overwhelming the reader with irrelevant technical jargon. However, there is little doubt
that the central concepts must be defined.7 In these documents, which describe research
into the health effects of genomic changes, the concept of causation is certainly central. It

6

This is, of course, only conjecture. To explore how these words are truly understood, it will be important
to discuss this language with potential research participants.
7
One fundamental difficulty with informed consent documents is that they are written for a generalized
audience and are developed without feedback. This fails to account for the varying levels of information
that may be desired by different individuals, and forces the writer to make assumptions about what the
reader will find important.
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is impossible to assess the potential benefits of taking part in such research, or its
potential risks, without understanding how the genome is connected to phenotype, and,
more specifically, how the researcher understands this connection. Vague causation
language prevents this insight.

Vague language does not just create problems on informed consent documents.
Miscommunication is a potential problem with all of the studied documents. Vague
causation language in published papers could be problematic if different scientists
subscribe to different causal theories, thus limiting the objectivity of the published
literature. More problematic are grant applications, whose intended audiences, much like
informed consent documents, often consist of lay individuals. As mentioned above, it is
impossible to predict the benefits of genetic research without some understanding of the
causal link between genome and phenotype. Important funding decisions could be based
on misconception when vague terminology is employed. Vague language, especially
when used to describe key concepts, is problematic in any context.

Words like “associated” and “involved” completely evade definition. Other vague
causation words hint at the authors’ understandings. In particular, some words were noted
to suggest a certain magnitude of genetic involvement, which in general was portrayed as
large. In fact, because of the significant implied role of genetics, the words “basis” and
“underlie” were originally classified as direct causation language:
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Understanding the genetic basis of these conditions will be helpful for
developing new treatments and preventative measures.
-

Project 1, Consent Document 1, Line 113

The genomic basis of their phenotype will be found using …
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 134

… discovery of [mutations] underlying [condition] when no mutations were
found otherwise.
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 163

Identification of functional elements in the human genome is one of the most
important aspects of genome analysis, and is a critical requirement for
searches for mutations and sequence variants that underlie human
phenotypes, since these efforts typically are restricted to the known
elements.
-

Project 5, Grant Application, Line 3

“Basis” and “underlie” are strong causation words, conjuring the image of a foundation
or structural framework. Like the steel girders of a building, here genes are said to
underlie phenotypes. Initially, this relationship seems very similar to that of direct
causation language, where genes cause phenotypes. However, the imagery of a
foundation or structural framework leaves room for variation that was not seen with
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direct causation language. While genes may be seen as responsible for major
characteristics, like the size, shape, and layout of a building, other influences are implied.
Buildings can be painted, decorated, and landscaped differently, and they will be changed
by weather and use. Similarly, when genes are said to underlie a phenotype, we can
anticipate other forces that will influence the final appearance and experience of the
condition.

Despite the clear imagery provoked by these words, they remain open to a multitude of
interpretations. It is difficult to know how to apply the mechanistic imagery of
foundations and frameworks to the complexity of genetic molecular biology. Are genes
more like a blueprint (a common genetic metaphor) or the actual steel girders from which
a building is formed? Is each individual girder important, or is it the end product that
matters? Human beings, far more so than buildings, are in a constant state of growth,
maturation, and change. How does such change affect the imagery of the genetic
framework? Furthermore, how are the complex, integral interpersonal interactions that
shape all human experiences translated into the imagery of buildings? Although this
language provides more clarity than the phrase “associated with”, there remains a vast
array of interpretations. The language is vague.

The imagery of a genetic framework does highlight a fundamental question of genetic
causation. In the metaphor of the building, we might ask which is more important: the
external facade or the purpose for which the building is used? The external facade
provides us with our initial impression, and as such is generally the primary concern of
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the architect. This is also the primary image produced by the causation language seen
here. However, on closer inspection, it is generally the use of the building (a result of
social interaction) that is emphasized. After all, structurally identical square rooms could
be used as anything from bathrooms, to jail-cells, to museums for fine art.8 Similarly, it
has been extensively argued that it is not the genetic “basis” of an individual, but rather
his social interactions that truly define phenotype and disease (Parens and Asch 1999,
Shakespeare 1999, Wasserman, Bickenbach et al. 2005). In this way, the imagery
provoked by the terms “basis” and “underlie”, which focuses our attention primarily on
the ‘external facade’, could be seen as harmful and misleading.

Like “basis” and “underlie”, other words were noted that seem to imply involvement of
factors outside the genome in the causal relationship. However, words like “contribute”
and “determinant” provide little insight into the extent of genetic involvement.

The purpose of this study is to understand how inherited and other risk
factors contribute to [conditions].
-

Project 7, Consent Document 2, Line 19

Our long term goal is to characterize the normal function of the [] gene and
to determine how mutations within this gene contribute to the pathogenesis
of [condition].
8

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 591

We, in fact, see this change in social interaction with buildings all the time. The Louvre was once a palace
residence. The Tate Modern was a power plant. While the structures remain the same, different social
interactions have turned both into world class museums.
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OBJECTIVE: To discover and define additional genetic determinants of
[conditions]….
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 10

Again, it is unclear how genes “contribute” to conditions, but this language seems to
imply the involvement of non-genetic factors. When we are asked to contribute money to
a cause, we assume that others will do so as well. We contribute an article or a chapter,
but to complete a journal or a book others also must contribute. We may occasionally
hear of a “sole contributor”, but we recognize this as a special instance, and therefore
label it distinctly. Generally, “to contribute” means to be one factor among many.

The language of contribution may, in fact, correlate well with common understandings of
genetic causation. For the majority of phenotypic conditions, the genome makes a
contribution, sometimes large and sometimes small, that is combined with contributions
from other sources. However, occasionally, such as with monogenetic fully penetrant
conditions, the genome may be considered a “sole contributor”. Other times, the genome
may not contribute at all.9

Thus, vague language is not necessarily problematic because it is incorrect. The word
“contribute” may accurately, though simplistically, describe common understandings of
genetics. The concern is that no distinction is made between large and small
9

This image is somewhat oversimplified. Even if a philanthropist is the sole contributor of funds to a cause,
the individuals organizing the event, recruiting the philanthropist, and ultimately utilizing the funds must
also be considered. The same is true of genomics. Even with ‘purely genetic’ conditions, the environment is
always present, and therefore will always play a role. Similarly, it is over-simplistic to rule out the genome
entirely, as it is present in all phenotypes.
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contributions, and that, although implied, the other contributors are frequently ignored.
The reader is therefore left to guess at the intended meaning of the author, resulting in the
potential for miscommunication.

The possibility of a language gap, in which authors and audience define words
differently, was particularly evident with the use of the word “linked”.

Mutations in [gene] were recently linked with one form of [condition].
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 130

Earlier studies have suggested that some genetic differences in special
populations are linked to these conditions
-

Project 1, Consent Document 1, Line 111

In genetic parlance, a physical condition is “linked” to an area of the genome through a
methodology called linkage analysis. It refers to a specific relationship between genetic
material and physical condition, albeit not a causal one (Passarge 2007). When
considering this technical definition alone, it is difficult to classify “linked” as a vague
causation word. However, without knowledge of this technical definition, “linked” lacks
clear meaning. It is as empty as “associated” or “involved”, and has countless possible
interpretations.
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The use of the word “linked” illustrates the difficulties that can arise when scientific
jargon overlaps with everyday language. To the scientific community, and the authors of
these documents, “linked” has a very specific meaning.10 To the general public, it could
mean nearly anything. The result is a gap in communication that obviously weakens the
basis for informed consent, and communication in general.

“Linked” is the only causation term encountered in these documents that I know to have a
specific genetic meaning. However, it is possible that each of the words described here
has a technical meaning when used by geneticists. If true, scientific communication
would be more precise, but the gap between geneticist and lay person would grow
substantially wider. These words would be much more difficult to identify as jargon, and
traditional filters of jargon, such as editors and research ethics boards, would be faced
with an impossible task.

In addition to inhibiting comprehension, the indefinite meaning of vague causation words
may also allow interpretations to extend beyond the relationship between genome and
phenotype. For example, the word “responsible” could impact views on social and
personal responsibility in health.

We wish to find out more about the genetic factors that cause these diseases
including identifying some of the genes that are responsible.
10

Project 3, Consent Document 1, Line 15

Of course, it is unclear if the authors intended the technical meaning of the word “linked”. Presumably, at
times they use the word in the same way the rest of us do. When the same word has both a common and a
technical meaning, there is no way to determine which usage is intended.
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This study is designed to identify the genetic (i.e. heritable factors that are
passed through your bloodline) risk factors responsible for the susceptibility
of [condition].
-

Project 4, Consent Document 1, Line 27

As with all vague causation language, it is unclear how “responsible” is to be understood
biologically. The idea that genes are responsible, though, has many potential social
meanings. When genes adopt a role of responsibility, our own health obligations could be
minimized. In a series of focus groups studying health promotion, Crossley (2002) found
that deterministic perceptions of genetics can undermine personal responsibility; “if
there’s something in your genes there’s not a lot you can do.” Elsewhere, it has been
noted that we often use words that abdicate our responsibility for illness, such as “fall ill”,
“catch a cold”, or “come down with” (Fleischman 1999). Many authors have suggested
that a genetic framework is being used more frequently to explain all health issues
(Lippman 1991, Lippman 1992, Conrad 1999). The use of the word “responsible” to
describe genetic causation may reinforce, even if unintentionally, such genetic
determinism.

Although “genetic responsibility” could shift the responsibility away from the individual,
the opposite is also possible. Genes are an inherent part of the individual. If genes are
said to be responsible, it may be difficult to separate this responsibility from the
individual. Thus, “genetic responsibility” could be translated into individual
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responsibility for things such as health care costs, insurance, and the social impacts of
health (Rothstein and Billings 1992).

Responsibility is especially complicated when applied to “hereditary” or “familial” genes.
It is easy to imagine parents being held responsible for the genetic health of their
children. This responsibility could take the form of increased medical costs or social
stigma. It could also be borne out legally, with the developing concept of “wrongful
birth” lawsuits (Pioro 2008). Indeed, the burden of genetic responsibility is already
recognized in women who express an obligation to undergo genetic testing as part of their
responsibility to family members, in past, present, and future generations (Hallowell
1999). Thus, although we all understand the word “responsible”, in the context of
genetics it could have many different meanings.

As a category, vague causation language was large and quite varied. The words share the
characteristic of unclear meaning, but vary in the extent and impact of their ambiguity.
Thus, they were discussed here in smaller subsets. The distinctions presented, however,
are purely theoretical; they are not based on the manner or context in which the words
were used. Similar to the blurred distinction seen between direct and susceptibility
causation language, vague causation words were used interchangeably and with no
obvious link to context. For example, in project 2, which explores a well-known
monogenetic condition, we see 3 subsets of vague causation language in addition to the
direct and susceptibility type language that was presented above.
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In summary, we have shown that [condition] is linked to an [specific] region
on chromosome [] in a four-generation family affected with the disease.
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 177

Further analysis of the [specific] region is necessary to identify the gene
involved.
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 180

Our long term goal is to characterize the normal function of the [] gene and
to determine how mutations within this gene contribute to the pathogenesis
of [condition].
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 591

The large variety of language used to describe the causal relationship makes a precise
understanding of that relationship nearly impossible. The multiple possible definitions of
each word are compounded when the words are all applied to the same concept. The
authors’ intended meanings are incomprehensible. However, due to the general
familiarity of the words used, their ambiguity is easily ignored, creating the potential for
miscommunication.

Vague language is not unique to these documents. Everyday language, when examined
closely, is rife with unclear terminology. In medicine, to mask concern with patients,
language without clear meaning, and therefore without clear emotion, is often used;
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“condition” is used instead of “disease”, “mass” instead of “cancer” (Fleischman 1999).
Likewise, vague language is a popular tool of the medical student. When quizzed, it is
easier to respond that there is an “association” between smoking and cancer, than it is to
describe the precise statistics and pathways. It has also been noted that ambiguous
language is used by doctors for the illusion of protection against malpractice (Bedell,
Graboys et al. 2004).

In informed consent, however, the use of vague language is problematic (Liss, Aspevali
et al. 2004). The purpose of informed consent is to provide information, and the quality
of this information is obviously compromised if the language used is understood
differently by researchers and potential research participants. On the other hand, so much
of the language that we use is vague, that to ensure precise definitions for all words,
consent forms would likely become unbearably long and full of unreadable ‘legal-ese’.
Therefore, it is important to recognize those concepts that are central to informed consent,
and to ensure that they are clearly defined. However, there is no clear mechanism to
identify the concepts that should be defined. Therefore, while it is likely possible to
predict some important concepts, such as causality in studies of genetic outcomes, I
believe that the safest approach would involve feedback from primary stakeholders when
developing informed consent documents.

External References
As a consequence of my struggle to understand the vague causation language used in
these documents, I noticed a significant difference between informed consent documents
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and the other research documents studied. When faced with a truly vague statement, such
as ‘gene x is associated with condition y’, an industrious reader of research papers or
grant applications is left with some recourse. Although not universally present, and
sometimes difficult to follow, these documents provide citations to previous literature.
The statement ‘gene x is associated with condition y’ is presumably based in prior
research, and to some extent that research is accessible to the reader. Thus, there is a way
to determine precisely what is known about the “association”, and therefore, presumably,
what is meant by the term.

The informed consent documents studied universally lacked citations. Thus, the reader is
not only left guessing how and to what extent a gene and condition are “associated”, but
is also left without any knowledge of how this association was determined. An
“associated gene” could be based on very solid scientific research, but could also be
based purely in theory or expert opinion. These distinctions seem fundamental in the
understanding of research for informed choice.

95

THEME II. COMPLEX, VAGUE, AND VARIABLE LANGUAGE
SUBTHEME #2: THE CAUSATIVE AGENTS11
In the preceding discussion about the language of genetic causation, three relatively
simple, but complexly overlapping categories were presented. However, in presenting the
data this way, much of the overwhelming complexity that was encountered in the coding
process was obscured. Each causation verb, complex in itself, was modified by
surrounding language that indicated varying degrees of certainty, as well as a range in the
number and type of both cause and effect. As an example of this added complexity, this
section explores the descriptions of causative agents.

Potential genomic causative agents are the focus of genetic research, and therefore are the
focus of the documents analyzed. As such, I anticipated that the language describing
causative agents would be highly developed and precise. However, I found the words
used to be complex, variable, and difficult to interpret.

In the simplest cases, the language portrayed a single causative gene.

A Study to Locate and Isolate the [condition] gene
-

11

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 2

During coding, my working title for this section was “multiple causation genes”. However, much of the
language encoded in this section was not about “genes”, but rather “mutations” or other “genetic factors”.
Reviewing the working titles throughout the project, I noticed that I frequently used the word “gene” even
though the category involved a much greater range of language. I am not sure why. It is possible that I am a
product of a generation that values the gene over other medical explanations. It might be the result of my
focus on “genetics” in this study, making the word “gene” more noticeable. Or, it could be that the concept
“gene” was the most prevalent and obvious in these documents, leading me to code this way.
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My DNA sample will not be used for any purpose, other than to look for the
[condition] gene without my further specific written permission.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 42

It took almost an entire century between the description of [condition] …
and the identification of a causative gene.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 128

Mutations in [gene] … have been found in a variant of [specific condition].
Mutations in this gene also cause [another condition] and [a third
condition]…
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 44

Single gene causation is simple and easy to understand. Logically, the language fits well
with a small subset of conditions, usually called monogenetic conditions. It is a form of
language that predominates in media descriptions of genetics, which tend to focus on “the
obesity gene” or “the cancer gene” (Petersen 2001, Bubela and Caulfield 2004).
However, this highly simplified language likely masks the true complexity of genetic
causation (Lippman 1992, Conrad 1999).

Descriptions that focus on a single genetic cause are unlikely to be adequate. All genetic
influences are modified by a variety of other causes, including both other genetics causes
and environmental influences. In avoiding these other causative factors, this language
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could misrepresent the nature of causation in the conditions studied. The genetic
scientists that author these documents are certainly aware of these other causative factors.
I imagine that other factors are not mentioned because they are assumed to always be
present – the background conditions for genetic causation. However, it is not clear that
individuals who lack training in genetics will recognize the basic assumptions made by
this language. Therefore, a gap in understanding could exist between the authors and their
audience.

The issue of unmentioned causal factors is highlighted in the case of a single gene
causing multiple conditions. For one gene to cause multiple conditions there must be
modifying factors. However, the language emphasizes a single gene as the cause and thus
masks this underlying complexity.

Mutations in [gene] … have been found in a variant of [specific condition].
Mutations in this gene also cause [another condition] and [a third
condition]…
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 44

Even if we ignore the many non-genetic factors that ultimately influence biologic
functioning, a single gene may not be so solitary or simple. Within the one “causative
gene” will exist a multitude of potentially causative mutations. These many mutations
could result in many different phenotypes, some similar but others drastically different.
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Thus, within the language of a single gene, there is a multitude of possible causes,
presumably recognized by the geneticist, but again potentially unknown to the reader.

Other descriptions of causation refer to multiple causal genes.
Characterization of genes involved in … [condition]
-

Project 3, Consent Document 1, Line 4

This permits us to analyze the DNA for the presence of genes, which may
confer susceptibility to this disorder.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 3, Line 15

Using genetic approaches, we propose to identify major disease genes that
predispose to [condition].
-

Project 4, Summary, Line 49

We would like to study some of the genes that may cause this [specific]
problem.
-

Project 3, Consent Document 4, Line 6

The laboratory will extract DNA from the sample so that we can study the
genes that we think may cause your [specific] disease.
-

Project 3, Consent Document 1, Line 28
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The concept of a condition being caused by multiple genes is logical, and I imagine
generally well understood. We all have many genes, and these all interact in biologic
processes. However, the concept of multiple causative genes becomes complicated when
it is applied to monogenetic conditions.

Our strategy to understand the common [conditions] is to study rare human
monogenic forms, such as [condition 1]. CIHR [] previously funded
discovery: 1) of causative genes for [condition 1]
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 5

This language contains a perplexing contradiction. A monogenetic condition is, by
definition, caused by a single gene, but here the author refers to a monogenetic condition
with multiple “causative genes”. It is unclear how this is supposed to be interpreted. The
multiple genes could be found in a single individual. We have already noted that, even in
the simplest genetic conditions, there are always modifying factors. Thus, perhaps
“monogenetic” is not intended to mean that only one gene is involved, but rather that one
gene plays the most important role.

On the other hand, this language could indicate that in any given individual a single gene
is considered to be causal, but in different individuals, different genes are the cause. This
interpretation complicates much of the other language seen in these documents. “The
[condition] gene” is a common phrase, both in these documents and in everyday parlance.
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However, if more than one gene causes a condition, it is unclear which gene should be
given this title.

The gene is the causal agent most often described in these documents. The emphasis on
the gene (with occasional reference to mutations) is not surprising in genetic research, but
it may be illogical. The gene is just an area of the genome that is associated with the
production of a protein (Passarge 2007). We all have the same genes. It is variations
within the gene – mutations or alleles – resulting in different protein products that
contribute to our differences. These documents never explicitly define “gene”, but
depictions of the gene as the primary causative agent seem to indicate that a nontechnical definition is being employed. Thus, the word “gene” appears to have more than
one meaning – the technical jargon as defined by textbooks and the meaning developed
through common use. When everyday words also have technical meanings, there is a
substantial risk of miscommunication, and that miscommunication is likely to remain
unnoticed.

Mutations are also depicted as causal agents at times in these documents.

We have identified the causal mutation [] in the [] gene within the original
family described by [researcher].
-

Project 7, Paper 3, Line 32
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By combining [genetic] analysis with phenotype assessment, we found
significant between-mutation variability for [physiologic parameter].
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 33

We are investigating the mutations in [gene] which result in [condition]
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 653

[Researcher] is investigating [condition’s] substantial inherited component,
looking at the ways mutations (DNA sequence changes) affect [organ]
development and [] function.
-

Project 3, Grant summary, Line 9

Three different point mutations were identified, each causing amino acid
substitutions in a portion of the protein predicted to interact with the
[receptor]. These mutations likely cause [condition] through a
haploinsufficiency of the [gene].
-

Project 2, paper 2, Line 149

There is a complex interplay between at least two proteins in which
mutations in either one can lead to [condition].
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 318
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“Mutation” is another jargon word that is widely used in general conversation.
Consequently there are many related but different possible definitions. It was impossible
to determine what meaning was intended in these documents. “Mutation” could refer to
any change in a cell’s DNA sequence (as is indicated in the fourth quote), just those
changes that have biologic effects, or just changes with presumed negative impacts
(Condit, Archer et al. 2002, Condit, Dubriwny et al. 2004). It is unclear if the definition
of mutation is limited to the level of DNA, or whether it can also refer to the resulting
physical attribute. In these quotations, mutations are said to occur in both genes and
proteins, although the fourth quotation contradicts this and limits mutations to DNA. I
have informally discussed the definition of “mutation” with a number of geneticists, and
received surprisingly different answers.

Interpretations of “mutation” are further complicated by the inherently negative social
understandings of the term. In general conversation, a mutation is a negative term.
Individuals describe the word as frightening and pejorative (Chapple, Campion et al.
1997, Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005). Thesaurus associations include words like “freak”,
“monster”, and “monstrosity” ( Roget's 21st Century Thesaurus 2008). In short, it is a
word that can mean very different things to different people.

To complicate interpretation further, there seem to be other forms of genetic variation
that are not mutations. However, these other variations were only hinted at, and never
explained.
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For newly discovered mechanisms of genomic variation, understanding both
the molecular mechanism in disease and the phenotypic consequences are
essential. Different types of genomic variation will probably have different
effects at the level of the phenotype. Thus, careful characterization of
phenotypes is essential for defining the impact of genomic variation on
disease susceptibility.
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 7

A carefully selected subgroup of samples and controls will be evaluated
using [method] for the purpose of discovery of [genetic variation] underlying
[condition] when no mutations were found otherwise.
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 163

There are many forms of human genomic variation, including single
nucleotide and small insertion/deletion polymorphisms, variable numbers of
repetitive sequences and structural alterations of chromosomes.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 276

They will serve as an international resource for biomedical researchers to
address research inquiry into the spectrum of genomic variation in health
and disease.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 239
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Other terms that were occasionally depicted as causative agents in these documents
include “protein”, “allele”, and “loci”.

These variants can contain entire genes, and in at least 14 instances they
overlapped with disease loci.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 332

As shown in Table 4, 15 LCVs already identified seem to overlap with
known disease loci. Our experiments will allow us to examine whether these
LCV polymorphisms in SC are associated in a non-stochastic manner with
some specific population or disease alleles.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 332

There is a complex interplay of at least two proteins in which mutations in
either one can lead to BDA1.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 589

Although an animal model with specific [condition] mutations has not been
described, analysis of the [genotype] mouse can provide important insights
into how the mutant protein may contribute to the physiology of these two
malformations.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 184
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These terms represent less familiar technical jargon. No definitions are provided in these
documents, and given the confusion around other technical terms, such as “mutation” and
“gene”, it is not clear that reference to any dictionary or textbook will adequately reveal
the authors’ intended meanings. Without definition, use of these words with potential
research participants could be confusing and even distressing. Furthermore, they expand
the variety of depicted “causes”, making it difficult to interpret the authors’
understandings of genetic causation.

Finally, there was a set of words used to describe causative agents that were vague and
essentially meaningless.

OBJECTIVE: To discover and define additional genetic determinants of
[conditions] by studying rare monogenic human [conditions] in Canadian
families and communities
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 10

The information you give us will be added to our computer files and used in
research on heredity and other risk factors for [condition].
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 35

The purpose of this study is to understand how inherited and other risk
factors contribute to [conditions]. This part of the study allows us to
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combine family history information with laboratory studies to identify
genetic and other factors that affect [condition] risk.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 3, Line 19

We wish to find out more about the genetic factors that cause these diseases
including identifying some of the genes that are responsible.
-

Project 3, Consent Document 1, Line 15

Some terms, such as “genetic factor” or “genetic determinant”, indicate that the cause is
found in genetic material, but give no further indication of the author’s meaning. The
phrase “other risk factors” is not even that specific; it could truly mean anything. These
complex, poorly defined descriptions of causative agents were coupled with complex,
poorly defined causation verbs and, as is described in the subtheme “Phenotypes”,
complex, poorly defined consequences. The result is perplexing.

Although the precise definitions of the various causative agents are uncertain, in most
individual sentences the purported cause is clear: it was “the gene”, “the mutation”, or
“the genetic factor”. However, much like the language of causation, the highly variable
use of these terms made interpretations impossible. I will use the language of project 2, a
long known, highly penetrant, autosomal dominant monogenetic disorder, as an example.

Some language suggested a single causative gene.
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A Study to Locate and Isolate the [condition] gene
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 2

My DNA sample will not be used for any purpose, other than to look for the
[condition] gene without my further specific written permission.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 42

It took almost an entire century between the description of [condition] …
and the identification of a causative gene.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 128

Elsewhere, the language reflected the extra complexity of multiple mutations within the
same gene.

Mutations in [gene] … has been found in a variant of [specific condition].
Mutations in this gene also cause [another condition] and [a third
condition]…
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 44

Three different point mutations were identified… These mutations likely
cause [condition] through …
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 149
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Language suggesting multiple causative genes, seemingly contradictory “the [condition]
gene”, was also observed.

This permits us to analyze the DNA for the presence of genes, which may
confer susceptibility to this disorder.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 3, Line 15

We have identified a second [] locus at … indicating that [condition] is
genetically heterogeneous.
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 127

[] mutations, however, account for only a subset of the [condition] cases,
suggesting that the trait is genetically heterogeneous …
-

Project 2, Paper 3, Line 51

Finally, there was language in the grant application that acknowledges a range of possible
causes.

The observation of these characteristics in multiple families suggests that
the gene(s) responsible for [condition] may also be expressed in …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 46
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Identification of the gene(s) that cause [condition] is therefore necessary to
elucidate its cause. Ultimately, knowledge of the gene(s) that cause
[condition] may also help us understand …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 82

Some of the variability in language might be explained by the different types of
documents that are represented. The term “gene(s)” was only seen in the grant
application, a document written prior to the research, when one might expect language to
express uncertainty. Likewise, the term “genetically heterogeneous” was only seen in the
published literature, which could represent a new insight from the research or potentially
a more sophisticated target audience. However, considering that project 2 represents a
monogenetic condition that has been known for decades, it difficult to explain the degree
of variation.

The variable language used makes it difficult to anticipate how the potential research
participants will interpret the informed consent documents. “The [condition] gene” is the
predominant phrase. However, in the description of the process of specimen collection
the authors use the word “genes”. This inconsistency could be confusing to potential
research participants (as it was for me), but it is not clear how it would influence their
understanding or ultimate decisions.

The gap in language between informed consent documents and grant application is more
concerning. Although “the [condition] gene” dominates the language of the consent
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documents, this term never appears in the grant application. The certainty of this strong,
simple, single gene is replaced by the uncertainty of “gene(s)”. These documents would
have been prepared around the same time, so the language difference cannot be explained
by different stages of research. The push to simplify language on consent forms, making
them more understandable, could be a reason to avoid a term like “gene(s)”. However, it
is not clear that a single causative gene is any easier to understand than multiple, and the
multiple “genes” is actually used elsewhere in the consent form. Another possible
explanation for this language gap is that consent documents and research grants have
different authors, with lawyers or ethicists playing a role in the language selection of
consent documents.

Whatever the reason, there is a difference in the language geneticists use with funding
agencies and that which they use with potential research participants. The simplified,
single gene causation used on the consent form is similar to the genetic language that has
been described in the lay media. This language has been criticized for ‘hyping’ genetic
research and over-representing the scientific basis for a genetic cause (Lippman 1992,
White 2001, Bubela and Caulfield 2004). In informed consent documents, this language
could overemphasize the potential benefits of participation and therefore impact decisions
to participate. The use of different language in different contexts also increases the risk
that core concepts, such as genetic causation, will be understood differently by the
researcher and the potential research participants.
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Of course, I do not believe that scientists of the caliber and reputation of those who
voluntarily submitted their consent document to our scrutiny would manipulate their
language intentionally. Indeed scientists who thought there may be even a slight chance
that such manipulation existed in their document would likely have ignored our request
for their participation, rather than contributing their documents to an ethical analysis of
language. I believe the scientists always have their patients’ qua research participants’
best interests in mind. However, it may be difficult for scientists to find the simplified
language considering the complex scientific terminology inherent in their research.
Beyond the word selection, a lack of appreciation of the social implications of language
choice is likely a problem for many scientists and clinicians in all areas of genetics.

The language of causative agents is one of many related subsets of language that combine
to describe the authors’ understandings of genetics, health, and disease. The language of
each of these subsets was complex, vague, and variable. When combined, it was virtually
impossible to guess the authors’ intended meanings or the audience’s potential
interpretations of these concepts.
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THEME II. COMPLEX, VAGUE, AND VARIABLE LANGUAGE
SUBTHEME #3: THE INTERCHANGEABILITY OF DISEASE LABELS
One of the primary goals of this study was to assess how various genetics and health
related words were defined through their usage. I wanted to know, for example, how
“disease” differed from “condition” and “disorder”. However, it quickly became apparent
that developing specific contextual definitions would be an impossible task. The words
appeared to be used interchangeably; no distinguishing features could be delineated. In
most cases, the synonymous language use was noticeable only through distant
comparison. That is, despite describing very similar concepts, different sections of the
documents would use different words. Occasionally, however, interchangeable word use
would be highlighted within a single sentence or paragraph.

The word “disease” was noted to be used interchangeably with “condition”, “disorder”,
and “malformation”.

We will also be investigating the link between these specific genetic
conditions as mentioned above and [specific] disease - a condition where …
-

Project 1, Consent Document 1, Line 35

These can help to study subjects with strong monogenic forms of common
diseases, such as … Individuals with monogenic forms of common
conditions serve as models to help understand mechanism.
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 79
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Previous reports of families with [condition] have shown that individuals
can inherit the disease as an isolated malformation, or in association with
other disorders.
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 119

However, to date, only about 1900 of the some 6000 Mendelian genetic
diseases, and many fewer of the complex common diseases, have been
characterized with any certainty at the gene level. Furthermore, for most of
the characterized disorders, only a subset of causative mutations are known.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 188

Sometimes, such as in the first quotation, the substitution is direct and seemingly
purposeful. In other cases, such as the second and fourth quotations, different words are
used in two adjacent sentences referring to the same phenomenon, creating the
impression of a desire to be varied in language use, but without indicating the relationship
between the concepts. Nevertheless, it is evident that in these documents “disease”,
“condition”, “disorder”, and “malformation” are, at least at times, used interchangeably.

The relationship between “disease” and “phenotype” is slightly more complex. In some
language it would appear that they are treated as equivalent.
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The severity of this phenotype ranges from [] … to a mild form of the
disease, in which …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 21

However, elsewhere disease is represented as a subset of phenotype.

Furthermore, annotation of the full range of human genomic variation
provides a starting point for understanding inter-individual differences
underlying various phenotypic conditions, including disease states.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 254

Of course, these two usages are not mutually exclusive. The words “dog” and “animal”
can be used interchangeably while still recognizing that dog is a subset of animal.
However, as the words are never defined, it is difficult to interpret exactly how the
authors intended these words to be understood.

The interchangeability of words developed a complex web. Above, “disease” and
“disorder” were used as synonyms, but “disorder” itself is used as a synonym for a large
variety of other words, including “condition”, “trait”, “characteristic”, “syndrome”, and
“problem”.
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… described a large family from [place] with a [specific] disorder and
correctly surmised that the trait was transmitted as an autosomal dominant
condition.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 8

You are being asked to take part in a research study that will investigate
[specific] disorders such as … We will also be investigating the link
between these specific genetic conditions as mentioned above and
[specific] disease…
-

Project 1, Consent Document 1, Line 29

There are >30 such documented genomic disorders, including [], [] and []
syndromes
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 421

Some of the most commonly reported associated disorders include []. The
observation of these characteristics in multiple families suggests …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 46

You are part of a family with an [specific] disorder that may be inherited.
We would like to study some of the genes that may cause this [specific]
problem.
-

Project 3, Consent Document 4, Line 6
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In turn, many of these words are again used as synonyms for other words, or for each
other. Figure 3 illustrates the web of equivalency that becomes evident in these
documents. The relationships indicated in this diagram are only those for which direct
examples of equivalency could be found, and therefore represent only a subset of what
seemed to be a much larger web. In the vast majority of cases these terms were used
individually, and their equivalency is only hinted at through similar usage.

Figure 3. Equivalency of disease words

The highly variable use of such disease titles is well represented in the many names used
to describe the condition studied in project 2. Through the various study documents, we
see the same condition described as: a phenotype, a disease, a condition, a trait, a genetic
disorder, a congenital developmental disorder, an abnormality, and a malformation.
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Previous reports of families with [condition] have shown that individuals
can inherit the disease as an isolated malformation, or in association with
other disorders.
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 119

Despite being the first human trait described in terms of autosomal
dominant Mendelian inheritance, little was known about the genetics of this
malformation until recently.
-

Project 2, Paper 3, Line 46

The severity of this phenotype ranges from … to a mild form of the disease,
in which …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 21

[] described a large family from [place] with a [specific] disorder and
correctly surmised that the trait was transmitted as an autosomal dominant
condition.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 8

Individuals affected by the abnormality were characterized by …
-

Project 2, Paper 3, Line 38
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The [conditions] are a group of rare, congenital developmental disorders
that affect …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 2

[Condition] is a genetic disorder, which is inherited as an autosomal
dominant trait.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 8

[Condition] is a genetic disorder in which …
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 10

I _____________________________________ understand that my/my
spouse’s family has been diagnosed as having a genetic (inherited)
condition called [condition].
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 7

This condition is quite mild and results in … The inheritance of this
condition is called autosomal dominant, which means that …
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 9

The varied use of disease related words throughout these documents increases the
complexity of the language, and increases the chance of confusion or miscommunication.
Multiple words are seemingly used to describe the same phenomenon, but it is unclear if
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they are meant to be understood as synonyms or just related concepts. The variable use of
language makes it difficult to determine exactly what each word refers to. Is “the
disorder” the same as “the condition” or “the disease”?

The interchangeable use of “disease” and “phenotype” produces unique difficulties. A
phenotype could be understood to represent all aspects of an individual. A disease, on the
other hand, will only ever consist of a subset of attributes. So, while I may have the
“disease phenotype” for hypertension, other aspects of my phenotype, such as my eye
colour or my height, are unaffected. When the words are used interchangeably, the
disease becomes the phenotype. An individual’s entire identity is subsumed by the
disease title that is applied to them.

Closer inspection of the documents in project 2 indicates that, to some extent, the
difficulties of variable language have been recognized. Of the many disease words used,
only 2 are found in the information letter and consent form: “condition” and “disorder”.
Each word is used multiple times without substitution, indicating a commitment to
consistency that is not seen elsewhere. The reason for this isolated consistency is unclear.
It could stem from a desire to simplify consent forms and improve readability. The
consent forms could have had a single author, while the other documents had multiple. It
could have been the result of a research ethics board suggestion to avoid certain
terminology. Whatever the reason, there seems to be some effort to limit the variability of
language in the documents intended for potential research participants.
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Perhaps more important than the limitation of variability is the language selected for use.
Three terms that were not used in either the information letter or the consent form were:
“congenital developmental disorder”, “malformation”, and “abnormality”. These words
are frightening, and would likely be considered pejorative by some (Hodgson, Hughes et
al. 2005). It makes sense to omit them from consent documents. However, if such
language is inappropriate on a consent form, what makes it more appropriate to use in
other documents? This language is found in published literature (papers 1-3) which is
potentially available to research participants. These words are also obviously part of the
normal lexicon of the researchers and are treated here as the equivalents of other disease
related words. While they may be absent from the formal language of consent documents,
it is reasonable to assume that these words could arise in the verbal discussions that are
also part of the consent process.

In many cases, despite a negative tone, these words fulfill important technical roles. They
may be avoided with patients or research participants because of fears that they may be
misunderstood, but potentially remain valuable in other discourse. However, that function
is only possible when each word maintains its own specific definition. A “malformation”
may be quite different from a “disease”, but when the two words are used
interchangeably, as we saw in these documents, that difference is lost and the words lose
their value.
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THEME II. COMPLEX, VAGUE, AND VARIABLE LANGUAGE
SUBTHEME #4: THE PHENOTYPE
An understanding of genetic science requires knowledge of the consequences of the
genome. The technical term used to describe the genetic outcome is the “phenotype”.
Like other genetics concepts encountered in the studied documents, depictions of the
phenotype were complex, allowing for many possible interpretations. In some cases,
descriptions of the phenotype were peculiar, differing significantly from my expectations
and conventional descriptions of health and disease.

Empty condition labels
The word “phenotype” was used relatively rarely in these documents. Clinical
descriptions of the phenotype (lists of characteristics or symptoms) were also uncommon.
The vast majority of references to the consequences of genomic influence used the name
of a condition to describe the outcome.

Below you will find a brief explanation of our study to identify the cause of
[condition].
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 5

These studies will include analysis for genes that affect the risk of
developing [condition].
-

Project 7, Consent Document 3, Line 30
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We propose to determine whether certain genomic regions of either deletion
and/or amplification in genomic DNA are associated with risk of
[condition].
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 151

Research has shown that genetic factors have an effect on the risk of
someone developing [condition] or other types of [] diseases. In other
words, some people are at higher risk of these diseases because of their
genetic make-up.
-

Project 3, Consent Document 1, Line 11

Mutations in [gene] were recently linked with one form of [condition].
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 130

OBJECTIVE: To discover and define additional genetic determinants of
[conditions]….
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 10

This language feels natural. We usually refer to medical conditions by a single name, not
by a list of symptoms. However, the use of this medical nomenclature presumes prior
knowledge of the condition described. In fact, insofar as these names are specialized
medical terms they are probably best thought of as jargon (Farrell, Deuster et al. 2008).
Sometimes this is obvious. Doctors would never tell a patient, “you have amyotrophic
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lateral sclerosis”, and simply assume that the patient understands. However, when using
common condition names, it is easy to overlook their technical nature. I imagine many
patients have been told that they have “diabetes”, “pneumonia”, or “strep throat” without
any further explanation of the terms.

Disease names are only meaningful insofar as they are given a definition. However, just
knowing a definition does not ensure understanding. Science is constantly evolving and
definitions of diseases continuously change. Furthermore, a single disease title is often
applied to a heterogeneous group of symptoms, or conditions that have a wide spectrum
of severity. Fleischmann (1999) recounts her frustration with trying to communicate with
other patients diagnosed with “MDS”. Even though they all shared the same disease title,
every individual had different symptoms, causing confusion and limiting the utility of
discussion. Indeed, within these documents, when the symptoms were listed for a given
condition, they often varied greatly from one description to another.

The use of disease titles without a corresponding definition therefore creates a significant
potential for miscommunication. When disease names are common, they are likely to be
recognized, but this does not guarantee a common understanding. In fact, given that the
researchers will have spent years, if not decades, studying a condition, it is reasonable to
assume that their understandings of that condition will differ significantly from someone
with limited exposure, even if, or perhaps especially if that individual has the given
condition. Many jargon words, such as condition titles, are used commonly making them
difficult to recognize as technical terms (Farrell, Deuster et al. 2008). Although some
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jargon is necessary in proving technical descriptions, it is generally recognized that when
jargon is used a definition or explanation should follow (Makoul 2001). Patients often
have preconceived notions about conditions that are potentially distressing and can differ
significantly from physicians’ understandings (Chapple, Campion et al. 1997, Bedell,
Graboys et al. 2004). The definitional ambiguities disguised by simple disease names
may be even more problematic in genetic research, where interpretations of “phenotype”
appear complicated and unconventional.

The normalized phenotype
When the concept “phenotype” was discussed, the language was complex, variably
applied, and difficult to interpret. My preconception was that “phenotype” is a
characteristic of individuals; a description of one person’s physical characteristics. What I
found was that “phenotype” was applied to a range of concepts, in ways that often
surprised me.

Certainly, in some cases “phenotype” was discussed in individuals, which is the usage
that I would have expected based on previous conversations about health and disease.

In addition, we will characterize the phenotypes of normal and diseased
subjects…
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 1359
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Individuals affected by the disorder were characterized by …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 10

Affected individuals were characterized by [physical characteristics], a
hallmark feature of [condition], but lacked traits common in more severe
forms, such as …
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 114

Our kindred had features similar to the families described by [researcher].
although some differences in phenotype were noted
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 117

This language represents my prior understandings of, and what I believe is the most
common way to discuss, health and disease. Individuals get sick. Dad has diabetes and
Aunt Sue is “affected by” her arthritis. However, the fourth quotation caught my eye. An
individual’s features (the kindred’s) are compared to those of a family. I had trouble
interpreting this – it was unclear to me exactly what it meant for a family to have
features. However, the language of phenotype in a family was used commonly.

In the early [time period] two [nationality] families with similar
characteristics were described..
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 14
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Many members in their study were [], a phenotype that was not observed
from our family
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 14

You are part of a family with an [condition] that may be inherited.
-

Project 3, Consent Document 4, Line 6

I _____________________________________ understand that my/my
spouse’s family has been diagnosed as having a genetic (inherited)
condition called [particular condition.]
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 7

In this paper we report a family with a relatively mild form of [condition].
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 114

The phenotype (represented here as characteristics or disease) does not, therefore, seem
to be an individual attribute. It is something that can be present in a group of people.
These statements challenged my interpretations of both “family” and “phenotype”. 12 The
“phenotype” does not seem to be something that one can point to; it is not her brown
eyes, or her height, or her asthma. It is something that can be shared.

A “phenotype” was also described as something that occurs in cells, body parts, and
biologic processes.

12

For a further discussion of the implications of this language on the concept of family, please refer to
Theme IV: The genetic family.
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While the [condition] phenotype is largely restricted to the [body part], with
some exceptions, the [condition] phenotype affects a broader range of
[bodily] elements.
-

Project 2, Paper 1, Line 202

The lack of phenotype in [condition] beyond that observed in the [body part]
suggests that …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 81

We will express the [gene] mutant in model cell lines…and will assess
effects on cellular phenotype …
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 35

we will: …5) extend families and evaluate metabolic, coagulation and
inflammatory phenotypes of specific mutation types
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 41

[Cells] will be profiled, since the early biochemical phenotype of [condition]
is a [specific] state with altered concentrations of [biochemical].
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 148

Thus, “phenotype” is used to describe a wide range of physical manifestations, from
molecular profiles to features of communities. In some ways, these descriptions seem
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contradictory. If the phenotype is in a body part – in my leg – how is it also shared among
the members of a family?

My preconception of “phenotype” probably impaired my ability to see how it was being
portrayed. I thought of phenotype as something that occurs in biologic entities, and I
could make this understanding fit with the language seen thus far. The phenotype was in
the cell, in the body part, or in the person. Even a family could be interpreted, in some
way, as a biologic entity. However, these documents also contained language that located
“phenotype” in a disease, which obviously required a different interpretation.

… new early phenotypes identified in [genetic conditions] may serve as new,
powerful diagnostic tools to assess [condition] risk in the general
population.
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 88

The lack of phenotype in [conditions] beyond those observed in the []
suggests that …
-

Project 2, Paper 1, Line 259

In this context, it seems clear that phenotype is not used to describe concrete physical
characteristics, but rather abstract or normalized qualities. The idea of a ‘disease
phenotype’ seems to indicate a theoretical collection of symptoms, rather than specific
features of any one individual. This interpretation would also explain how multiple
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individuals in a family, all with unique physical characteristics, can in some way share
the same phenotype. Indeed, there even appears to be a formalized system for the
normalization of human phenotypes:

The “Human Phenome Project” detailed a system for discovery and
cataloguing of standardized phenotypes, and correlating these with genomic
data.
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 77

The understanding of “phenotype” that becomes obvious through this language is that of
a standardized description; it is a method of abstracting away from the specifics in order
to group individuals together. This is an important tool for research. We study “diabetes”,
not necessarily the individuals with diabetes. However, it is also a concept that can be
confusing when re-applied to individuals. Individuals with the ‘same disease’ can present
very differently. One person with diabetes may have near normal blood sugars and only
require some advice on diet and exercise. Another person will have much higher levels,
not only putting them at future risk but also making them currently symptomatic,
requiring a variety of medications, further testing, and possibly hospitalization. These
differences, hidden behind a single disease name, can be problematic in informed
consent, as individuals expect their physicians to discuss their personal risks and benefits,
not those of the “average person” (Walter, Emery et al. 2004).
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As every individual has a specific set of symptoms, signs, and modifying factors, it can
be difficult to determine which are worthy of being grouped into the “phenotype”. This
process of normalization is represented in these documents in the language of
“hallmarks” and “characterization”.

Individuals affected by the disorder were characterized by …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 10

Although [physical characteristic] is the hallmark feature of [condition], a
number of other features have been reported including…
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 37

Affected individuals were characterized by [physical characteristics], a
hallmark feature of [condition], but lacked traits common in more severe
forms, such as…
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 114

Presumably, the set of “hallmark features” corresponds to the phenotype being discussed.
A family can have a phenotype because, despite each family member’s unique physical
attributes, they share a set of specific, hallmark characteristics. These hallmark
characteristics will not be identical in every individual. In a ‘family with high cholesterol’
every member will have a different blood cholesterol level and unique attributes that
modify the impacts of high cholesterol. However, for the sake of communication, we
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group, label, and normalize the individual experiences. Thus, although the concept of a
familial phenotype was difficult to grasp, it makes sense if we understand phenotype to
be an abstract, normalized concept rather than a feature of any one individual.
Language that describes individuals as being “characterized” by physical attributes is
problematic. This language allows the author to decide what attributes of an individual
are important. In many cases, the individual will likely disagree. A person may be blind,
but could rightly object to being ‘characterized by blindness’. This language allows
individual traits, no matter how trivial to a person’s life, to stand in the place of an entire
individuality. As such, this language is likely to be seen as pejorative (Parens and Asch
1999, Taylor and Mykitiuk 2001, Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005).

The other problem with the normalization of “phenotype” is that abstraction away from
the specifics of the individual, while helpful for research, can be counter-productive
clinically. Grouping together all patients with depression, for example, will mask many
different reasons for being depressed and the accordingly different appropriate treatment
modalities. Unlike research, clinical work requires a focus on the specifics of the
individual.

These two different descriptions of illness – the abstract normalized account and the
account of the specifics of an individual – are not mutually exclusive. However, I am not
sure that they are always distinguished by our language. I feel that my confusion about
the depiction of phenotype in these documents was a result of my being stuck on the
specifics, while the documents described the abstract. It took a long time and a lot of
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focus to notice the divergence because the language of disease titles, characteristics, and
phenotypes can be used to describe both. The usage observed in these documents does
not seem to be the same usage we employ in our daily conversations about health and
illness. Even among geneticists there appears to be confusion about how “phenotype”
should be understood, as some geneticists believe individuals can exist who have no
phenotype, but others argue that would be a contradiction (Crusio 2002). Thus, the
phenotype could represent a concept that, due to its multiple possible interpretations,
could weaken informed consent through unrecognized miscommunication.

New classes of illness
The normalization of “phenotype” removes the concept from the realm of everyday
experience. “Phenotype” becomes the property of science; geneticists control which
characteristics are worth our attention. However, the resulting constellation of symptoms
or characteristics remains generally recognizable as a traditional medical condition. Other
descriptions of “disease” or “phenotype” seemed to hint at entirely new classes of illness.
In these descriptions, it appears that people can be sick without having any symptoms.
The geneticists themselves may not know what the symptoms are; they just know that
there is a disease.

Recent studies have shown that this disease often affected multiple family
members some of whom may not have any symptoms
-

Project 4, Consent Document 2, Line 30
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We will: … determine the phenotype in pre-symptomatic FPLD children.
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 39

Sensitive new phenomic tools can reveal previously unseen markers,
sometimes called “early” or “intermediate” phenotypes.
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 78

This language represents a significant departure from normal understandings of health
and illness. In traditional frameworks, patients present with signs and symptoms that
define their disease. Patients were in control; they had the power to decide what ailments
warranted a visit to the doctor. This new language represents disease affecting individuals
even though “they may not have any symptoms”. These are phenotypes in “presymptomatic” individuals, allowing us to label their disease earlier. The ultimate power
in determining who is healthy no longer lies with patients, but is instead controlled by the
findings of geneticists, who can discover and label “early” phenotypes.

This power is evident in the usage of the word normal within quotation marks that was
occasionally observed.

134
Our profiling work in Activity 5 will include pooled leukocytes from
“normal” healthy individuals and we will have established which group of
genes is expressed at detectable levels on microarrays from this work, as
well as from previous profiling studies.
-

Project 6, Grant Application, Line 241

The goal for profiling [condition] in “normal” cell and tissue sources is to
generate an atlas of [] that is representative of the “normal” adult human
population.
-

Project 6, Grant Application, Line 126

Recently, in a preliminary study scanning [] the genome in 55 'normal' individuals
we discovered … that [unique mutations] exist in the human genome.
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 39

When I first encountered this usage, I imagined the quotations were being used in a way
that I have used them in the past – to indicate skepticism with the general concept that we
can normalize human beings. However, the third quotation implies a different
interpretation. The researchers found new mutations in these individuals. While they
originally believed these individuals did not have a disease phenotype, the finding of a
mutation made the researchers questions if these people were indeed “normal”.
Presumably, now that the mutation is found, the goal is to find the phenotype.
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The creation of new classes of illness and the search for new phenotypes is seemingly the
result of a gene-centered theory of disease. In the past we might have diagnosed people
based on their symptoms, and then went looking for the associated gene. Now, we can
diagnose people based on their genes and then search out their symptoms after the fact.
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THEME II: COMPLEX, VAGUE, AND VARIABLE LANGUAGE
SUMMARY
The language of these documents was difficult to interpret. My initial goal of developing
contextual definitions of key terminology proved to be impossible. Language use was far
too complex, ambiguous, and variable to allow inference of the authors’ intended
meanings.

Despite the complexity in the language presented throughout this theme, my presentation
fails to capture the utter confusion I was faced with throughout the process of coding. The
organization of language into discrete categories for the purposes of writing produces an
artificial sense of order in the presented data. In this analysis, I compare and contrast
language usages that, because they exist across many different documents and studies,
would not be evident to the audience of any individual document. Furthermore, each
category of language described here was modified by countless others, each of which was
equally complex. For example, subthemes that developed in conjunction with the
language of causation, but were not presented due to limitations on space, included:
language describing multiple levels of causation (from gene to protein to organism);
language describing who gets sick (from individuals to families to communities);
language of certainty and uncertainty (such as ‘the gene may cause’); language describing
heredity; and the lack of language depicting non-genetic causes. The language of each of
these subthemes was equally complex, variable, and vague, and therefore the overall
depiction of the authors’ understandings of genetic causation was chaotic.
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Vague or incomprehensible language is problematic for informed consent. The
importance of comprehensible consent forms, which eliminate abstruse language and
esoteric jargon, is well recognized (Sankar 2004, Stead, Eadie et al. 2005, Beardsley,
Jefford et al. 2007). Certainly, unfamiliar or technical language was a factor in my
confusion. However, the vast majority of language used was common and superficially
uncomplicated. That common language can also confuse was a key insight from this
research. Unlike jargon, the equivocal meaning of these common words is unlikely to be
recognized. Consequently, the intended meanings of these words will not be clarified,
increasing the likelihood of unrecognized miscommunication.

The role of genetics in health and disease is complex and interpreted differently
throughout the literature (Lippman 1992, Conrad 1999, Cox and Starzomski 2004,
Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). The genetic framework, based in probability and prediction,
varies significantly from traditional depictions of health and disease (Bayertz 1998, ten
Have 2003, Bhutta 2004). Furthermore, personal understanding of genetic health
conditions will be strongly influenced by individual life experiences (Wittgenstein 1968).
Therefore, it is likely that a geneticist, having spent years focused on the potential genetic
mechanisms of disease, will have different understandings of genetics related language
than the general public. However, the ambiguity and variability of the language
encountered in these documents obscures any such differences in understanding.

When definitions are not explicit, readers are forced to guess at intended meanings,
allowing other, potentially inappropriate factors to influence understanding. It is
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recognized that the media has created significant hype around genetic research that could
skew understandings (Petersen 2001, Bubela and Caulfield 2004). The language of these
documents subtly reinforces such hype by portraying genetics as the only or major cause,
and intimately connecting disease phenotype with genetic changes. Furthermore, these
documents are written and distributed by experts and authority figures, and therefore have
a sense of objectivity. A bias towards genetics is probably expected in documents arising
from genetic research (as any researcher will likely have a bias in favour of his or her
own research), but when such language appears in informed consent documents it may
inappropriately aggrandize the potential benefits and thus entice participation.

Language may influence informed choice, but again one should not infer that these
researchers are manipulating their research participants. These researchers generously
and voluntarily participated in this ethics study. They are highly respected clinicians with
their patients’ and research participants’ best interests at heart. I have described new
understandings of the ways that familiar language can result in miscommunication and
therefore influence informed consent. As far as I know, this is the first time some of these
issues have been noted, so the authors of these documents could not have been aware of
them. Potential research participants may be enticed into participation, but if they are it
would be the result of the unintended and unrecognized ambiguity of the everyday
language that was used.

Significant differences were noted between the language used in consent documents and
the language found elsewhere in the genetic research documents. In general, the language
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in consent documents was limited and simplified when compared to other research
documents, such as grant applications and published papers. This is consistent with the
push to make informed consent documents comprehensible by writing them in language
suitable to specific, lower grade levels (Hochhauser 1997, Baevsky 2008, Jefford and
Moore 2008). Unfortunately, biologic processes are inherently complex, and the process
of simplifying language also seems to simplify the depiction of those processes. Thus,
although the goal of simplifying language is to increase comprehension, the descriptions
provided may sacrifice important information and therefore actually inhibit
understanding.

Misunderstandings arising from common, but inconsistently interpreted language may
also have effects that extend beyond informed consent. Decisions to conduct and fund
research may be influenced by language use that emphasizes the importance of the
genome. Independent of scientific support, understandings of genetics will also influence
medical practice and patient expectations (Liss, Aspevali et al. 2004). Furthermore,
conclusions about genetic causality may extend beyond molecular mechanisms and into
the social realm, affecting ideas of personal, familial, and social responsibility (Rothstein
and Billings 1992, Crosseley 2002). Finally, varying understandings of vague and
variable language can contribute to the capacity of our language to cause harm (Rothstein
1991, Nisker and Daar 2006). For these reasons, it will be important to further explore the
understandings of the genetics related language discussed here with the authors of these
documents and their intended audience.
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THEME III. THE LACK OF DEFINITIONS
The process of coding frequently left me confused and frustrated. I was trying to
understand words that seemed to defy definition. All that I wanted was a dictionary that
could help order the chaos. In retrospect, it seems odd that it took me so long to officially
notice that these documents contained no explicit definitions, no glossaries, and no
resources to aid those who did not understand.

Of course, the reason for my delayed recognition was the fact that there was nothing to
recognize. I was focused on coding, and no coded sentence could reveal what was not
there. It is a difficult task to observe the absent. It is also a difficult task to present the
absent. As a results section, this could not possibly be shorter. I have no quotations to
present.

Once I recognized the lack of definitions, their absence surprised me. I realized, given the
nature of the documents, that I would have expected clear definitions. The purpose of
informed consent documents is to explain complex scientific concepts to individuals who
may have no prior exposure to such concepts. Surely, such a feat requires definitions?
Grant applications also seem to warrant definitions. The documents are written to
promote new research, often with novel research methods, and certainly with the goal of
achieving novel results. I would have assumed that some concepts associated with such
cutting-edge work would need to be defined.
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After I noticed the general lack of definitions, I re-read the documents specifically
looking for any that I may have missed. In a handful of instances explanations of terms
were embedded into the text, but these examples were certainly the exception and not the
rule.

This study is designed to identify the genetic (i.e. heritable factors that are
passed through your bloodline) risk factors responsible for the susceptibility
of [condition].
-

Project 4, Consent Document 1, Line 27

[Condition] is a genetic disorder, which is inherited as an autosomal
dominant trait. This means that an affected individual has a 50% chance of
passing the disorder to their children.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 1, Line 8

[Researcher] is investigating [condition’s] substantial inherited component,
looking at the ways mutations (DNA sequence changes) affect [organ]
development and [] function.
-

Project 3, Grant summary, Line 9

I debated with myself extensively about whether these quotations truly represent
definitions. Part of the problem, I have come to realize, is that I was not sure how to
define “definition”. In each example, a concept is further explained, but the consequence
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could be either an “explanation” or a “definition”. The distinction may be important,
considering the complexity and opacity of the language seen in these documents.
Reflecting on my results, I believe an explanation is any statement that attempts to put a
complex concept into plain words, while a definition is a method of formalizing a word’s
intended meaning. In other words, when a word is defined, each and every time that word
is used it means the same thing. Both concepts are important. Explanations help clarify
the complex scientific and genetic terminology – or the jargon – found in genetic research
documents. Definitions, on the other hand, can be used delineate even simple concepts to
ensure a shared understanding. That is, most of us would not need “health”, “disease”, or
“normalcy” explained to us, but we may want to know how the researcher defines these
concepts.

I think, therefore, that the above examples are best thought of as explanations. Their
presence does indicate that the authors are aware that some of the concepts that they use
are complex and difficult to understand. It remains unclear, however, why these
explanations are so rare.

When I could not find explicit definitions, I began looking for language or structure that
might provide some of the functionality of definitions. I think, in some instances, a
reference section might represent a source for further explanation or definition. Readers
with enough interest and energy can trace unfamiliar concepts to the source, and in doing
so potentially determine their definitions. This process may work for grant applications
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and published papers, although I suspect it is rarely used. However, none of the consent
documents in this study contained a reference section.

I imagine that the duel processes of written and verbal informed consent partly explain
the observed lack of definitions. Researchers probably see their role in the consent
process as explaining and clarifying the content of the consent form. In a sense, they
function as the dictionary or reference. However, there are problems with such a verbal
dictionary. Unlike a static document, there is no guarantee of consistency in the
definitions provided (Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999). Research ethics boards are unable to
review this form of information to ensure its adequacy. Furthermore, one of the primary
reasons to provide written consent documents is to provide a lasting source of
information, as it is unlikely that individuals will absorb all important information from
just a single meeting (Ghulam 2006). What is the value of an information letter that does
not contain key information?

My biggest concern with relying on verbal clarification of written information is the
responsibility it places on the reader. This system forces the reader to identify words that
he or she does not understand, and then ask for clarification. In some cases, this might not
happen because the reader is embarrassed to admit a lack of knowledge. More
importantly, as we have seen in exploring the language of genetic causation, it is possible
to not recognize the words that need to be defined. The words may be familiar, but the
author and the reader may define them differently.
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Putting definitions on the informed consent documents negates this problem. It allows the
researcher, with input from a research ethics board and ideally also from representatives
of the target population, to identify the key concepts behind the research and explicitly
define them from the outset.
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THEME VII. THE GENETIC FAMILY
The depiction of “family” that I encountered in these documents seemed unusual. Like all
of the language observed, descriptions of “family” were complex, varied, and at times
very difficult to interpret. This section focuses on the most consistent usage of “family”:
the depiction of families as single, coherent, modifiable entities that are defined
genetically.

I first noticed that the definition of family employed in these documents might differ
from my own when families were described as having characteristics or diseases.

In the early [time] two [nationality] families with similar characteristics
were described.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 14

This study could lead to a better understanding of how [condition] occurs in
families.
-

Project 7, Consent Document 3, Line 20

I _____________________________________ understand that my/my spouse’s
family has been diagnosed as having a genetic (inherited) condition called
[particular condition.]
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 7
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This usage of “family” was novel to me. With my preconceived notions about “family” I
was unable to grasp the meaning of a ‘family with a characteristic’. The image that came
to mind was that of a large group of people trying to balance on a bathroom scale, so that
the researcher could conclude, “your family weighs one thousand six hundred and twelve
pounds”. Likewise, a family with a disease indicated to me a group of people with foodpoisoning – everyone is sick. Although not explicit in these phrases, it seems obvious that
not every member of the family had the disease or characteristic in question. The
statement “I understand that my/my spouse’s family has been diagnosed as having a
genetic (inherited) condition” seems pointless or redundant if every member shares the
same disease – who would not already know? Therefore, it appears that these were not
statements of observation, but rather of definition.

This idea was reinforced by language that indicated families could possess mutations or
genes.

We have now shown that two of his families had mutations in [gene]
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 259

We have also documented this mutation in families from …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 288
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We have collected DNA samples from 16 [condition] families and have
sequenced the [] gene in all except family 14
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 401

The concept of a family having a mutation produces seemingly arbitrary exclusions. In
the simplest form of genetic heredity, a parent will have a specific allele (what you could
call a mutation) and that allele will be passed on, by random chance, to 50% of the
genetically related offspring. Therefore, even in the simplest ‘atomic family’ only half of
the members would have a given mutation. Furthermore, spouses are unlikely to be
genetically related and so will also lack the mutation, not to mention families that involve
adoption, re-marriage, or gamete donation. In the average ‘family with a mutation’, less
than half of the individuals will actually possess the genetic change.

The idea of a family with a characteristic seems even less coherent. At least with a gene,
an allele, or a mutation, there may be a single objective entity that some individuals have
in common. A mutation, being just a change in a biochemical chain, can probably be
identically replicated. I am not sure that the same can be said for most characteristics, no
matter how simple. We might say, “Your family has blonde hair”, but this is surely an
over-simplification. If you compare the actual pigmentation of each individual’s hair, you
are likely to find tremendous variation – one may be ‘platinum blonde’ and another ‘dirty
blonde’.
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Therefore, the statement that a family possesses a mutation or a characteristic does not
seem to be observational. A family in which all members share the same mutation or
characteristic, even if loosely defined, would be exceptionally rare. Instead, these
statements are probably best understood to be definitional. They are statements about
what it means to be part of a family. This definitional sense is probably best seen in the
use of the phrase “disease family”.

Some [familial condition] families with no mutation in a known gene may
be sufficiently informative…
-

Project 1, Summary, Line 46

Upon identification of the mutation and validation in other [condition]
families, our immediate goal will be to …
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 571

Membership in a “[condition] family” seems predicated on the presence of the condition,
or the mutation in the case of genetic conditions. By combining the family and the
condition into a single entity, the meaning of “family” is fundamentally altered and the
relationship of the individual members becomes less certain, especially for those who
would have not previously considered themselves to have the condition. This may result
in individuals perceiving themselves differently, or being perceived differently by family
members, based on whether or not they have the mutation or disease.
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Imagine a family in which some of the individuals have been shown to have a BRCA2
(breast cancer related gene) mutation. To use the language of these documents, this is a
“breast cancer family that has a mutation in the breast cancer gene”. It would be difficult
to be counted as part of this family without the mutation, but this obviously excludes
members of the family we would traditionally recognize.13 It also potentially provokes
emotional and cognitive distress. What are the impacts on a daughter who has not
inherited the BRCA2 mutation, when her three sisters and her mother all have breast
cancer? People have described mixed reactions to negative genetic testing, with relief
balanced by feelings of increased responsibility and concerns of marginalization (Burgess
2001). Might there be a sense of detachment or guilt that is emphasized by our language
choice? What about family members who choose not to be tested? We would benefit
from research examining how family members who participate in genetics research see
themselves in relation to other family members depending on whether or not they are
found to carry the “mutation that occurs in the family”.

It is clear that the use of “family” that predominates in these documents varies
significantly from everyday language. The definition is based on genetics rather than any
social relationship. Thus, the definition seems to be based on the ideals and goals of the
researchers, to whom the concept of family is valuable insofar as it is associated with

13

My assumption that families are not normally thought of as “having disease” may reflect my personal
bias in language use. Although this language is novel to me, it may be familiar to the potential research
participants, who are the intended audience of these documents. I do not belong to a family that has been
diagnosed with a ‘genetic condition’. I am also medically trained, and thus probably more focused on
mechanisms of genetic inheritance and causation that make it unlikely, if not impossible, for every member
of a family to share the same genetic makeup. Certainly, families in which multiple members have been
diagnosed as having a disease, such as breast cancer, may very well consider their family ‘to have’ or ‘to be
affected by’ disease. Issues of language use among individual diagnosed with ‘genetic conditions’ will have
to be addressed with such individuals in the future.
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genetic disease. This is further evident in the description of how geneticists control the
family, expanding and extending the concept based on research goals, and redrawing
family trees based on genetics findings.

After our extensive clinical characterization, the family was subsequently
extended to include an additional 15 members, and genetic linkage studies
were initiated to identify the gene that causes [condition].
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 223

We will … extend families and evaluate … phenotypes
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 58

These families will be expanded and evidence for causation of the [ ]
mutations will be obtained ….
-

Project 1, Grant Summary, Line 21

Since we discovered a new pod of the family we anticipate a significant
increase in this value.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 246

We have obtained DNA samples from descendants of [researcher 1’s]
historically relevant family and we demonstrated that this family not only
had the same mutation as [researcher 2’s] families, but that [researcher 1’s]
[nationality] family was also related to the [researcher 2’s] [nationality]
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family. We have also documented this mutation in families from [place] and
from [place] suggesting that a common founder may be responsible for a
significant proportion of [condition] cases with [gene] mutations.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 286

The observation of a common haplotype between the three families suggests
that the [ ] mutation is an ancestral allele.
-

Project 2, Paper 3, Line 87

Here we see that the concept “family” is no longer just studied, but fundamentally
changed – “extended” for the goals and by the criteria of science. It appears that
individuals only count as “family” if they meet the study’s criteria. Previously distinct
families and individuals, completely unknown to each other, become a single family
because of research results or an “ancestral allele”. This language leaves little doubt that
family is understood as a genetic concept. Genetics has the power to look back in time
and discover new ‘scientifically true’ families.

More than just emphasizing genetics, the language of these documents creates the
concept of family that fits the research. This is best seen in the depiction of single person
families.
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The DNA was from family 16, which is currently represented by a single
individual.
-

Project 2, Grant Application, Line 419

The candidate gene sequencing approach showed that two patients had
novel rare missense mutations in [gene]. These families will be expanded...
-

Project 1, Summary, Line 20

In each case, a single individual composes a family – though it is clear from the second
example that the researchers hope this will not be the case for long. It is difficult to
understand what it means for a single individual to be a family. The definition employed
here seems to abandon any need for relationship, whether social or genetic. It is evident
that the definition of “family” is guided by researcher goals and understandings.14

The emphasis on “family” as a genetic rather than a social construct has potential legal
and social ramifications (Caulfield 2002). Language that emphasizes “familial disease”
and the responsibility of an “ancestral allele” may increase the feelings of guilt associated
with passing on a mutation (Cox and Starzomski 2004). This language could also
reinforce ideas of legal culpability of previous generations for current health problems
(Pioro 2008). The language used here may also strengthen views that ‘biologic’ families

14

The idea of letting a single individual stand for an entire family is analogous to the language that was
used to describe phenotypes, where single trait was often allowed to represent an entire individual. It is also
similar to the language discussed in Theme V (Conceptual meshing) where we see individuals’ entire
identities tied to their disease state. Obviously, in focusing on a tiny part of the whole, this language
drastically oversimplifies the concept it is supposed to represent. The author claims the power to determine
what aspect of the whole is essential and ignores the rest.
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are in some way more legitimate than families not based on ‘blood or marriage’ and
reinforce stigma surrounding adoption, childlessness, and infertility (Holtzman 2008). If
we focus on genetic relationships, it is unclear who qualifies as family. Married couples
who do not have children are not genetically related – would they count as family? What
about families that involve adoption, re-marriage, or gamete donation? Current family
law already favours biologic relationships over those based on social ties alone and
language of individuals in positions of power, such as respected scientists, that support
this definition could have a powerful impact (Deech 1998, Caulfield 2002, Holtzman
2008).

The language used to discuss genetic families produces problems at two extremes. In
some cases the individual is allowed to stand for the whole family, while in others the
family eliminates any sense of individuality. The use of “condition family” emphasizes
the family, provoking conditional membership, and disregarding or disguising the
individual members, many of whom will not have the eponymous condition. Even among
those with the condition, this language promotes a potentially trivial trait – membership
in a “condition family” – to a defining characteristic. At the other extreme, language was
used that represented an entire family through a single individual. Again, a potentially
trivial attribute of that individual – his genetic makeup, or condition – was used to define
the entire family. This synecdochic language, in which either a part is allowed to stand
for the whole, or the whole for a part, represents the power of the author to unilaterally
assign significance and promote a theory of disease that may not be accepted by those
being described (Parens and Asch 1999).
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Although I believe that the language used here illustrates the tremendous power that can
be associated with language choice, I do not believe that the authors of these documents
intended their language to be interpreted in this manner. In fact, given the subtle ways in
which language’s power is manifested, I imagine that the authors were unaware of the
potential social implications of their words. (As some of these social implications are
noted here for what I believe to be the first time, it would seem impossible to have been
aware of them.) Certainly, training in the medical sciences has not historically included a
significant focus on the impacts of written language. These well respected scientists
voluntarily contributed their documents to an ethical analysis of their language. These
scientists are obviously acting with the best interests of their patients and research
participants in mind. That their language could be interpreted as potentially harmful is
surprising, and illustrates the complexity of language that can be interpreted differently
by different individuals.

The varying meanings and understandings of “family” also impact the communication
between researcher and potential research participant. Although a textual analysis,
without the input of the authors and audience, can never be certain about a word’s
intended meanings and ultimate interpretations, it seems that the representations of
“family” in these documents differ significantly from the standard understandings of the
word. However, the multiple possible interpretations are hidden within a single,
seemingly simple and recognizable word, increasing the opportunity for
miscommunication. This easily missed gap in language could pose a significant obstacle
in the informed consent process.
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THEME V. CONCEPTUAL MESHING

The “disease individual”
‘Conceptual meshing’ is used to refer to a linguistic formulation observed frequently in
the studied documents, in which two distinct concepts are combined into a single new
entity, usually without clear meaning. It is left to the reader to determine how the
components of the distinct concepts are supposed to mesh.

Despite the frequency of its use, conceptual meshing was not noted until late in the
coding process. The style was familiar, and in many ways quite natural. It is used
commonly in everyday language, and the majority of uses were unremarkable. It was
only the cacophonous tone of the phrase “disease individual” that drew attention to the
style.

For each disease type we will profile [genetic material] for up to 30 disease
individuals such that sufficient quantities of data can be generated ascertain
whether there are statistically significant differences in the quantitative
distribution of specific [genetic] patterns between the disease individuals,
compared to the pooled sample of healthy/normal individuals.
-

Project 6, Grant Application, Line 248
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Some remaining subgroup of [condition] individuals will have [] mutations
that may be revealed …
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 71

We will also examine [condition] subjects who have no mutations in
[specific genes] …
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 98

We will also examine a subset of another 20 [condition] patients, for which
their mutation has not yet been determined.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 762

We will: i) extend novel [condition] kindreds with mutations called []; ii)
perform [] comparison of [conditions]; iii) determine the phenotype in presymptomatic [condition] children.
-

Project 1, Grant Sumary, Line 39

The phrase “disease individual” stood out because it was novel and unexpected.15 It had
the appearance of a typographical error, except that it was repeated consistently. Disease
was not an adjective used to describe the individual, as in “diseased individual”. Nor was
it an attribute of an individual, as in “individual with disease”. In fact, in this meshed

15

For the confidentiality of my research participants, [condition] is used in place of the specific condition
names being studied. The true tone of these phrases is revealed by substituting a specific condition name
for “[condition]”, such as “diabetes individual” or “cancer individual”. See Theme I: The difficulty with
presenting qualitative data ethically and anonymously for further discussion.
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formulation, it is not even clear that the individual is given priority. Disease and
individual are no longer separate, but a single, new concept: the “disease individual”.

As a reader of these documents, I was left to ponder the meaning of this new phrase.16 I
had a reasonable understanding of the word “individual”. Interpretation of “disease” was
more complex, but I could draw on external references to help clarify meaning. On the
other hand, “disease individual” cannot be found in any dictionary, nor even in common
usage. The reader is left to rely on personal understandings of “disease” and “individual”
to postulate what the combination might mean.

The unique and complex combination was emphasized by the use of more customary
language elsewhere in the documents. Individuals were said to be “diseased” or to be
“with disease.”

We will examine individuals with [condition], but no mutation in [specific
genes]…
-

16

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 98

One of the important limitations of this study is the inability to comment on how language is understood
by other readers. Confusion of the coder could represent usage of language that is generally confusing, but
it could also indicate the coder’s specific lack of knowledge, an over-analysis of certain ideas, or a cultural
and educational background that may differ drastically from that of the intended audience of the
documents. An important, and anticipated, next step is to directly explore these ideas with the authors and
the intended audience of the documents.
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The discovery of significant differences in [gene] expression in patients with
disease, particularly in genes of known medical relevance, may lead to
enhanced diagnostic procedures and …
-

Project 6, Grant Application, Line 252

In addition, we will characterize the phenotypes of normal and diseased
subjects …
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 1358

The use of such traditional language highlights the novelty of “disease individual”. It
seems to imply a specific intended meaning of this new phrase. However, the very similar
contexts in which the different usages were found made it difficult to guess at their
intended distinction.

Although it was the cacophony of the phrase that originally drew attention to “disease
individual”, it was the ambiguity that provoked. “Disease” and “individual” are both
familiar terms, but their combination is novel. The use of such a compound neologism is
problematic for informed choice. The phrase is not defined – either within these
documents or in any outside resource. The reader is left to guess at the intended meaning
of the author, leaving room for misinterpretation and distress.

When compared to other forms of neologism, conceptual meshing may be particularly
prone to miscommunication. A neologism that is completely foreign is likely to be
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defined. A conceptually meshed neologism, on the other hand, has a familiar feeling. The
individual words are well known, despite the novelty of their combination. The author is
therefore more likely to neglect the need for definition, as was seen in these documents
with “disease individual”. The reader is also more likely overlook the term, and therefore
fail to ask for clarification.

Unlike completely novel words, which could adopt any meaning, interpretation of
meshed concepts is presumably limited by the terms involved. It seems clear that “disease
individual” has something to do with “disease” and “individual”. However, the possible
interpretations are still quite varied. Using the analogy of another meshed concept, ‘fire
truck’, we can see that meshed concepts are prone to ambiguity. Among many other
possibilities, a ‘fire truck’ could be a truck on fire, a truck painted with fire decals, a truck
meant to fight fires, a truck used to start fires, a truck that delivers fire wood, or matches,
or lighters, or even a cloud of smoke that takes on the shape of a truck. Further ambiguity
arises when one considers the various interpretations of ‘truck’: pick-up truck, dump
truck, monster truck, toy truck, eighteen-wheeler, etc… “Disease individual”, being a
novel combination of two fairly complex terms, is even more cryptic.

Of course, the phrase ‘fire truck’ is generally well understood to mean a big red vehicle
used to fight fires. The term has developed a specific definition based on common usage.
“Disease individual”, on the other hand, is a novel combination. Therefore, it cannot have
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yet developed a consensus definition. Like the first use of ‘fire truck’, “disease
individual” currently requires clarification.17

It should be noted that, in the documents studied, the meshed “disease individual” was
not seen in consent forms or information letters. It was exclusively found in grant
applications. However, even its presence there should raise questions about informed
consent. If the phrase is commonly employed by geneticists, it is reasonable to assume
that it will eventually be found on documents intended for research participants or
patients. More importantly, we must consider the significance of the gap in language
between consent forms and other scientific documents. While the meaning of “disease
individual” is unclear to me, it is obviously used by the authors to describe a specific
concept. The “disease individuals” were, after all, the focus of the research described.
The omission of such language from consent forms may represent an inadequate
description of the research being conducted. Surely, if the language is important in
describing the project to grant committees, it would also be important in the description
provided to potential participants. Individuals may rightly want to know that, for the
purpose of a study, they are specifically considered “disease individuals”.

The unclear meaning of these terms may also be problematic in scientific
communication: both with grant committees and among scientists. It is unclear the extent
to which such terms are used and known among geneticists. They were found in four

17

The context of meshed neologisms is presumably important in determining the need for explicit
definition. In literary works, where many such terms arise, and even in day to day life, some degree of
ambiguity is tolerable and probably considered artistic. However in scientific literature, and especially on
consent forms and information letters, it is problematic.
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different projects in this analysis, but the pool of Canadian genetics researchers from
which we were drawing was small, so the authors may have known each other, or even
shared documents. However, if such terms are not commonly understood, their use in
scientific communication could weaken comprehension and jeopardize objectivity.

The phrase “disease individual” is further problematic in its implications for the
individual. It is not immediately clear how “disease individuals” differ from other
individuals, but the language certainly implies a distinction. (Why else emphasize the
“disease”?) In fact, it is not even clear that a “disease individual” should be understood to
be an individual. The two concepts are entangled. The disease is integral, so the
individuality is presumably diminished (as compared to a ‘stand-alone’ individual.)
Although the presence or absence of a condition may be paramount to geneticists, that
same condition may be secondary to the individuals who possess it. Unfortunately,
language that meshes disease and individual signals a potentially false and harmful
importance of disease.

Language has been recognized as a powerful tool that can shape our thoughts and
influence our understandings of social acceptability (Rothstein 1991, Devlieger 1999,
Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005). Numerous studies have indicated a direct impact of
language choice on our actions (Zhang and Norman 1995, Zhang 1997, Hall 2006,
Heritage, Robison et al. 2007). The ultimate impact of language that meshes the concepts
of disease and individuality are presently unknown, but current discussion of the impacts
of language may help us understand what such impacts could be.
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A significant body of literature has been dedicated to the discussion of the best, or most
appropriate, phrases to use when referring to individuals with disabilities (Devlieger
1999, Harris 2000, Byron, Cockshott et al. 2005, Jette 2005, Schuntermann 2005, Jette
2006). Accepted terminology has changed drastically with time, indicating acceptance of
the idea that word choice matters (Devlieger 1999). Although there is no consensus on
the best language, and accepted usages vary by country, an underlying theme is clear: we
strive for language that emphasizes individuality and ensures that disability is recognized
as a secondary (at most) characteristic (Shakespeare 1999).

The meshed “disease individual” clearly runs counter to this goal. Rather than
recognizing disease as secondary, it becomes an essential, inseparable component. It is
not clear how individuality is supposed to be interpreted in this meshed entity. The
combination allows a single trait to obliterate a whole identity (Parens and Asch 1999). It
also meshes the individual to a concept – “disease” – that has been classified as offensive
or pejorative by affected individuals (Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005).

The analysis of written documents can only reveal potential interpretations of language,
rather than the authors’ intended meanings. I am certain that the well-respected scientists
who generously donated their documents for this ethical analysis would be distressed to
see their language interpreted as other than completely encouraging understanding of
information and promoting informed choice of their research participants. This analysis
highlights the potential problems resulting from the numerous and frequently unintended
potential misunderstandings of genetics related language. Any harmful interpretations of
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language encountered throughout this thesis are certainly unintentional. Nevertheless, the
goal of this research was to highlight and study such unintended harms so that they may
be prevented in the future.

Some language, rather than combining individuality and disease, seemed to eliminate the
concept of individuality altogether. The individual still exists in the “disease individual”.
The sense of primacy may be lost, but the individual has not been discounted altogether.
Unfortunately, there was one example in the studied documents of individuals being
referred to only as a disease:

Initially, we will use high-resolution [technique] to examine the [genetic]
composition of the parents of 20 [condition] having deletions.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 760

This sentence is awkward and difficult to understand. The proposed research aims at
examining the genetic composition of the ‘parents of 20 individuals with genetic
deletions’. However, the sentence reads: we are going to study the ‘parents of 20
condition name having deletions’. The individuals are replaced by their condition name.
This phenomenon has been recognized previously, with patients in hospitals often being
referred to by a disease name or body part, such as “I am going to see the kidney in room
7” or “I admitted a sickle cell last night”. Though not uncommon, such language is
unanimously recognized as inappropriate and disrespectful of patients (Fleischman 1999).
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There appears to be a spectrum of language that can be used to describe individuals with
disease, with “disease individual” being an intermediate between “disease” on its own
and “individual with a disease”. (Perhaps the far end of this spectrum should be
understood to include “individual” with no mention of disease.) The meaning of this
spectrum, however, is unclear. It may represent a temporal change in language use, with
one form becoming more commonly used. If this is the case, it would presently be
impossible to say which direction along the spectrum we are headed. It could also
represent a spectrum of power, in which different scenarios call for different tools of
language.18 Finally, it is possible that the various phrases are just the result of arbitrary,
unconsidered language choice.19

Conceptual meshing creates a further linguistic problem that I have not seen discussed
elsewhere in the literature. By combining “disease” and “individual”, a new class of
words seems to be potentially pejorative or dangerous. Words that are legitimately
applied to a single component of a meshed concept may be problematic when applied to
the whole. We may want to “eradicate” disease, but this language would be shocking if
applied to a “disease individual”. 20

18

Again, the language used here illustrates the power that can be associated with language choice.
However, I do not believe that the authors of these documents intended their language to be interpreted in
this manner. These well respected scientists voluntarily contributed their documents to an ethical analysis
of their language. These scientists are obviously acting with the best interests of their patients and research
participants in mind. That their language could be interpreted as potentially harmful is surprising, and
illustrates the complexity of language that can be interpreted differently by different individuals.
19
Variable and seemingly random word choice was consistently seen in other areas of these documents.
Please see Theme II: Complex, vague, and variable language for further discussion.
20
In this respect, the phrase “disease individual” could actually be beneficial in genetics research. A
common concern raised about language in genetics is discussion of curing or eliminating disease. While
these goals seem laudable, in genetics the condition is part of an individual, and currently the only way to
eliminate the disease is to eliminate the person. Thus, substitution of “disease individual” for “disease” may
serve as a reminder of the problems with such statements.
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Other meshed individuals
Once the phenomenon of conceptual meshing was recognized, it was noted frequently.
However, it remained a difficult phenomenon to identify. I have re-read sections of text
repeatedly, only to notice an example of conceptual meshing on a subsequent reading.
Further exploring the documents and reflecting on everyday language revealed that
conceptual meshing is a very common phenomenon, which likely explains why it was
often difficult to spot. We use meshed phrases everyday: television dinner, coffee table,
picture frame, soup can, bus driver, door man, etc. Its omnipotence suggests that
conceptual meshing is an integral component of our language, presumably increasing
flexibility and descriptive ability. However, the fact that conceptual meshing is prevalent
does not diminish its complexity, especially in novel combinations.

In the documents studied here, “individual” was noted to be meshed with many concepts
other than “disease”. These other examples of conceptual meshing provide insight into
the meaning and impact of the phrase “disease individual”. In one case, we see
individuals meshed with their place of origin:

Furthermore, compared with [another place] in which 5 mutations account
for >90% of all [condition] cases, the diverse spectrum of causative
mutation types in [place] subjects with [condition] creates an excellent
resource for evaluating a range of phenotype-genotype variability.
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 30
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In this section of the grant application, the author is arguing that location is an important
aspect of the proposed research. Geography is one of the factors that make this study
worth funding. In this context, the characteristic of study participants most important to
the researcher/author is their location. The author’s values enter the language through
conceptual meshing. Like disease, a characteristic that in most settings is entirely trivial is
made an integral component of the individual’s identity. In fact, the individual as an
individual is lost, and a new concept is formed: the “place individual”.

Elsewhere, we see individuals meshed with their role as a research participant:

As a research subject, it is your right to know and understand all the
procedures that are to be done in this study
-

Project 1, Consent Document 1, Line 19

THE INFORMATION SHEET MUST BE ATTACHED TO THIS CONSENT FORM
AND A COPY GIVEN TO THE RESEARCH SUBJECT
-

Project 3, Consent Document 2, Line 56

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, please call …
-

Project 4, Consent Document 1, Line 81

Additionally, we have genotyped 258 patients and 188 control subjects …
-

Project 4, Summary, Line 21
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These terms, although familiar, are further examples of conceptual meshing. These
examples further illustrate how conceptual meshing can take trivial characteristics – such
as being involved in a research study – and make them intrinsic to the individual, based
on the priorities of the researcher/author. To the researcher, the most important
characteristic of a “research subject” is his involvement in the research.21 Likewise,
“control subjects” are important only insofar as they are controls.

I want to re-emphasize that I do not believe that any of the scientists who voluntarily
contributed their research documents to this analysis actually think that their research
participants are valuable only for their research roles. This language emphasizes the
inherent conflict of the medical researcher. They perform their research precisely to help
their research participants; they care about their research participants. However, the
demands of objective quantitative research are that individuals be considered in the
absence of their individuality, as statistics, in order to reduce bias and discover abstract
truths. The language used represents that hidden conflict and illustrates the confusion that
is possible when the same words can be used in both a specific technical or scientific
sense in addition to a meaning more familiar to the potential research participant.

Finally, we have an intriguing example of individuals meshed to another individual.

21

Of course, the word “subject” in itself is problematic for much the same reason. It is a word that indicates
that the primary worth of the individual is his role in research. A subject is abstracted of individual
characteristics in order to become a passive object of study.
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The genotypes were subsequently compared to data from the [researcher]
families.
-

Project 2, Paper 3, Line 72

Here, the author meshes individuals with the characteristic that is most important from
the standpoint of the paper: the fact that they were previously studied by a specific
researcher.22 In the lives of the individuals mentioned, one can guess that the researcher
was no more than a tertiary character. However, in this phrase the very essence of these
families is entwined with the research. The researcher is elevated to a role of fundamental
significance.

These examples of conceptual meshing illustrate the potential power of such language.
The author is able to choose any characteristic, no matter how trivial, and fundamentally
entangle it with an individual. These phrases may be descriptive or even logical, but they
are based solely on the priorities of the author. The individuals described have no input,
despite the fundamentally transformative impacts of the language.

An analogy to consider is of the phrase “street person”. This phrase discounts the
individuality of the person. The individual, in this context, only matters insofar as he
lives on the street. This language allows us to distance ourselves from an individuality
that we don’t want to consider and focus on an object defined by its lack of a home. Of
course, the same individual who at one time is a “street person” may at another time be a

22

This language also presents individuals as possessions. Like “subject”, it paints an image of subservient
individuals who are studied, and ultimately owned by the researcher.
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“place individual”, and at another be a “disease individual”, while all the time
considering himself “brother”, “son”, “father”, or “person”. In each case, it is the author
who defines the essential characteristic the person.

The use of “disease individual” is therefore not simply stylistic. It is a tool of language
that allows the author to define the purpose of the individual. We can objectify him. We
can discuss his disease without having to consider the symptoms and suffering, allowing
for ‘better’ and ‘more objective’ science. 23

The X gene and other meshed concepts
In addition to the meshed “disease individual”, the concept disease was also noted to be
combined with a number of other concepts in these documents, including genes,
mutations, loci, and tissue.

Using genetic approaches, we propose to identify major disease genes that
predispose to [condition].
-

Project 4, Summary, Line 49

A Study to Locate and Isolate the [condition] gene
-

23

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 1

Again, I wish to emphasize that none of the researchers who generously participated in this study
intentionally use language to objectify their research participants. I did not recognize the inherent power of
this language until I had been immersed in these documents for nearly two years. Traditional scientific and
medical training does not encompass the social powers of language. The purpose of this research is not to
identify potentially harms in the past, but rather to explore language so we can be more aware of its impacts
in the future.

170
My DNA sample will not be used for any purpose, other than to look for the
[condition] gene without my further specific written permission.
-

Project 2, Consent Document 2, Line 42

The overall goal of the current proposal is to identify major disease genes
that predispose to the inherited susceptibility of [condition] by:
-

Project 4, Grant Summary, Line 30

Human disease mutations and SNPs often occur in these sequences…
-

Project 6, Grant Application, Line 4

[A grant] previously funded discovery… of >70 human disease mutations
causing [condition], [condition] and [condition].
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 6

We may additionally include disease tissue for …
-

Project 7, Grant Application, Line 165

These variants can contain entire genes, and in at least 14 instances they
overlapped with disease loci.
-

Project 1, Grant Application, Line 331
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The location of the disease locus within the region between [] and [] was
further supported by multi-point linkage analysis (data not shown).
-

Project 2, Paper 2, Line 100

While the [condition] phenotype is largely restricted to the [body part], with
some exceptions, the [condition] phenotype affects a broader range of []
elements.
-

Project 2, Paper 1, Line 202

Like “disease individual” these phrases transform their subject based on the purpose or
interest of the authors. In each case a new single concept is formed from two. In some
cases, this combination may be usefully informative. In others, the resulting meshed
concept may unintentionally confuse, mislead, or harm.

Insofar as conceptual meshing functions to create neologisms, it should be expected and
perhaps embraced in research settings. The very nature of research is to generate new
ideas, which will not have been named before. Conceptual meshing is a mechanism that
can name these new ideas while retaining known terminology. “Disease mutation” may
be a perfect example of this usage. Mutations in the human genome are tremendously
common and mostly harmless. However, medical research is only concerned with those
that cause injury or “disease”. Therefore, the meshed concept of “disease mutation” may
be helpful and descriptive.
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However, the phrase “disease mutation” remains at least somewhat problematic. This
phrase still must be recognized as newly coined and therefore without a widely known
definition. “Disease mutation” could mean any number of things. Does a “disease
mutation” necessarily cause a disease, or can it just be associated with that disease? Does
the link between disease and mutation have to be scientifically proven, or can it just be
reasonably conjectured? Newly coined, undefined combinations create potential gaps in
communication between researcher and research participants, and even among
researchers.

More important is the recognition that such phrases represent the beliefs and goals of
their authors and should not be taken as objective truths. This point is well illustrated by
considering the well-known example of sickle cell disease. Simplified, sickle cell disease
occurs when an individual has two copies of the “sickle cell mutation”. When only one
mutation is present, the condition is called “sickle cell trait”, and normally does not have
negative health impacts, but interestingly is protective against malaria. In this scenario,
how are we supposed to understand the phrase “disease mutation”? A single mutation is
actually protective against disease. Therefore, some individuals might want to call this a
“health mutation”. Others may wish to just not label it at all.

Finally, by meshing the concept of disease to a mutation, we must recognize the potential
of our language to cause harm. In describing scenarios like sickle cell disease, such a
combination may just be confusing. However, in other situations this language intimately
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ties disease to an element of an individual, masking the possibility that such an individual
may not see himself as being diseased (Shakespeare 1999).

The conceptually meshed “disease gene” is even more problematic. While “disease gene”
is a very common phrase, both in these documents and within the wider scientific and lay
literature, it is a perplexing phrase (Conrad and Weinberg 1996). The concept “gene”
simply describes a stretch of DNA responsible for encoding a specific RNA molecule
(Passarge 2007). Strictly speaking, we all have the same genes. It is our alleles – specific
subsets of DNA order within a gene – that vary. It is difficult, therefore, to interpret the
meshed “disease gene”. The gene is present in every individual, yet there exists no
disease that we would attribute to everyone. Therefore, the meshed “disease gene” must
take on a meaning that is distinct from the definitions of its individual components.24

The meshing of disease and gene is so prevalent in these documents that long before the
phenomenon of conceptual meshing was noticed, an entire category was dedicated to
exploring the phrase ‘the X gene’. Whenever possible, it seems that genes are named
after – or meshed with – a disease or trait or physical characteristic. It occurs extensively
in scientific and lay literature (Torres 2002). However, the impact and meaning of this
language is not entirely clear.

24

If the definition of “disease gene” is not limited in some way by its components, then it is also fair to
assume that “disease individual” could take on definitions that are removed from our common
understandings of “disease” and “individual”, further complicating our understanding of a “disease
individual”.
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Aside from being conceptually flawed, the combination of a specific disease name with a
gene is troubling for other reasons. Most genes are associated with many possible
phenotypes, and all phenotypes are dependent on more than just a single gene. What,
then, is the significance of a “disease gene”?

As an example, let us consider the well-known ‘breast cancer gene’. The first conceptual
difficulty is that only a small minority of breast cancer cases are related to the ‘breast
cancer gene’ (Balmana, Diez et al. 2009). The conceptually meshed ‘breast cancer gene’
seems to imply a more generalized role. Such a combination emphasizes the genetic
theory of disease, at the expense of other theories, and may give potential research
participants the impression that genetic research is the best, or only means available to
investigate cancer. Indeed, it has already been argued that this misconception has
substantially influenced funding decisions, explaining the vast sums that have been spent
on the Human Genome Project, at the expense of other areas of research (Wilson 2001).

The emphasis on one specific disease may also be troubling. There are actually two well
recognized ‘breast cancer genes’ (National Center for Biotechnology Information 2008).
The BRCA2 (short for breast cancer 2, early onset) gene is one of these two genes. There
is no doubt that certain alleles of this gene can cause early onset breast cancer. However,
the complexity of the term ‘breast cancer gene’ is evident when one considers that the
same gene has also been linked to prostate cancer (Giusti 2003), pancreatic cancer
(Murphy 2002), Wilm’s tumor (a childhood kidney cancer) (Reid 2005),
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medullablastoma (a brain cancer) (Reid 2005, 2008), and Fanconi’s anemia (a rare, fatal
blood disease) (Alter, Rosenberg et al. 2007).

The phrase “disease gene” makes a strong and potentially misleading statement about the
relationship between genetics and disease. The two are fundamentally linked. Genes are
made part of disease, and disease part of genes. Many worry that the public’s adoption of
a genetic framework of disease is oversimplified and extended beyond its scientific basis
(Lippman 1992, Conrad 1999, Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). Although disease is the result
of a complex interplay of many factors, such as social and physical environments,
economics, personal behaviors, and available health services, genetic explanations are
increasingly eclipsing all others (Lippman 1991, Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). This
simplification to and hype of genetic causes has been extensively noted in media
representations of genetics (Petersen 2001, White 2001, Bubela and Caulfield 2004).
White (2001) argues that geneticists rely on “genohype” to drive their funding and foster
these representations through public relations departments and press releases.25 “Disease
gene” is an extreme example of this genetic oversimplification, in which disease and gene
are combined into a single, inseparable concept. When adopted by scientists and funding
agencies, an oversimplified genetic framework of disease privileges genetic research over
all other approaches (Lippman 1991, Wilson 2001, Miller, Begbie et al. 2006). When
adopted by physicians and patients, such thinking may compromise care and lead to
‘genetic fatalism’ (Crosseley 2002).

25

The language of press releases from genetics studies is an interesting area for future study.
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The use of the conceptually meshed “disease gene” in informed consent documents
fosters a potentially faulty understanding of health and disease that may over-emphasize
the potential benefits of the research being conducted. A “disease gene” causes disease. It
is simple and straightforward. It is something that should be studied. By masking the
multitude of other contributors and therefore other approaches that may be considered to
treatment and research, the language of “disease gene” may be falsely enticing research
participants into genetic studies.

Summary of conceptual meshing
Conceptual meshing is ubiquitous in scientific literature and everyday language alike, and
is often unremarkable. It is a tool of language that combines distinct concepts into single
novel entities. That conceptual meshing is ubiquitous in the English language likely
indicates its importance.26 It provides flexibility, innovation, and control over the ideas
we express. Its prevalence also indicates that conceptual meshing is generally
comprehensible.

However, the examples of conceptual meshing explored here illustrate the complexity of
this linguistic combination. As is the case with “disease individual”, the combinations are
often novel and open to a variety of interpretations. Familiarity with the individual terms,
by both the author and the audience, can mask this novelty and therefore mask the need
for explicit definitions. Authors and audience may interpret these phrases differently,
creating a gap in language that would weaken informed consent and scientific
communication.
26

It is unclear whether conceptual meshing is also used in other languages.
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As we saw with “disease gene” and “disease mutation”, interpretations of meshed phrases
can be very complex. In some settings, meshed phrases seem contradictory – such as
describing the sickle cell allele as a “disease mutation” when it can actually be protective.
Other times, the phrase seems arbitrary, choosing to name a gene after one disease out of
a multitude that can be caused. Indeed, as we saw with “disease gene”, the new concept
may differ so drastically from the meaning of the components as to cast doubt on any real
connection.
Conceptual meshing instills the values and goals of the author into the language.
Depending on the needs of the authors, we saw individuals variably meshed with
diseases, places, research roles, and other individuals. Similarly, genes, mutations, and
tissues could all be intimately linked with a specific disease to emphasize the importance
of the research being described.

The impacts of such language are not immediately clear, but are potentially significant.
Meshing genetic concepts to disease supports a genetic framework of disease that may be
extended beyond its scientific scope. This link could influence research and funding
decisions, as well as research participants’ informed choice. Perhaps more concerning are
the potential implications of meshing “disease” and “individual”. The phrase “disease
individual” diminishes individuality and may be seen as pejorative by the intended
audience of these documents.

The true implications of conceptual meshing cannot be assessed in this study, as I have
not assessed the intended meanings of authors, nor the actual interpretations of the
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readers. I believe the examples used here illustrate a linguistic formulation that, by
concealing its novelty, may unintentionally result in confusion when used in informed
consent documents. Furthermore, although unintended, the potential for harm exists if the
language is interpreted as pejorative by the intended audience of these documents. It is
evident to me that the scientists who contributed their documents to this research do not
intend to harm or to confuse. However, it is also not clear how these meshed concepts are
intended to be understood. The next step will be to explore these phrases with involved
stakeholders.
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DISCUSSION
There is a potential gap in communication when discussing genetics, health, and disease,
in that the same words, when used by different individuals, can have different meanings.
Therefore, understanding is not ensured simply through a shared lexicon. Previously,
discussion of miscommunication in science and medicine has focused on unfamiliar
language or jargon, based on the assumption that the use of ‘plain language’ would
improve understanding (Stableford and Mettger 2007). In essence, this approach
attributes misunderstanding to the use of two different languages: ‘medical or scientific
English’ versus ‘plain English’ (Stead, Eadie et al. 2005). The primary observation of this
study was that miscommunication can occur – and may even be more likely to occur –
despite everyone using the same language.

Because of its primacy in our lives, we tend to think of language as objective. We assume
others will understand what we say, in the way we intend be understood. However, the
meanings of words change with time, place, and context (Wittgenstein 1968, Speed
2006). New understandings are neither instantly adopted, nor mutually exclusive.
Therefore, different groups will use words differently, with the consequence, or perhaps
intention, of not being fully understood by other groups (Holmes 2001, Speed 2006).

Individual experiences, beliefs, and goals shape understanding (Wittgenstein 1968,
Holmes 2001). The word “diabetes” will be understood differently by the scientist who
has spent decades researching the condition, than by the individual who has spent
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decades living with it, than by the person with no prior experience of diabetes. Even
within these broad groups, understandings of words and phrases will vary.

It was this vast spectrum of possible interpretations that made the language of these
documents so complex. The individual words were not esoteric, unfamiliar, or overly
technical. In fact, because the language was so common and apparently simple,
difficulties in comprehension were often not appreciated on initial readings. However,
upon reflection it became evident that, despite the ease of reading, the authors’ thoughts
remained unclear; key concepts remained undefined. The language’s complexity was
initially masked by an aura of familiarity. The very possibility of miscommunication was
hidden by the apparent simplicity of the language.

Language that is familiar, but which allows many possible interpretations cannot easily
convey new ideas. The author’s novel ideas are obscured by the readers’ preexisting
understandings. Thus, when familiar language is used to describe complex genetics
concepts, previously held ideas are unlikely to be changed. Unfortunately, general
understanding of medical, scientific, and genetics concepts is poor (Waggoner and Mayo
1995, Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999, Corrigan 2003, Miller, Begbie et al. 2006). The genetic
framework, based on prediction and probability, is complex and non-intuitive (Issa 2002,
ten Have 2003, Bhutta 2004). Concepts that are essential to genetics conversations, such
as inheritance, susceptibility, and relative risk, are poorly understood by the general
public (Erby, Roter et al. 2008). Therefore, the use of such language is likely to create a
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gap in understanding. However, this gap might remain unrecognized because the
language used to describe these concepts is familiar and appears simple.

This apparent language gap widens in the context of genetics research when, as was
commonly seen in the studied documents, common concepts are redefined in unusual or
confusing ways in the context of genetics research. Families were described as single
coherent entities, capable of having characteristics and diseases. Illness was redefined so
that individuals could be diagnosed and labeled despite having no outward indications of
disease. Individuals became entwined with concepts such as disease, location, and
research role, to create novel and poorly defined entities. The concepts changed, but the
words remained the same, resulting in an invisible obstacle to clear communication.

Changing definitions of health, disease, and normalcy in the context of genetics have
previously been recognized (Issa 2002, ten Have 2003, Cox and Starzomski 2004,
Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). Genetic testing creates “presymptomatic” or “potential
patients”, who have genes, but may never become sick (Bayertz 1998, ten Have 2003).
Genetics also creates entirely new categories of disease, in which classic symptoms never
develop. For example, pharmacogenetics – the field of study that relates genetics to the
efficacy of drug therapies – has the potential to create a new, subclinical classification of
disease, in which individuals with a genetically decreased response to a medication are
seen as ill (Issa 2002). The meanings and understandings of these new, poorly-defined
genetics-impacted concepts are often markedly different from those that are still
commonly employed outside of genetics (Cox, Burger et al. 2002, Mykitiuk and Nisker
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2010). Thus, a significant language gap could easily exist between those working in
genetics and the individuals with whom they interact, including patients and research
participants.

Beneath the veil of familiarity, the language of the studied documents was complex.
Many words and phrases had the potential for multiple interpretations. Neither the
authors’ intended meanings nor the potential research participants’ likely understandings
were clear. The primary source of this confusion appeared to be language that was vague
and variable.

Vague language is ubiquitous in all communication. The general meaning of a word can
be known without knowledge of a precise definition. For example, everyone understands
the word “love”, but would likely be challenged to provide a specific definition. Other
words are just inherently vague, in that they describe relative rather than absolute
concepts. In informed consent documents, such ambiguous terminology can lead to
miscommunication. The words “rare” and “common” are used to describe frequency, but
despite the seemingly simple meanings of these words, interpretations will vary. Rare to
one individual will mean ten percent, while another will picture one in a billion
(Sutherland, Lockwood et al. 1991, Beardsley, Jefford et al. 2007). Similarly,
interpretations of severity words, such as “mild”, “moderate”, and “severe”, vary
enormously even though the words are well known (Wertz and Knoppers 2002,
Beardsley, Jefford et al. 2007, Burgess 2007). In these documents, the descriptions of
causation, causative agents, and phenotypes were superficially straightforward, but
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ultimately ambiguous. The words were comprehensible, and therefore unremarkable, but
lacked a clear definition.

Vague terminology is presumably unavoidable. As the definition of any word is
developed through shared understandings within a group of language users, differing
patterns of usage and differing life experiences will lead to varying interpretations of the
same word (Wittgenstein 1968). Minor differences in understanding are often
unimportant or can be compensated for through the context of usage. For example,
although the definition of “car” may or may not encompass vehicles such as minivans
and pick-up trucks, the statement “get in the car” is perfectly comprehensible when
standing next to a single vehicle with its door open. On the other hand, when making the
complex decision about participation in genetics research, the unintentional use of vague
terminology in descriptions of core concepts is obviously problematic.

If every word is potentially vague, vague words cannot be blamed for miscommunication.
In situations when precision is important, key concepts must be defined. Definitions
provide the audience with access to the author’s intended meanings, and therefore allow
for the identification of potential discrepancies in understanding. However, the studied
documents were completely devoid of definitions, despite discussing complex genetic
theories that seemed to fundamentally transform understandings of health and disease.

The importance of defining jargon and complex scientific terminology is well recognized
(Makoul 2001, Stead, Eadie et al. 2005, Stableford and Mettger 2007). However, the
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language that caused confusion in these documents was generally plain and familiar.
Plain, but vague language is open to many interpretations, but this ambiguity is easily
overlooked because the words are familiar. The data suggests that these familiar words
are also unlikely to be defined or explained by the authors, presumably as a consequence
of their familiarity. Therefore, each potential research participant will develop his or her
own understandings, without recognizing other possible interpretations, resulting in the
potential for unrecognized miscommunication.

My analysis also suggests that understanding can be impeded by inconsistent word
choice. I had anticipated that many core concepts would not be explicitly defined in these
documents, but had assumed that clues to the authors’ intended meanings would be
present in the context of their use. In other words, I had planned on developing contextual
definitions by comparing and contrasting the manner in which words were used.
However, words appeared to be used interchangeably, without obvious pattern, making it
impossible to guess at the authors’ intended meanings.

The exceedingly variable word choice that was encountered evoked the image of an
author immersed in a thesaurus. However, the words used are complex, and it is not clear
that they truly represent synonyms. What was referred to in one sentence as a “disease”
would be, in the next sentence a “disorder”, a “malformation”, or a “syndrome”. The
same condition would be caused by a “mutation”, a “gene”, multiple “genes”, “proteins”,
or “genetic factors”. This variability made it difficult to define the individual words, and
also obscured the general concept that these words were meant to describe.
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In the process of writing up my results, I gained a better understanding of the
phenomenon of variable language use. The nature of the data that I was presenting meant
that my writing was, in places, very repetitive. I recurrently used the same phrases to
introduce quoted material. I also attempted to limit my impact on the presented data and
to avoid potentially pejorative terms by remaining consistent in my use of certain
genetics-related terms. For example, I elected to use the word “condition” for all
descriptions of phenotypes and disease processes. The resulting repetitive language felt
elementary, bland, and awkward – especially in a graduate thesis. I was incredibly
tempted to vary my word choice. I cringed whenever the same word was used in
subsequent sentences. I didn’t want my writing to bore. More importantly, I was
cognizant of the fact that my work would be judged as a representation of my academic
career. As such, I felt obliged to display a considerable lexicon to prove my erudition and
demonstrate that I belonged in the academic community.

I do not doubt that varied language use makes writing more interesting, but it comes with
a cost. This study suggests that when words are used interchangeably, each word loses
meaning. Instead of denoting multiple unique but related ideas, the words all adopt the
same ambiguous sense. Words that in some contexts may have specific technical
definitions, such as “gene”, become blurred with less specific concepts. The result can be
confusing and difficult to follow. It is unclear when multiple words are used whether the
authors of informed consent documents intend them to be understood as distinct or as
referring to the same concept. Is the “disease” mentioned here the same as the “disorder”
mentioned there?
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Variable word choice probably also reduces the likelihood that clarification of unclear
meaning will be sought. When a single word is not understood, we might expect potential
research participants to seek clarification. However, I imagine that many individuals
would be hesitant to ask for definitions of multiple words, and therefore may not ask at
all. Moreover, when a single word is used repeatedly, it is likely to draw the attention of
potential research participants and indicate a key concept. When many different words
are used to refer to the same concept, it is less likely to be noticed.

The reason for the use of particular words and phrases is a fundamental determinant of
their appropriateness. For example, vague and variable language may enhance the
overall aesthetic and multiple meanings of a poem. Poets want their readers to emote,
speculate, and be inspired. On the other hand, inconsistent and vague language is
detrimental to consent documents, whose purpose is to inform, clarify complex concepts,
and empower choices.

In addition to the vague and variable language noted above, a few specific language uses
were identified that seem to contribute disproportionately to the language gap between
researcher and potential research participant. Jargon, or highly technical terminology, has
previously been noted as a source of medical miscommunication (Makoul 2001, Farrell,
Deuster et al. 2008). However in medicine, and particularly in genetics, there may be a
subset of language that has a specific scientific meaning, but also a common, nontechnical usage, and therefore might not be recognized as jargon. Words like “gene”,
“mutation”, “carrier”, and “linked” all have precise meanings in genetics, but are used
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differently in everyday language. Similarly, specific disease titles, such as “diabetes” or
“cancer”, have medical definitions that do not necessarily match those of common
parlance. These differing definitions are hidden within a single word that remains
unchanged no matter what the intended meaning.

The linguistic formulation that I have called “conceptual meshing” may also significantly
contribute to the language gap. My data suggests that, unlike traditional neologisms, a
conceptually meshed neologism is unlikely to be defined, as each individual word is
familiar and therefore the combination does not appear to require definition. However,
although the authors of consent documents using this novel combination have an intended
meaning, that meaning may be unclear to the reader. Indeed, as frequently occurred with
me, the reader is unlikely to recognize the meshed term as novel or requiring
clarification. The result is an unintended gap in language and a potential for
miscommunication.

Another contributor to the language gap is the difference between the language used in
information letters and consent and that used in grant applications. Some specific
examples were noted. “Disease individual” was only found in grant applications, never in
consent documents. In project 2 we saw “the gene” in the consent form become “gene(s)”
in the grant application. Many condition titles, such as “malformation” and “disorder”,
were conspicuously absent from documents intended for research participants. However,
the difference is far more than these specific examples, and far more difficult to describe.
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Essentially, consent documents seemed relatively simple while grant applications caused
confusion and provoked anxiety.

It is not surprising that the language of grant applications and consent forms differ. The
target audiences are different, and there is great emphasis on writing consent documents
in plain and elementary language (Hammerschmidt and Keane 1992, Goldstein, Frasier et
al. 1996, Hochhauser 1997, Stableford and Mettger 2007, Baevsky 2008, Jefford and
Moore 2008). However, there is a risk in attempting to simplify the language of consent
documents: once language has been changed, it may no longer say the same thing. If
“disease individual” and “malformation” were important terms in explaining research to
funding bodies, might they not also be important in explanations to potential research
participants? As each group is only exposed to the documents intended for them, the
differences in language are invisible; there is an undetectable language gap.

Impacts on informed consent
Based on my observations, informed consent is fundamentally about communication.
Language is used to promote understanding and request consent. Language must
therefore be clear and descriptive, as any miscommunication will weaken the foundation
of informed consent. Previous literature examining language in informed consent has
tended to focus on difficult language or jargon as barriers to understanding (for example:
(Waggoner and Sherman 1997, Davis, Holcombe et al. 1998, Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999,
Coyne, Xu et al. 2003, Stead, Eadie et al. 2005)). The language observed here highlights
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a different problem in the unrecognized miscommunication that can occur when common
words are understood differently by different individuals.

Any impediment to comprehension is problematic for informed consent. However, this
analysis has led me to the observation that common but ambiguous language may present
a larger obstacle than language that is esoteric or unknown. Although scientific jargon
may not be understood, the potential research participant at least appreciates that it is
unfamiliar, allowing it to be identified and clarification to be sought. On the other hand,
the words discussed here were generally common and therefore unlikely to draw
attention. Potential research participants are not prompted to seek clarification and the
author is also unlikely to recognize the need for definition. This potential language gap is
like a game of ‘broken telephone’ with everyone speaking English, but the message not
transmitted, whereas the use of jargon is like a conversation between one individual who
speaks only English and another who speaks only French - the miscommunication is clear
(Stead, Eadie et al. 2005).

It is unclear how the common but vague language used in these documents will be
interpreted by potential research participants. The authors provide no definitions and
there are no signals to the potential participants that a novel meaning is intended.
Therefore, the potential research participants’ prior understandings are likely to be
retained. For example, when the authors of these documents discuss “family”, the reader
will recognize the word and interpret it as always, even though the intended meaning may
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be novel. Thus, this language may promote retention of previously held ideas and
interfere with informed choice.

In promoting the retention of previously formed ideas, the language gap also allows
potentially inappropriate factors to influence understanding. Pre-existing bias and
misunderstandings are not addressed. This is especially problematic in genetics research.
The field of genetics is extensively discussed in the media, and depictions tend to “hype”
genetics, overstating the capabilities of current medical technology (Petersen 2001, White
2001, Bubela and Caulfield 2004). Therefore, potential research participants may have
skewed understandings of the benefits of genetic research, which would be reinforced by
language that allows them to develop their own interpretations.

The language gap between researcher and potential research participants is obviously
problematic for informed consent, but the solution is not straightforward. When jargon is
the source of miscommunication, the problematic terms are relatively easy to identify and
define. When the issue is vague but common language, almost every word could be
considered for definition. There is a risk that one could over-reach, defining too many
concepts, and rendering consent forms unbearably long and burdened with unreadable
‘legalese’. Such a consent form is likely to be discarded rather than read, and is therefore
of no value to the informed choice process.

On the other hand, some concepts must be defined if informed consent is going to truly
inform. Presently, the best balance between ambiguity and precision is not clear. It seems
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evident that concepts central to the research ought to be defined. In genetics, for example,
it seems that “causation”, “gene”, “health”, “disease”, and “family” represent a few core
concepts that would warrant definition. Unfortunately, however, there is no clear
mechanism that identifies concepts requiring definition. Words that seem obvious to the
authors may be understood differently by the audience. Some concepts requiring
definition can probably be identified by the researchers, perhaps with the help of a
research ethics board, and we should strive to ensure these definitions are provided.
However, I believe the ideal approach will have to involve feedback from primary
stakeholders, who could be involved in the process of developing informed consent
documents and helping to identify language gaps in advance.

That varying understandings of common words could impact informed consent is a
concept that I have not found discussed elsewhere. Thus, we should not expect that the
authors of consent documents would take such variability into account. Although I have
stated that such language may entice participation in genetics research, I do not wish to
imply that researchers are manipulating their research participants. These researchers
voluntarily participated in this ethics project. They are highly respected clinicians with
their patients’ and research participants’ best interests at heart. They have labored to
describe their research in simple and recognizable language. However, this analysis has
demonstrated that because simple language can provoke numerous interpretations,
miscommunication may still be possible. Therefore, potential research participants may
be enticed into participation not through the actions of the researchers, but as a
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consequence of differing beliefs and values being expressed using indistinguishable
words.

Social impacts of genetics language and the language gap
The science of genetics has undoubtedly improved understanding of many conditions,
leading to better communication among scientists, physicians, and patients, and
potentially helping in decisions about prevention, screening, and treatment. However,
considerable concerns have been raised about the impacts of genetics and society, many
of which arise from questions of definition (Lippman 1991, Lippman 1992, Conrad and
Gabe 1999, Shakespeare 1999, Wilson 2001, Knoppers and Chadwick 2005, Miller,
Begbie et al. 2006, Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). Ought condition X be defined by
genetics, or is it better defined in terms of social determinants of health? Is condition Y
really a “disease” or just part of the normal spectrum of health? Should an individual be
defined and labeled just because they possess a specific mutation, gene, or physical
attribute?

Through this analysis I recognized the rather evident fact that the authors of research
documents have definitional control over key concepts, such as health, disease, and
normalcy. In the studied documents, several basic concepts were noted to be redefined in
unusual ways. “Illness” did not require signs or symptoms. Genetic relationships became
a requisite for “families”. Through the use of the phrase “disease gene”, the authors
fundamentally redefine disease as a genetic process. The definitional power of the author
is represented in its extreme in the meshed concept “disease individual”. This phrase

193
combines a single characteristic with the essence of an individual. The author claims the
power to choose a potentially trivial feature, and make it an essential component of one’s
identity.

The consequences of definitional power are potentially profound. In the phrase “disease
individual”, the author characterizes an individual by a trait of the author’s choosing,
allowing a single trait to synechdochically represent the entire person (Parens and Asch
1999). This language could debase one’s self worth and fundamentally change how one is
viewed by others. It sets a tone of social acceptability (Rothstein 1991). Furthermore, it
could alter personal and societal views on responsibility and blame for health conditions
(Rothstein and Billings 1992, Crosseley 2002).

The redefinition of “family” based on genetic rather than social relationships could also
have significant impacts. Individuals without specific mutations or diseases may have
difficulty claiming membership in “disease families”. The language used could alter
individuals’ understandings of their relationships by promoting the view that some bonds
are more legitimate than others (Burgess 2001, Cox and Starzomski 2004, Holtzman
2008). This language also reinforces stigma surrounding childlessness, adoption, and
infertility (Holtzman 2008). Finally, the genetic definitions promoted could have
significant consequences for family law (Caulfield 2002, Holtzman 2008, Pioro 2008).

Similarly, defining disease as fundamentally genetic has significant social impacts. Other
factors that influence health and disease, such as social and physical environments,
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economics, personal behaviours, and available health services are ignored by this
definition (Lippman 1991, Conrad and Gabe 1999, Mykitiuk and Nisker 2010). This
language could influence decision making, allowing “genetic fatalism” to become a
driving force in individual health decisions (Lippman 1992, Crosseley 2002). The use of
such language by respected researchers will reinforce the widespread “genohype” we
have already witnessed in the media (Petersen 2001, White 2001, Bubela and Caulfield
2004). The term “disease gene” implies that genetics offers the only, or the best, approach
to studying and treating disease. Thus, this language will also influence decisions to fund,
conduct, and participate in future research, potentially diverting money and resources
away from important non-genetics enterprises (Lippman 1991, Wilson 2001, Mykitiuk
and Nisker 2010).

Although I believe that the language used here illustrates the tremendous power that can
be associated with language choice, I do not believe the authors are deliberately using
language this way. In fact, given the subtle ways in which language’s power is
manifested, I imagine the authors were unaware of the potential social implications of
their words. The definitional power that I believe these authors possess is not about
choosing one advantageous meaning amongst many, but rather using a word without
recognizing that it may have different meanings.

The existence of multiple understandings of concepts like health, disease, and normalcy
is not intrinsically problematic. In fact, the multiplicity of understandings is probably
beneficial when acknowledged and exploited as a source of creativity and balance in
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medical research and health promotion. However, a concerning language gap can develop
when certain definitions are allowed to dominate while other are ignored.

In these documents, the language of health was distinctly focused on genetics. Although a
substantial body of literature finds fault with using genetics alone to define health and
disease, these dissenting views are neither accessible to the audience through these
documents, nor are they widely acknowledged or presented in the media. Therefore,
potential research participants may be unaware that more than one definition of health
and disease exists.

Even when multiple definitions are acknowledged, certain definitions may dominate,
isolating minority views. Definitions develop through shared understandings within a
group of language users. Broader understanding is the result of one group’s definition
winning out over others. In this way, definitions can become dominant because of the
authority of a group of language users rather than any intrinsic value or sense in the
language itself (Wittgenstein 1968, Holmes 2001). As a society, we value doctors and
scientists as authority figures. As such, there is a risk that we may accept the genetic
definitions used here as objectively and authoritatively true, instead of one of many
possibilities.

That one view of health and disease is dominant in these documents is not problematic.
The authors do not conceal other beliefs, they simply write with their own inherent and
unrecognized biases – as we all do every time we use language. The potential problem
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arises when the reader is not exposed to other views, or when the familiar language
conceals the possibility that author and reader may disagree. The problem is not with the
language these scientists used, but rather with a general unawareness that words can have
different meanings for different groups of language users.

Language can be a powerful tool and accepted definition can have important emotional,
social, and legal consequences. The definitions of words are neither static nor objective.
We should anticipate that important social concepts, such as “disease” or “family”, will
be understood differently by different people. It is not problematic for groups to disagree
about definitions; in fact, it could be beneficial. However, we ought to be wary of the
power of one definition to eclipse all others and become the solely recognized, “true”
definition.

The harms of language
The capacity of language to cause harm is closely related to the power language can have
in social systems. Language forms a foundation of social acceptability, and inappropriate
words can set the stage for harms. Words can scare, isolate, and dehumanize (Rothstein
1991, Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005, Nisker and Daar 2006). Unfortunately, potentially
but unintentionally harmful or pejorative language was seen throughout these documents.

Language can be offensive because of its inherent negativity and devaluation of
characteristics that an individual does not have, but rather is (Shakespeare 1999, Byron,
Cockshott et al. 2005). The inherent negativity of “risk” is an example that was
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frequently seen. Other words, such as “disease”, “disorder”, and “malformation”, have
likewise been classified as offensive and were frequently used here (Hodgson, Hughes et
al. 2005). The word “mutation” is an example of language that is harmful because of its
associated imagery (Condit, Archer et al. 2002, Condit, Dubriwny et al. 2004, Hodgson,
Hughes et al. 2005). Finally, in allowing potentially trivial characteristics to stand for
individuals, some observed language usages may debase a person’s intrinsic value
(Parens and Asch 1999). This was seen with the interchangeable use of “disease” and
“phenotype”, the discussion of “characterizing” individuals by their traits, and the use of
disease names to refer to people. Similarly, but perhaps more concerning, is the phrase
“disease individual” that fundamentally combines the individual with a disease,
presumably diminishing any other aspects of his individuality.

The capacity of any individual word to cause harm was amplified by the interchangeable
use of language. By simple probabilities, highly variable language increases the chance
that pejorative language will be used. However, more troubling is the single common
sense that all words adopt when used interchangeably. “Disease” is generally seen as a
negative concept, and is therefore potentially pejorative in genetics, whereas “condition”
is not (Hodgson, Hughes et al. 2005). However, in the studied documents, these terms
were used interchangeably. The result is that both probably assume an offensive tone.
Furthermore, the overall language may seem negative, as the author does not recognize
any difference between these concepts.
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One of the biggest challenges I faced in understanding the language of these documents
was reconciling the language I observed with the stated goals of the documents and their
authors. The language could be potentially harmful, but it was coming from a source that
I am certain did not want to cause harm. These documents are written by doctors and
medical researchers – individuals who spend their lives trying to help people. The studied
documents were voluntarily contributed for analysis by scientists who, in participating,
obviously value ethics and informed consent. The research grants were designed with the
goal of improving health for the very people that the language appears to harm.

The solution to this apparent conflict, I believe, lies in the language gap. Words that
appear innocuous to the author are potentially interpreted as harmful by the audience. The
author uses these words without ever being aware of the other possible meanings. The
harm is unintentional. I remember writing many grade school history papers blissfully
unaware that my use of “Indian” or “Eskimo” was highly offensive. Similarly, I was
shocked to see that the word “disease” was considered pejorative by some (Hodgson,
Hughes et al. 2005). In medicine, I have used this word every day, and it was an immense
struggle (that I have probably failed) to eliminate it from this document. Like me, I
imagine that the respected scientists who authored these documents were never aware of
this alternate understanding of “disease”. Thus, the language gap does not just cause
miscommunication, but it may also cause harm.
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Potential Limitations
A potential limitation of this study is that only written language was analyzed. Written
documents only represent a subset of the communication that is involved in the informed
choice process. Potential research participants are provided with verbal information by
the clinical research coordinator, and are provided with the opportunity to ask questions.
Information letters and consent forms are provided as consistent and lasting sources of
key information. Unlike clinical interactions, consent documents are reviewed many
times, by their authors as well as research ethics boards, before being presented to
potential research participants. Consequently, the language is more carefully selected
than is possible in verbal conversation. Furthermore, informed consent documents are
written with multiple goals, and heavily influenced by legal concerns, which may create
unnatural or confusing language that would not be used in verbal conversation.

Written documents were primarily chosen because of their enduring nature, which allows
them to be studied much more easily than clinical conversations. However, written
documents are likely good representations of the general lexicon of an author and the
general content of informed consent. The information provided during verbal consent is
similar to that in written documents, although it is much more variable (Bjorn, Rossel et
al. 1999, Sankar 2004). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the word choice seen here
would be mostly mirrored in clinical encounters. If anything, problems recognized in
formal, polished written language are likely to be magnified in informal, uncensored
clinical conversations.
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Although my focus was the impacts of language on informed consent, the language that
was analyzed and presented was drawn from a large variety of documents, including
many that would not be available to potential research participants. Indeed, several
language usages that were presented as potentially harmful or confusing were never
found on information letters or consent forms. Thus, the relevance to informed choice of
observations based on this language may be questioned.

I believe that the inclusion of research documents other than the information letter and
consent form was essential to this analysis. The observation that language differed
between consent documents, grant applications, and published papers increased the
relevance of the language that was not seen by potential research participants. It
illustrates the potential language gap between the researcher and potential research
participant. It raises the question of why some words are used in one context while other
words are used in another. Furthermore, the use of such language in any document
illustrates that it is part of the author’s lexicon, and therefore may be expected to arise in
encounters with potential research participants.

Another important limitation of this study, which has been discussed throughout, is the
lack of involvement of both researchers and potential research participants. The
interpretations, therefore, represent only those of the analysts, and are not related to the
intended meanings of the authors or the actual interpretations of potential research
participants. However, the inductive research done here is an important first step that
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identifies potentially troubling usages of language, which can later be more fully explored
with researchers and potential research participants.

I must emphasize that the possible interpretations depicted here do not represent the
intended meanings of the authors. I have focused on language with the potential to
confuse or harm because of its importance for informed choice, but I do not believe that
the authors intentionally used harmful or confusing language. These authors voluntarily
sent me their documents for analysis. Furthermore, the consent forms would have been
reviewed by local research ethics boards, and therefore others had previously been
deemed the language appropriate. This apparent contradiction is explained by the
language gap that can result from the multiple potential and unintended interpretations of
language.

Finally, I must mention the general limitations of qualitative methodology. These are not
truly limitations, but rather assumptions inherent to the qualitative paradigm. The results
presented here are not generalizable to other research settings, but inductive descriptions
of language use, rather than generalizability, was the goal of this research. Neither are the
results objective, as the subjectivity of the researcher is an inherent component of the
research (Lincoln and Guba 1985, Catanzaro 1988, Altheide 1996, Berg 2007). This
study represents an important, initial exploration of informed choice language that
inductively developed themes that will hopefully be examined further to determine their
applicability in other research settings, their meaning in this particular research setting,
and their true impact on informed consent.
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Future directions
Language develops meaning only through the shared understandings of its users
(Wittgenstein 1968). This study examined the language in documents, but never directly
involved those who use the documents to communicate. Therefore, although I can
describe language use, I cannot portray the authors’ intended meanings or the
interpretations of the audience. I have described being confused by many words with
unclear meaning and variable use. I have highlighted terms that appear to assume new
meanings in the context of genetics. I have indicated some language that could cause
harm. However, it is not clear that this language actually confuses the intended audience,
that it is the basis of any miscommunication, or that it causes any real harm. The nature
and extent of a language gap cannot be established without the involvement of both the
authors of the documents and their intended audience.

A true understanding of the language gap and the impacts of language on informed
consent will require an appreciation of the use and understanding of language by the
involved communities. In genetics, these communities include patients, their families,
research participants, researchers, doctors and other health care providers, parents and
potential parents, individuals living with genetic conditions or born using genetic
technologies, and individuals hoping to use such technologies. Through shared
experiences and connected social networks, each group will develop collective
understandings of words like health, disease, and normalcy. Understandings will vary
among groups, either on the basis of unnoticed differences in life experiences or as the
result of more cognizant shared beliefs (Wittgenstein 1968, Holmes 2001, Stead, Eadie et
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al. 2005). The in-depth interview based research that will be required to appreciate such
differences in language use and understanding was an anticipated future step from the
outset of this project.27

However, before interpretations of language can be explored, one must first determine the
language of interest. Inductive qualitative research is essential when approaching a topic
anew. It allows for novel insight and hypothesis development that is grounded in data.
Previous research on language use in informed consent has focused on complicated
scientific topics, complex language, or jargon as sources of miscommunication. Analysis
of documents has therefore focused on classifying and quantifying previously identified
problematic language (Waggoner and Sherman 1997, Davis, Holcombe et al. 1998,
Bjorn, Rossel et al. 1999, Coyne, Xu et al. 2003, Stead, Eadie et al. 2005). On the other
hand, the inductive methodology of qualitative content analysis provided the opportunity
to recognize the language gap – a potentially significant obstacle to informed consent that
I have not seen described elsewhere. Numerous specific language usages were identified
as potential sources of a language gap, the meanings and understandings of which can
now be explored in further detail with the various interested groups of language users.

I have focused on the gap in language that may occur when different groups interpret the
same words differently. In the examples I have provided, it is possible that a true
language gap does not exist. That is, despite the spectrum of possible interpretations, both

27

How do researchers describe a “disease individual”? How do research participants react to this term? Indepth, structured interviews with all key populations of language users about each problematic language
usage described here will be necessary to fully understand the intended meanings, understandings, and
impacts of this language.
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researcher and potential research participant could interpret all words identically.
(Though, this seems unlikely given the numerous examples of concepts that are
dramatically altered within the framework of genetics.) However, even if a true language
gap does not exist in this case, the concept remains important, as the potential for a
language gap always exists. Whenever we communicate, especially when communication
occurs between groups with different backgrounds and life experiences, the potential for
unrecognized miscommunication exists. Thus, when precision is important, such as in the
context of informed consent to genetics research, the potential for a language gap must be
considered.

Language is the principal tool available to ensure not just informed consent in research,
but understanding in all health care interactions. The language of genetics is particularly
complex, as it incorporates the unfamiliar concepts of prediction, probability, and
heredity into health care discussions. However, the general difficulties with language
described here are probably not unique to genetics. Many medical concepts are complex
and will likely be presented with vague and variable language. Understandings of health
related terms will vary, as scientists, physicians, and patients all have different
experiences that shape their understandings. Therefore, we should anticipate that
significant language gaps might be present in all medical communication.

Conclusion
This study suggests the potential for unrecognized miscommunication, or a language gap,
in consent documents for genetic studies, but further work will be required to delineate

205
the scope, impact, and possible solutions to this problem. Meanwhile, the best approach
to avoiding miscommunication resulting from a language gap is not clear. Until we
understand more, I believe that the best approach is consistency in language use. By
limiting the number of different words used to describe key concepts, the chance of
divergent or harmful interpretations decreases. Furthermore, consistent language may act
as a signal of a concept’s significance. Rather than being overwhelmed and confused by
complex and variable language, potential research participants will be more likely to
recognize key terms, even if they are being used in novel or unfamiliar ways. This
provides the opportunity to seek clarification. Additionally, the author of the consent
document should identify key concepts at the outset, in order to ensure consistency, and
therefore will be more likely to provide explicit definitions or opportunities for
explanation.

However, consistency does not eliminate the language gap. The meanings of common
words often seem obvious. The consistent use of a word like “disease” throughout a
consent form does not guarantee that the researcher and potential research participants
agree on its meaning. However, the word is so familiar that its definition is unlikely to be
discussed. This problem can be partially rectified by identifying and defining key terms
in advance. Unfortunately, it is not prospectively obvious which words might generate a
language gap, and therefore require definition. Assessment of differences in language
interpretation requires the involvement of individuals from each different group of
language users involved. Therefore, I believe that a feedback process in document
development will prove important in diminishing the impacts of the language gap. One
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solution would be to involve primary stakeholders from the proposed community of
research participants in the writing of research documents. This would allow for the
discussion of key terms and identification of possible sources of miscommunication
before informed consent documents are used with potential research participants.

There is a lot to learn about the impacts of the language gap on communication. As we
continue to improve medical communication by favouring plain language over jargon, the
language gap may become a major source of miscommunication. Plain language is an
excellent goal, but the language gap reminds us that it may not be enough. We must
ensure that simplified language is still able to describe the complexities of science. And
we must recognize that for plain language to truly improve comprehension, individuals
must understand not just the words, but the underlying concepts.
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GLOSSARY
A glossary was a late addition to this thesis. Although I wrote about the problems that can
result from a lack of clear definitions, the task of providing definitions was daunting. I
did not know how to begin – a glossary is not a standard component of academic writing
and I had never been taught how to develop one. It wasn’t clear exactly what terms
required definitions, how they ought to be defined, and by whom.

I believe that key concepts must be defined, and that is what I will attempt to accomplish
below. However, it is important to recognize that this list was developed entirely by me. I
cannot be certain which terms may be understood differently than my intended meaning.
Ideally, the audience would be somehow involved in determining what concepts should
be defined. I believe this highlights another responsibility of the author: the need for
consistency. It is only through the consistent use of language that the audience will be
able to recognize the terms that they would like better defined.

* I have provided definitions of a number of genetics related terms. This is obviously
problematic in a project that was designed to examine the understandings and meanings
of these words in genetics research documents. I provide my definitions not as ‘the
correct definition’, nor as the definitions used within these documents. The definitions
provided here are meant to provide the reader with a sense of my understandings of
genetics, and therefore my potential biases.
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Allele*: Any subset of DNA order within a gene. Alleles are what actually represent the
differences between us at the genetic level. We all share the same genes, but
within each gene, there are many possible DNA sequences, which are called
alleles.

Anonymization: The process of removing information that could identify research
participants from presented data so that research participants remain
anonymous.

Community of language users: Any group of individuals with meaningful interactions
or shared life experiences that therefore develop a shared use of language.

Conceptual meshing: A linguistic formulation observed frequently in the studied
documents, in which two distinct concepts are combined into a single new
entity, often without clear meaning.
Definition: A method of formalizing a word’s intended meaning. When a word is
defined, each and every time that word is used it is intended to mean the same
thing.

Disease individual: A novel phrase seen here that combines disease and individual into a
single new concept without clear meaning.

Explanation: Any statement that attempts to put a complex concept into plain words.

Family*: A group of closely related individuals. I have not defined the nature of the
relationship that is required to count as family. For now, I would say that any
group of individuals that self-identifies as a family is a family.

Gene*: A stretch of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) responsible for encoding a specific
RNA (ribonucleic acid) molecule.
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Genome*: The entire collection of a single individual’s or organism’s genetic material.

Identifier: Any piece of data that could, either alone or when combined with other data,
expose the identity of a research participant.

Language: Any system used to communicate. Here, I have exclusively discussed word
based language, specifically English. However, language could also involve
other signals or gestures, such as American Sign Language.

Language gap: The divide that exists between two individuals when they use the same
language (the same words or signals) with different meanings and
understandings.

Meaning: The message or image that is intended to be conveyed by when using a word
or symbol is used.
Mutation*: Any change in the sequence of an organism’s DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid).

Phenotype*: The observable characteristics of an organism.

Understanding: The message or image that is interpreted when a word or symbol is
encountered.

Vague language: Language that can be interpreted in many different ways. Note: This
term was often used interchangeably with “ambiguous language” in these
documents.28

28

I have argued for consistency in language use throughout this paper. Ideally, I would have liked to have
used a single term to describe this concept. Unfortunately, I recognized this dual usage only after finishing
the thesis, and modification was impractical.
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The X gene or the disease gene: A frequently used phrase that combines a specific
disease name, such as cancer or diabetes, with the word gene, that lacks a clear
scientific meaning. Examples include ‘the obesity gene’, ‘the breast cancer
gene’, and ‘the cystic fibrosis gene’.
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